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Wikipedia defines cybersecurity as “the protection of computer systems 
from the and damage to their hardware, soware or information, as well as 
from  disruption or misdirection of the services they provide.” More  p recisely, 
 cybersecurity consists in ensuring three properties of  information, services, and 
IT infrastructure: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Thus, securing an 
 information system means preventing an  unauthorized entity from  accessing, 
 altering, or making unavailable  computer data, computing services, or the 
 computing infrastructure. Another increasingly important property is privacy, 
which may be seen as the confidentiality of the link between persons and data. 
Note that the terms security and safety are sometimes misused. While safety 
refers to  accidental threats, security refers to intentional threats. Security and 
safety remain quite different and well-identified domains that build on different 
hypotheses, and the protection mechanisms against accidental and intentional 
threats are usually complementary. In this white book, we restrict our attention 
to security.
The digitalization of our society is radically changing the manner in which 
computer systems are used. A huge proportion of the population is  continuously 
connected to the Internet, using an amazing number of different services. 
Simultaneously, we are permanently exposed to attacks: our sensitive data may 
be stolen, modified, or destroyed. We also live with the risk of mistakenly and 
irreversibly leaking our private information on the Internet. Companies, states 
and their critical infrastructures, which nowadays are interconnected, are also 
vulnerable. The economical and societal damage of successful cyberattacks may 
be considerable. Cybersecurity has thus become a general concern for all, citizens, 
professionals, politicians, and, more generally, all decision makers.
This book provides an overview of research areas in cybersecurity, illustrated 
by contributions from Inria teams. The first step in cybersecurity is to identify 
threats and define a corresponding attacker model. Threats, including malware, 
physical damage or social engineering, can target the hardware, the network, the 
operating system, the applications, or the users themselves. Then, detection and 
protection mechanisms must be designed to defend against these threats. One 
of the core mechanisms is cryptography: cryptographic primitives can ensure 
the confidentiality and integrity of data. These primitives must be the object of 
continuous cryptanalysis to ensure the highest level of security. However, secure 
cryptographic primitives are not sufficient to guarantee secure communications 
and services: this task requires the use of so-called cryptographic protocols, imple-
menting richer interactions on top of the primitives. Cryptographic  protocols are 
Executive summary
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distributed systems: ensuring that they achieve their goals, even in the  presence 
of an active adversary, requires the use of formal verification techniques, which 
have been extremely successful in this field.
While cryptographic primitives and protocols are fundamental building blocks 
for security, additional security services, such as authentication and access control, 
are needed to enforce a security policy. These security services, usually provided 
by the operating system or the network devices, can themselves be  attacked and 
sometimes bypassed. Therefore, activities on the information  system are  monitored 
in order to detect any violation of the security policy. Finally, as  attacks can spread 
extremely fast, the system must react automatically or at least reconfigure itself 
to avoid propagating attacks.
As noted above, privacy has become an intrinsic part of cybersecurity. However, 
even though it oen relies on cryptographic primitives and protocols, it also has 
its own properties, techniques, and methodology. Moreover, the study of privacy 
oen requires to take legal, economical, and sociological aspects into account.
All these security mechanisms need to be carefully integrated in security- critical 
applications. These applications include traditional safety-critical  applications that 
are becoming increasingly connected and therefore more vulnerable to security 
attacks, as well as new infrastructures running in the cloud or connected to a 
multitude of Things (IoT).
Despite recent significant advances in several areas of cybersecurity, there 
are still major scientific questions le open. Here are a few selected challenges 
where Inria could make new, major contributions:
→ Post-quantum cryptography. Building a quantum computer is widely 
 believed feasible in the next decades and most cryptography used today could 
be  efficiently broken by such a computer. Therefore, it is important to think now 
about  quantum resistant cryptography, as information encrypted today may still 
be sensitive when quantum computers appear.
→ Computing on encrypted data. The need for computing on encrypted data 
has emerged with the  appearance of the cloud and outsourced computation. This 
problem can be solved using techniques called homomorphic encryption and 
functional encryption. In 2009 a theoretical breakthrough was achieved with the 
first fully homomorphic  encryption scheme, but this scheme remained completely 
impractical due to its poor computational efficiency. A lot of progress has been 
made since, but more research is needed; any significant technical advance may 
quickly be exploited as an economical advantage.
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→ End-to-end formally verified cryptographic protocols 
The security of cryptographic protocols is extremely difficult to ensure, and the 
use of rigorous, formal methods is a necessity. Computer-aided security proofs 
must include all aspects from the specification down to the implementation. 
Recent works, in particular around TLS 1.3, have shown that this approach is now 
feasible. However, this still requires a careful co-design of proof and code that 
can only be performed by experts. Leveraging such proofs to more general code 
and more complex security properties, e.g., properties guaranteeing the privacy 
of the user, remains a huge challenge.
→ Security for IoT. for IoT is a major challenge. Attacks are still relatively easy 
(many devices have not been designed with security in mind), invasive (e.g., in our 
lives), and have major potential impact because of the huge number of available 
devices, which increases the attack surface and makes distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks much easier. The research directions are numerous: let us mention 
for instance the desire to securely update the soware embedded in a device, 
the need for lightweight cryptographic primitives adapted to limited resources, 
the analysis of the security of new low-power wide-area wireless technologies, 
the detection and mitigation of intrusions or misbehaving devices, or the need 
for secure-by-design frameworks and protocols to facilitate the development 
of IoT devices.
→ Protecting citizens’ privacy. Our connected world experiences an 
 unpre cedented growth in terms of  personal, increasingly intrusive data collection, 
be it while surfing the web, using a smartphone, or driving a connected car. The 
lack of transparency, as many  services and devices behave as black boxes, and the 
lack of user control are  major issues. How to express consent or opposition in the 
absence of information or user interface? Identification of such hidden behaviors, 
which requires data flow analyses, is hindered by the number, complexity, and 
diversity of underlying applications and communication technologies. Challenging 
 transverse research activities are required to bring transparency, highlight good 
and bad practices, and enable regulators to enforce data protection laws.
It is essential to include security from the start in system design. The same 
holds for cyber-resilience: massive cyber-attacks are an increasing threat and 
the security-by-design principle should also apply to resilience of networks and 
critical, digital infrastructures.
Cybersecurity oen lacks incentive, as its benefits are hard to grasp. This is 
oen due to a lack of expertise. Indeed, academics, who have sharp expertise in 
most areas of cybersecurity, are oen underrepresented in national or industrial 
advisory committees. Education is therefore essential to security, and major 
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 dissemination efforts should be made for all audiences: from teachers,  researchers, 
industrial actors, and specialists, to everyday citizens, including children.
High security lab (LHS) at the Inria Research Center in Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique  
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About this white book
 Our goals 
The primary goal of this Inria white book on cybersecurity is to detail Inria’s 
view on cybersecurity challenges. To this end, we include a general overview of 
academic research topics in cybersecurity and, in particular, a cartography of 
existing research in cybersecurity at Inria. We also take this opportunity to draw 
general recommendations in the domain of cybersecurity. We have chosen to 
conduct all these subgoals in parallel in a single, unified document, without 
a constant distinction between the objectives. Therefore, while we aim for a 
 complete coverage of research in cybersecurity, the level of detail is intentionally 
non-uniform: domains where Inria has a strong position or, on the opposite end, 
where Inria’s contribution should be increased are emphasized; less structured 
fields are also given a more comprehensive presentation.
This white book is written to address a wide audience, and to allow different 
levels of reading. It includes technical presentations of the different cybersecurity 
domains and a detailed description of the work done in Inria teams which would 
interest cybersecurity experts or someone looking for detailed information on a 
particular subdomain. It also includes more accessible information typeset in text 
boxes: the sections covering technical material include executive [ Summary ], as well 
as a list of [ Inria teams] working in each area with a short summary of their related 
activities. Other additional information includes [ Highlights ], pedagogical [ Note ], 
 and [ Research challenge ] boxes.
Therefore, the non-expert reader may first focus on the text boxes, only digging 
into the full text when necessary. Challenges are described in situ, but they are 
also collected in a dedicated chapter (§8.1) for convenience.
 The methodology 
This white book is a collaborative effort, with contributions from many people 
from Inria and its partners. The writing of this book was coordinated by a working 
group that consisted of Steve Kremer, Ludovic Mé, Didier Rémy, and Vincent Roca. 
Given the breadth of the topic, they relied on the help of many other researchers 
who provided input on their topic of expertise to the working group—a complete 
list of contributors is given at the end of the book. In a second step, the chapters 
have been proof-read by researchers working in the respective areas. Citations to 
scientific papers are intentionally restricted to seminal work, rather than trying 
to give an extensive bibliography. This white book has been conducted under 
the supervision of the “Cellule de veille et prospective”—the Inria scientific and 





The remainder of this white book gives an overview of research areas in 
cybersecurity and, in particular, the activities of Inria teams. There are certainly 
many ways to present activities in cybersecurity, sorting them by methodologies, 
sub-communities, application domains, etc. In this book we follow a winding 
path, which seemed to be a good compromise for presenting Inria’s activities in 
cybersecurity.
Here is an overview of our journey in cybersecurity:
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
We set the scene: we define the scope of cybersecurity, discuss the issues 
and stakes, giving examples of attacks and their consequences. We also discuss 
key security properties, as well as some legal (e.g. cybersecurity regulation) and 
sovereignty considerations.
Chapter 2: THREATS
Works on cybersecurity oen start by defining the “attack model”: that is, 
the capabilities of an attacker. In this chapter we discuss different threats that 
can target the hardware, network, operating system, applications, or even users 
themselves. We also review some research efforts whose goal is a better under-
standing of these threats.
Chapter 3: CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography plays an essential role and constitutes the basis of cybersecurity. 
In this chapter, we cover all aspects of cryptography, ranging from the design of 
the core primitives to more complex protocols that provide high-level  guarantees 
regarding the security of communications and transactions.
Chapter 4: SECURITY SERVICES
Additional security services are needed in order to design operational systems, 
even if they are oen built upon cryptographic primitives and protocols. These 
are addressed in this chapter where we present security mechanisms that can 
prevent or mitigate threats and attacks on the information systems and their 
components, including hardware, networks, and operating systems.
Chapter 5: PRIVACY
Nowadays, privacy is considered an intrinsic part of cybersecurity. While 
 privacy oen relies on cryptographic primitives and protocols, it also has its own 
properties, techniques, and methodology. In this chapter we focus on privacy, 
covering technical aspects as well as legal, economical, and sociological issues.
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Chapter 6: SECURITY-SENSITIVE APPLICATIONS
While the previous chapters focused on specific services and tools, here we take 
the opposite approach, looking at a selected set of security-sensitive  applications 
and discussing the specific security questions they raise.
Chapter 7: CYBERSECURITY IN FRANCE
Finally, in Chapter 7, we give an overview of cybersecurity activities at Inria 
and their positioning in France.
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1.1  Cybersecurity, a central concern
 A serious concern for our societies 
While the word cybersecurity was hardly known to the general public two 
decades ago, it has become a recurrent topic in public media punctuated by 
frequent cybersecurity attacks, the discovery of new breaches, or the revelation 
of general surveillance by large companies or state bodies.
The world has changed, and quickly. Cybersecurity has become a  general 
concern for all: citizens, professionals, politicians, and, more generally, all  decision 
makers. It has also become a serious concern for our societies that must protect us 
against cybersecurity attacks with both preventive and reactive measures, which 
implies a lot of monitoring, and must simultaneously preserve our freedom and 
avoid general surveillance.
Cyberattacks may be conducted by criminals, but also by states for industrial 
espionage, for economic damage to apply pressure, or to inflict real damage to 
infrastructure as an act of war.
States and their interconnected critical infrastructures are vulnerable. 
Cyberattacks also put companies—of all sizes—at high risk. The economic damage 
caused by successful cyberattacks may be considerable. However, our protection level 
is still considered largely insufficient compared to the risks and potential damages.
While our awareness is improving and protective measures are increasing, they 
still do so at a slow pace. This is partly due to a lack of incentive: cybersecurity is 
an investment whose benefits are oen hard to grasp, as it only pays off when an 
© Inria / illustration Clod
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attack that could have otherwise succeeded fails, and this is difficult to measure. 
This slow progress is also due to a lack of expertise—at all levels.
Cybersecurity is therefore an economic and sovereignty issue for many states, 
including France.
 A challenge for the digital era  
The digitalization of our society is completely changing the usage of  computer 
systems. Until the early 90s, computer systems were only loosely connected. Few 
people had personal computers at home, and those were rarely connected to 
the Internet. Email spam hardly existed. Cybersecurity was mostly a concern for 
states and large companies including the financial industry.
Since the end of the 90s, the situation has completely changed. The growth 
of the web, and the appearance of ADSL and smartphones quickly brought cheap 
and fast Internet connections to almost every home in developed countries and 
revolutionized the role of the Internet. Smartphones and 3G/4G have also spread 
Internet access into developing countries. A huge proportion of the population 
is now continuously connected to the Internet, using an amazing number of 
different services. Simultaneously, we have become permanently exposed to 
attacks, with our sensitive data at risk of being stolen or damaged. We also live 
with the risk of mistakenly and irreversibly leaking our private information on 
the Internet. Cybersecurity is now a serious issue for everyone: citizens, small 
and large companies, administrative and state bodies. For example, a successful 
 ransomware attack on a small company that does not have (well isolated) backups 
may put the company’s business in danger, or even in bankruptcy. The company 
may lose access to all of its orders, and the listings of its providers and clients; 
the company may have to pay a huge amount of money for the decryption key, 
which in the worst case may never be delivered.
The attack surface has considerably increased due to the number of  connected 
devices, some of them being weakly secured or completely unsecured, and most 
of them operated by uninformed users. This has tremendously increased the 
chances for an attack to be successful, to the benefit of the attacker, making 
cyber-criminality more profitable. Besides, the attack may be launched from 
anywhere in the world.
The situation is likely to worsen in the upcoming years with the spread of 
connected devices forming the Internet of Things (IoT), which is still only in its 
infancy. The number of connected digital devices may increase by at least  another 
order of magnitude. This interconnection exposes everyone to the weakest level of 
security of the trusted machines to which anyone is connected, as they may serve 
as an attack relay. By relying on low protection levels, we not only increase the 
risk for ourselves, but also the risk of contributing to the spread of a large-scale 
attack. This means that each actor has a responsibility and a moral obligation 
15
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towards the community to deploy sufficient protection measures. The IoT increases 
both the attack surface and the contamination aspect of cyber security breaches, 
which calls for yet higher security levels.
 Diffusion across computer science  
Since an entire system is only as secure as its weakest link, the interconnection 
and interaction of machines and applications (which oen run in a distributed 
environment) makes cybersecurity a central question for almost all soware today. 
It is therefore not surprising to observe the diffusion of expertise in cybersecurity 
to other domains of computer science.
There are several converging reasons for this evolution, leading to cross- 
fertilization between disciplines. For example, cybersecurity has been a  predilection 
domain for formal methods research: cybersecurity was in urgent need of  expertise 
in the area of formal methods and, simultaneously, formed an  extremely  challenging 
and stimulating playground for researchers in formal methods. Formal methods 
are now well-established in cybersecurity, especially in France, although this is 
still a growing research domain (see §3.3.2 and §3.3.3).
In the area of databases, researchers have been more and more exposed to 
 security issues. At first they were cybersecurity users, importing off-the-shelf 
 techniques to their research domains, but they have quickly become active 
 contributors to cybersecurity. For example, the database community has proposed 
new paradigms such as the private cloud to enforce privacy by design.
In other areas, such as system security, distributed computing, and network 
services, the reasons are more intricate; but in each case, the evolution reflects 
the increasing exposure of these domains to security issues. More recently, there 
have been new and fruitful interactions between cybersecurity and machine 
learning, in both directions: on the one hand, machine learning methods are 
being applied to security, especially in reactive security (§4.4 and §4.6). On the 
other hand, machine learning raises new security and privacy issues (see §6.3.3).
 Diffusion across other sciences 
Even more importantly, cybersecurity is  becoming a major concern for 
 application domains outside of computer science that use computer devices 
or digital services in critical ways: e-health, medicine (§6.3.1), robotics (§6.3.2), 
power and water supply plants, smart cities, and, more generally, all critical 
 infrastructure (§6.2.2).
This interdependence of computer science subdomains regarding security 
issues is both a real challenge and an opportunity for Inria to seize, since it is 
present in most of these subdomains. The diffusion of cybersecurity across other 
sciences is a chance to apply cybersecurity research, for which there will be lasting 
demand—and expectations.
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1. ENISA, “Denition of Cybersecurity: Gaps and overlaps in standardization”, version 1.0, December 2015. 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-cybersecurity.
1.2  The scope of cybersecurity
Wikipedia defines cybersecurity as follows:
Computer security, also known as cyber security or IT security, is the protection  
of computer systems from the the and damage to their hardware, soware or 
information, as well as from disruption or misdirection of the services they provide.
However, the exact notion of cybersecurity differs depending on the context 1. 
Security in general includes both cybersecurity and physical security. However, 
cybersecurity requires some form of physical security, since physical access to 
computer systems enables a whole class of attacks. Conversely, physical security 
may depend on cybersecurity to the extent that it uses computer systems, e.g., 
to monitor some physical space or maintain a database of authorized persons. 
Still, the difference between cyber- and physical security should always be clear, 
and we only address cybersecurity hereaer. Moreover, in many places, we will 
just use the word security to mean cybersecurity.
 [ Note ] Physical security vs. cybersecurity 
Physical security and cybersecurity are quite different in nature.
Digital information is immaterial: duplicating and exchanging data and code with anyone 
anywhere in the world is nowadays a trivial, extremely fast process, with almost zero 
cost. Hence, an attack or malware launched by a single person can spread worldwide, 
at a large-scale, in less than an hour.
Digital information is of discrete nature: a single bit flip may introduce a critical failure 
and turn a perfectly working system into a malfunctioning one, which is then more 
vulnerable to compromise. This contrasts with the laws of physics, which tend to be 
continuous at a macroscopic level, and usually let one observe a slow deformation of 
a structure before it reaches its breaking point. Digital information ignores borders, 
and may even play with contradictions between the legislations of different countries 
or their maladaptation to the digital age.
This makes cybersecurity much harder to achieve than other forms of security.
 Safety vs. security 
Soware safety is concerned with the absence of  misbehavior, both in normal 
and exceptional situations, but still in a neutral environment when no one is 
trying to intentionally attack the system. Soware safety is not just a matter of 
chasing bugs: it also calls for an analysis of the  possible sources of misbehavior 
17
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and how to handle them in a fail-safe manner. This requires a specification of the 
soware’s expected behavior, including a model of the environment, and some 
justification as to how or why the soware respects its specification.
In contrast, soware security aims for the absence of misbehavior in an 
 adversarial environment, where an attacker intentionally tries to misuse a  system, 
putting it in an erroneous state that is not part of its intended specification. 
Security can also be approached by modeling the environment, but this is much 
harder to achieve exhaustively, because attackers do not comply with predefined 
rules, but rather continuously search for previously unknown means of attack. 
Hence, security also requires us to keep up-to-date with attackers’ progress in 
all areas (soware breaches, algorithms and techniques, hardware capabilities, 
etc.). A complementary approach consists in describing normal execution paths 
and monitoring execution, so as to raise an alarm and react appropriately when 
some trajectory goes outside of normal executions.
 [ Note ] Safety vs. security 
The terms security and safety are sometimes misused. Safety refers to accidental 
threats, due to internal misbehaviors or non-intentional misuse of the system, while 
security refers to intentional threats. Safety deals with fault-tolerance, while security 
deals with resistance to attacks. For example, a car may crash because of a soware 
specification or an implementation bug (safety issues), or because of an attacker taking 
remote control of the vehicle (a security issue).
Despite these differences, safety and security are oen tied to one another. 
Since security works in an adversarial mode, it should also consider accidental 
threats which may be exploited by the attacker. Hence, security is a stronger 
requirement than safety. In many situations, however, the soware is exposed 
to the outside world, typically connected to the Internet, where attacks are the 
norm—and safety without security would oen not make much sense!
Safety and security also share a lot in their methodologies. Dealing with the 
safety of large soware systems that interact with the physical world, such as 
Cyber-Physical Systems (oen known as CPS—see §6.2), has led to some well- 
established methodologies. One should start with a safety risk analysis phase, 
where all  situations that may lead to catastrophic consequences are explored. 
Representations such as fault trees can be used to systematically describe such 
situations. The identified risks are then quantified to estimate the probability of 
the occurrences of these situations. Ensuring safety means ensuring that this 
 probability remains below a given threshold. Of course, a first step to satisfy the 
safety property is to ensure the absence of internal faults (bugs) in the soware, 
as these faults are the primary cause of failures. Formally, one writes a soware 
specification to describe the expected behavior of the soware, and then shows 
18
that the actual implementation satisfies the specification. Unfortunately, not 
all cases may have been considered in the specification. Moreover, there may 
be external faults (for example, an erroneous value coming from an external 
 sensor) that are not  considered in the soware specification, and that can lead 
to disasters. Hence, we must also use additional mechanisms, essentially based 
on dynamic error  detection and recovery mechanisms, used to treat the errors 
due to external faults before they lead to catastrophic consequences.
A similar approach applies to security. A security risk analysis (see §2.4) replaces 
the safety risk analysis. While it is not possible to reason statistically to build an 
unassailable system in the case of security, it is still useful to ensure that there are 
no bugs (at least of some kind) in the soware, for example by the same formal 
approach as the one followed for safety, because attacks oen build on vulnera-
bilities that stem from a remaining bug. Monitoring takes the form of dynamic 
attack detection and recovery mechanisms. This implies a model of the attacker, 
which should at least cover all known types of attacks, for example in the form 
of an attack signature base. In this view, the safety-by-design principle becomes 
the security-by-design principle, meaning that the soware must be designed 
from the foundation to be secure 2. This has led to design principles such as the 
OWASP recommendations 3.
However, security and safety remain distinct and different domains, built on 
different hypotheses, and the protection mechanisms against accidental and 
intentional threats are usually complementary. In this white book we restrict 
our attention to security.
1.3  A few examples and lessons learned
Unfortunately, cybersecurity incidents are common, and too oen make the 
headlines. Here we describe a few illustrative examples, in order to highlight the 
huge diversity of attacks. Some of them target well identified entities, such as 
TV5 Monde and the Dyn company, although the attacks used totally different 
 techniques. At the other end of the spectrum the Wannacry ransomware targeted 
a huge population, propagating in a viral manner. Certain electronic voting systems 
are known to be vulnerable and, on several occasions, security researchers have 
highlighted their inadequacy through proof-of-concept attacks. The following 
example illustrates how anonymized databases can sometimes be attacked, 
 revealing physical identities. The last two examples highlight, for the first one, two 
hardware-targeted soware attacks that exploit advanced processor performance 
optimization techniques, and for the second one, weaknesses of some Internet 
of Things devices and their exploitation.
2. See Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_by_design 
3. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles
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4. https://static.sstic.org/videos2017/SSTIC_2017-06-09_P09.mp4
The TV5 Monde targeted attack: on April 9th, 2015 the French TV network 
TV5 Monde was the victim of a major sabotage. Around 9pm, the website and 
social media channels (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) were defaced. About an hour 
later, the network infrastructure was no longer operational and broadcasting 
was interrupted, resulting in a complete TV blackout—the worst thing that can 
happen to a TV network. The French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) later 
found that the attack was carefully planned 4. The attackers first connected in 
January, using a stolen login and password. This allowed them to get access to 
the internal network, to collect internal documents containing information on 
the network infrastructure and existing accounts, and to exploit unconfigured 
services that still relied on default accounts and passwords. Deleting firmware on 
the network infrastructure (routers and switches) then caused the breakdown, 
making a simple restart impossible.
Denial of service attacks from the Mirai botnet of home devices: the Mirai 
malware’s goal is to turn vulnerable home devices (such as IP cameras, printers, 
baby monitors, or home routers) into remotely controlled bots that can later be 
used to launch large-scale denial of service attacks. This is what happened on 
October 21st, 2016, when this botnet targeted the name servers of the Dyn  company 
Research on malware – © Inria / Photo C. Morel 
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5. New York Times, “A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749”, August 9, 2006 http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html
(used for instance when translating domain names to IP addresses, see §2.2). 
This attack resulted in a blockage of many web sites worldwide for several hours.
The Wannacry ransomware: on Friday May 12th, 2017, the WannaCry  ransomware 
propagated throughout the world, infecting more than 230,000  computers 
in over 150 countries within a single day (source Wikipedia). This ransomware 
 targets  computers running the Microso Windows operating system, with  major 
 consequences for their owners: aer infecting a computer, the ransomware 
encrypts data and displays a note to inform the user, asking for a bitcoin payment 
in exchange for the decryption key. This ransomware is considered a worm, since 
it scans for vulnerable systems and then replicates itself on these new targets.
Electronic voting vulnerabilities: in the last few years, several European 
countries (Estonia, France, Norway, and Switzerland) held legally binding  political 
elections that allowed part of the voters to cast their votes remotely via the 
Internet. French people living abroad were allowed to vote via the Internet for 
the June 2012 parliamentary elections. An engineer demonstrated that it was 
possible to write malware that could change the value of a cast vote, with no 
way for the voter to know. In the 2011 Estonian parliamentary election, a similar 
attack was reported by computer scientist Pihelgas, who conducted a real-life 
experiment with fully aware subjects.
Re-identification in the AOL anonymized database of web search queries: as 
reported in the New York Times 5, AOL released an anonymized database containing 
more than 20 million web search queries. Even though the data was anonymized, 
users could be identified aer some investigation, thereby revealing all their  personal 
search queries. More generally, database anonymization is a complex task with 
pitfalls, that requires finding an appropriate balance between utility and privacy.
The Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities: on January 3rd, 2018, two  hardware 
vulnerabilities, Spectre and Meltdown, were simultaneously released. Both 
 vulnerabilities exploit speculative execution (and in particular branch prediction), 
an optimization technique in modern processors. To avoid idle processor cycles, 
e.g., while waiting for the result of a memory access, processors may perform 
 out-of-order execution. A branch may then be speculatively executed, while 
 waiting for the evaluation of a conditional. If the branch was wrongly executed, the 
results are discarded. However, even if the results are discarded, a memory access 
nevertheless leaves a trace in the cache. The idea of the Spectre and Meltdown 
attacks is to force a forbidden memory access. Typically, buffer overflows are 
prevented by checks on the size of the buffer. These checks can be circumvented 
however by making the branch prediction wrongly predict the test. Then, a cache 
attack can be used to check which area of the memory has been executed. (Such 
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[ER16]. E. Ronen, A. Shamir. Extended functionality attacks on iot devices: The case of smart lights.  
In IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P’16), 2016.
attacks simply  measure the time necessary for accessing a particular memory 
address.) The attacks are particularly severe, because they exploit the design of 
modern processors, and cannot be simply patched by a soware update. Moreover, 
 speculative execution is at the core of modern processor design, and is unlikely 
to be abandoned by processor manufacturers.
Smart lights causing epilepsy seizures: researchers from the Weizmann Institute 
of Science have shown that it is possible to hack commonly deployed smart lights, 
and to strobe them at a frequency that may trigger epileptic  seizures [ER16]. The 
 attack is interesting because by turning traditionally  unconnected objects (here, 
light bulbs) into smart objects, they can be misused to create an unexpected attack. 
This particular attack exploits a combination of several flaws. First, when initializing 
the smart light controller, the password that allows the controller to connect to the 
local WiFi is sent unencrypted and can easily be sniffed. Second, the lights accept 
commands from any devices on the local WiFi without a proper authentication 
mechanism. Third, the controller does not verify the length of the commands it 
receives, allowing the concatenation of multiple commands, circumventing the 
limit on commands that may be sent per second. Finally, the attack is based on 
undocumented API options, allowing attackers to create a strobe effect.
 Lessons learned 
These examples highlight several key aspects of security:
→ Security is an essential cornerstone in a digital world which increasingly 
 pervades every aspect of our daily lives, public and private. Without security, 
the world collapses. Attacks such as WannaCry have deeply impacted unprepared 
citizens, private companies, and organizations, threatening their activities.
→ All the domains of our digital world are concerned, including the  embedded 
devices omnipresent in our “smart” homes, and in industrial production  controllers 
(including those for critical infrastructures like power and water supplies). 
Since all of them are connected to the Internet, security is a serious concern, as 
 demonstrated by the attack on smart lights mentioned above. The Mirai botnet 
example highlights that all electronic devices need to be secure. Even if this is well 
understood for computers, it is far from obvious for other objects, in  particular 
embedded devices forming the Internet of Things (IoT)—either because they 
are autonomous, have a small battery, limited processing power, or are badly 
connected. Moreover, the inability of IoT devices to apply soware updates and 
patches is a real concern. On the other hand, soware updates can themselves 
be subject to attacks. All of these aspects are still the subject of active research.
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→ Education is essential to security. The WannaCry attack relied on an operating 
system exploit that had been fixed in a Windows update two months earlier. This 
only impacted unprepared end users and system administrators who failed to 
update their computers in a timely manner, not realizing how important it was. 
Security is oen regarded as complex, mechanically limiting its usage. Usable 
security, meant to facilitate use of security by end users, is an important and 
 active research domain that is closely related to security education and awareness.
→ The security of a system is always limited by that of its weakest  component. 
Even if the core security components (e.g., the cryptographic primitives) are 
 rarely attacked, the same cannot be said of the soware implementations of 
the  cryptographic protocols and services. In the case of WannaCry, the attack 
relied on an exploit of the Windows SMB protocol (the first weak link), which was 
 sufficient to take full control of the computer, no matter what other operating 
system  protections were in use. The second weak link was the users, who by not 
updating their computers made the attack successful. The TV5 Monde attack was 
made possible first of all by social engineering, and then by the use of unmodified 
default login/passwords on various technical equipments.
→ Obscurity does not increase security. Sometimes, people believe that hiding 
the internals of a system or security mechanism will increase  security. However, 
by now we know that, on the contrary, open design principles  improve a system’s 
security. In cryptography this fact is known as Kerckhoffs’s principle, and goes 
back to the 19th century: A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything 
about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This principle should 
be applied to other systems as well. An open design and well documented 
system will actually ease security reviews by experts. Attackers are oen able to 
reverse engineer systems, and “security by obscurity” only gives a false sense of 
security. For instance, the attack on smart lights exploited an undocumented 
functionality.
→ Large, complex systems cannot be totally validated through human 
 inspection: automatic verification tools are needed to find security protocol flaws 
as well as implementation flaws. The SMB component targeted by WannaCry has 
a long history behind it. In spite of that, a security flaw could be identified that 
made the attack possible. The increasing complexity of each individual component, 
and the complex composition of components in large interdependent systems, 
require advanced and automatic security validation tools, which is traditionally 
a very active research topic.
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6. https://elie.net/blog/security/unmasking-the-ransomware-kingpins/
→ Security and privacy are closely related. The WannaCry ransomware did not 
try to exfiltrate user’s data, but it could have done so. The attacker had full access 
to data stored on target computers (e.g., the patient database of a medical center) 
and could have threatened to disclose this sensitive information. It is therefore 
essential that security and privacy be considered together at the design stage so 
that, for instance, malicious intrusions do not put data at risk. Security by design, 
and more recently privacy by design, have become key principles in security design.
→ Diversity of attackers’ motivations and the difficulty of attribution. Although 
WannaCry has been classified as ransomware, motivated by the desire to make 
money, the NotPetya malware that quickly followed it in June 2017 might be a 
“state-sponsored malware that attempted to disguise [itself ] as ransomware in 
order to muddy [its] attribution and potentially to delay investigations.” 6 These 
examples highlight the diversity of the attackers’ motivations and the difficulty—
sometimes, the impossibility—of attributing an attack.
→ Detection and mitigation of attacks. The previous examples show that security 
is hard to achieve. Since zero risk cannot exist, the early detection and mitigation 
of attacks is as important as the attempt to reduce the risk of  successful attacks.
More generally, there will probably always be vulnerabilities in our systems, 
despite increasingly efficient preventive security mechanisms. The  vulnerabilities 
appear at all levels of our information systems: applications, OS, firmware, and 
Malware analysis and detection – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
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even hardware, as illustrated recently by the Meltdown and Spectre attacks. 
Vulnerabilities are sometimes present for a (very) long time in our systems, and 
we can only hope that they are not exploited before they are discovered. New 
vulnerabilities are discovered on a daily basis 7, and new forms of attacks can 
appear at any time. It is mandatory that we detect well-known attacks, but also 
new forms of attacks, if we are to increase the security level of our systems.
→ Security comes at a cost. It is easy to understand that security may be 
 expensive, with additional costs to study, implement, configure, manage, and 
evolve security tools. But security can also have an operational cost, leading to less 
efficient systems. For example, mitigating the Spectre or Meltdown attacks may 
require removing some cache techniques or disabling speculative execution. Such 
mitigation would entail a significant and possibly unacceptable processor-speed 
slowdown. Hence, in some cases, one may have to accept a difficult compromise 
between security and efficiency.
Each of these topics is the subject of active research and is introduced in this 
document.
 [ Note ] The cybersecurity threat 
The cybersecurity threat is real and serious. We only see the tip of the iceberg: in the 
vast majority of cases, even the existence of the attack is a critical piece of information 
for companies or states that is rarely released.
For experts, the question is not whether large scale cyberattacks will eventually succeed, 
as the answer is definitely positive, but rather: are we sufficiently prepared? This means 
we should of course reduce the risk of such attacks by better preventive and reactive 
protection, but also increase our cyber-resilience including pre-established procedures 
to reduce the catastrophic impacts of successful attacks, and faster recovery to a safe 
mode of operation aer such attacks.
1.4  Security properties, services,  
and mechanisms
 Security Properties 
Cybersecurity consists in ensuring three basic and essential properties 
of  information, services, and IT infrastructures well known as the CIA triad: 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Thus, securing an information system 
means preventing an unauthorized entity (user, process, service, machine) from 
7. https://www.cvedetails.com/browse-by-date.php
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accessing, altering, or rendering inaccessible computer data, computing services, 
or the computing infrastructure. Notice that other properties, such as authenticity 
(proof of the origin of information), privacy, or protection against illegal copying 
could also be listed. However, these additional properties can also be seen as 
particular cases of these three basic properties.
 [ Note ] On cybersecurity properties 
Confidentiality: assurance that information is disclosed only to authorized persons, 
entities, or processes.
Integrity: assurance that the system (configuration files, executable files, etc.) or 
 information are modified only by a voluntary and legitimate action, i.e., that the system 
or information have not been accidentally or deliberately changed.
Availability: assurance that a system or information is accessible in a timely manner 
to those who need to use it.
Authenticity: assurance that a message is from the source it claims to be from.
Privacy: ability for individuals to control their personal data and decide what to reveal 
to whom and under what conditions. Privacy can thus be generally defined as the right 
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others.
Anonymity: confidentiality of the identity of the user or entity. We note that preventing 
re-identification through side information is not easy, and that indistinguishability, 
which ensures that an attacker cannot see the difference among a group of entities, is 
also an important property linked to privacy. Note also that anonymity aims at hiding 
who performs some action, whereas full privacy may also require hiding which actions 
are being performed.
Security policy: a set of rules that specify how sensitive and critical resources are 
 protected, i.e., how some or all of the previous properties are guaranteed.
Resilience: initially defined as the ability of a system to return to its original state aer 
an attack, resilience is nowadays seen as the capacity of a system to deliver its services 
continuously, even while under attack (i.e., capacity to tolerate attacks).
 Security Services 
Reaching the objectives of cybersecurity requires  enforcing physical, organiza-
tional, and logical counter-measures. Even if physical  measures (such as guarding 
or controlling accesses to buildings) and organizational  measures (such as  precisely 
defining the mission of an external IT service provider) are  crucial, we focus in 
this document on logical security, i.e., on hardware and soware services and 
mechanisms to ensure the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
A secure computer system must offer preventive services to hinder any 
 violation of these properties, detection services to identify any successful attempt 
to  violate these properties, and reaction services to deploy new or  enhanced 
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8. Obligations correspond to preconditions to fullfil to be permitted to read or write information. For example, 
a user can be authorized to sign a file if and only if this file has already been previously signed by another given 
user. Obligations are generally enforced at the application level.
9. Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_Resilience
 counter- measures in case of any successful violation. Indeed, while the goal of 
cybersecurity is to protect a computer system against attacks, one must also 
assume that some of the attacks will succeed. Therefore, cybersecurity also deals 
with intrusion detection and responses to attacks.
Prevention first involves precisely defining which entity may access what 
information and in which way: permissions, prohibitions, or obligations 8 to read 
or write information are to be defined. This constitutes a so-called security policy. 
Prevention can even take place before the definition of a policy. Indeed, it is good 
soware engineering to detect early source and binary code vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited to violate the security properties: this is the security by design 
principle. Even earlier on, we may also prove that a given property is guaranteed 
by the soware: this is formally proved security.
The security policy is concretely enforced through security services. The 
following services can be offered, depending on the policy and on the context: 
entity identification and authentication, control of access to information by these 
entities, control of information flows within the system, detection of attempts 
to exploit potential vulnerabilities of the system (intrusion detection, virus 
detection), and responses to these attempts (reaction).
An even more ambitious objective that could be pursued would be the ability 
for a computer system to deliver the intended outcome despite adverse cyber 
events. In other words, the computer systems would tolerate attacks, a capacity 
generally called cyber-resilience 9. From a high-level point of view, an entity (state, 
company, organization, etc.) could be more concerned with cyber-resilience, which 
is the final objective to achieve, than with cybersecurity, which is a set of deployed 
techniques that the end-user need not necessarily see.
Cyber-resilience, being the capacity to tolerate attacks, has of course a lot of 
similarities with fault tolerance, which deals with hazardous hardware failures or 
soware bugs. Even if the hypothesis of safety and security are quite different, 
since attackers do not follow the rules but rather continuously search for new 
breaches, the mechanisms proposed to tolerate faults may be adapted to tolerate 
attacks. Thus, some basic principles of cyber-resilience include replication of data 
and backups, which have long been well-established in the database community. 
Besides, replication should be used in the context of a distributed system, to avoid 
having a single point of failure. While cyber-resilience is of major importance, 
many techniques to achieve it are reminiscent of other fields (e.g., safety), and will 
not be detailed in the remainder; others are completely relevant to the security 
field (e.g., DDoS Mitigation) and will be discussed in the corresponding sections.
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 Security Mechanisms 
Security services rely on mechanisms implemented at various levels of 
 information systems and infrastructure, including hardware, firmware,  operating 
systems, network layers, hypervisors, and applications. Cryptography is of course a 
fundamental building block in many cases: the study of cryptographic primitives 
and their use in exchanges between machines (through cryptographic protocols) 
are therefore two essential aspects of digital security.
1.5  Legal aspects
 1.5.1 European security regulation 
The European Union cybersecurity strategy 10 is built on several instruments, 
with the goal to improve European cyber-resilience and response while preserving 
for each nation a level of sovereign capacity to control the main components of 
their national defense strategy.
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 11, 
set up in 2004, is an important actor of the European cybersecurity landscape. 
A significant extension of its missions is currently under discussion, aimed at 
making it the privileged interface with the member states, including support in 
the implementation and operation of cybersecurity directives.
In mid-2016, the European Union adopted the Directive on security of network 
and information systems (known as the NIS directive) 12, for an application  mid-2018. 
This directive focuses both on Digital Service Providers (DSP) and Operators of 
Essential Services (OES). Both DSP and OES are held accountable for reporting 
security incidents, even if services are run by non-European companies or if the 
information system management is outsourced to third parties. DSP and OES 
are also required to provide information that allows for an in-depth security 
assessment of their information system and policies. Finally, the member states 
are required to identify agencies in charge of collecting and processing security 
incidents, in addition to a national competent authority (e.g., ANSSI in France).
There is also a need to promote the development of secure-by-design  products 
and services throughout Europe. In order to achieve this goal, the European 
Union is putting forward a proposal to set up a European security certification 
framework, capable of issuing European level security certifications and labels 
of products and services. This is a daunting task, because even though a very 
broad set of security certification schemes exist throughout the world, no  unified 
or combined solution exists. Understanding what is required to make things 
10. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cyber-security  




14.Documents produced by ECSO WG1 are available at:  
http://www.ecs-org.eu/working-groups/wg1-standardisation-certification-labelling-and-supply-chain-management. 
15. http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/EN/C-2017-6100-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF  
16. Loi no 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 relative au renseignement, Legifrance. 
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consistently secure is a complex task. The European Cyber Security Organization 
(ECSO) 13 liaises with the European Commission for the definition of a European 
security certification framework proposal. ECSO has issued a state of the art of 
existing industrial cybersecurity standards for various activity domains, and is 
working on a so-called meta-scheme approach encompassing many existing 
certification schemes, evaluating the level of confidence provided by individual 
schemes and mapping them onto a harmonized set of security levels 14.
Because zero risk does not exist, the European Commission has also  issued an 
official blueprint, called Commission Recommendation of 13.9.2017 on Coordinated 
Response to Large Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises 15. This  recommendation 
sets out the objectives and modes of cooperation between the member states and 
European institutions when responding to such incidents and crises.
The European Union is at the forefront of privacy and data protection, with the 
new GDPR regulation and the ePrivacy regulation that will complement it—see 
§5.1.2 where these aspects will be discussed.
 1.5.2 Forensic analysis 
Generally speaking, forensic analysis is related to scientific methods of 
 identifying the authors of a crime by examining objects or substances involved 
in the crime. In the context of cybersecurity, forensic analysis is related to the 
explanation of a cybercrime, based on the analysis of information or traces le 
by the attacker in the computing systems used or attacked.
Concretely, forensic analysis aims to explain the state of a computing system by 
extracting information and using it to reconstruct the series of actions  undertaken 
by the attacker. A special effort has been made to produce  techniques and tools 
to analyze the content of mobile phones, which are oen used to prepare and 
perform criminal actions in the real world. Here, defense against cybercrime joins 
defense against crime.
 1.5.3 Surveillance and security 
With the increase of the terrorist threat, we have witnessed, in several countries, 
the deployment of mass-surveillance systems intended to help fight terrorism. In 
France, this took the form of the “Loi relative au renseignement.” 16 In particular, 
this law requires the deployment of black boxes within French Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) in order to both collect connection information from specific 
previously-identified targets in real time, and to analyze connection information 
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of ISP subscribers in order to identify potential suspects via an automatic process 
(whose details are not publicly known). The re-identification of the subscriber 
requires an official decision of the Prime Minister (or a delegate).
These laws highlight the tension between public security and privacy. They 
have also been criticized because of their economic cost and potential inefficiency, 
in particular when faced with the “false-positive paradox.” 17 The risk is that “more 
false positives will only overstress technologies, thus causing even more work for 
signals-intelligence agents, who are already overloaded.”
The term “mass dataveillance” has been given to practices where  governments 
or governmental organizations perform surveillance and data collection at a 
 national scale (or larger). This is opposed to “personal dataveillance”, which targets 
an individual of (supposed) interest.
As a reaction to this evolution of surveillance (and in particular to E. Snowden’s 
revelations), the IETF has considered that “pervasive monitoring is an attack” in 
RFC 7258 18 and that IETF protocols should mitigate it. Encryption by default is 
among the IETF’s initiatives (§2.2).
Surveillance and cyber defense are complex topics by nature. AMNECYS (Alpine 
Multidisciplinary NEtwork on CYber Security studies) 19 is an example of multi-
disciplinary initiative that has gathered several research teams in order to  contribute 
to this complex question.
1.6  Sovereignty issues
Since most critical infrastructure is now controlled by computers, oen 
connected to the Internet, protecting infrastructure requires protecting  computer 
systems and networks. Hence, cybersecurity is a sovereignty issue for states and 
the EU. Therefore, states and the EU must have the ability to understand the risks 
and threats. This requires the highest scientific competences, and can only be 
maintained in the long-term by pursuing advanced research in all domains of 
cybersecurity. We not only need to have the best experts, but we also must have 
them in sufficient numbers to cover the increasing needs (see §2.3.3). In addition, 
we also need experts at intermediate and lower levels to be able to implement 
the security policies correctly.
States should also have the power to act. This requires sufficient control over 
digital infrastructure and the whole cybersecurity chain, as the security of the 
whole depends on the security of the weakest link. This implies control over the 
soware and hardware used in critical infrastructures, so that it can be analyzed 
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Hardware is one of the weakest links, as France and Europe do no longer have 
the capacity to design and produce their own hardware. Hence, some form of 
sovereignty has already been given up. Indeed, it is quite possible that hardware 
devices are rigged with backdoors or hidden functions that allow, for example, 
a government agency or a company to spy on Internet traffic or to prevent the 
operation of a particular service.
In fact, the digital and thus dematerialized nature of cybersecurity makes 
 cybersecurity sovereignty different from other forms of sovereignty, such as 
 defense. While the latter is the privilege of states or supranational organizations, the 
former can be implemented at smaller scales. Many entities (citizens, companies, 
associations, etc.) can claim some degree of sovereignty over the security of their 
own data, computer systems, and networks. A consequence of digitalization is the 
potential transfer of some of the traditional state sovereignties to other entities: 
blockchain-powered land registration, minting money with digital currencies, or 
citizen identification services 20, etc. These different levels of sovereignty do not 
exclude, but rather complement one another, leaving sovereignty of each kind of 
data at the most appropriate level. This ability of cybersecurity to be decentralized 
should not endanger the sovereignties of the states. On the contrary, it is a chance 
that should be exploited, leaving some autonomy to the different entities within 







There are many types of attacks against information systems. The threats are 
therefore numerous. The attacks can target the hardware, the network, the system, 
or the applications (very oen through the malicious actions of a malware), or 
even the users themselves (social engineering, phishing). The attacker can be an 
insider, or an outsider.
In this chapter, we present bodies of work carried out in order to build a better 
knowledge of such threats and attacks. Various attack models can be considered 
in these bodies of work, to define the knowledge of the attacker about the  system 
and the actions the attacker can realize. The section devoted to the human factor 
also focuses on two crucial aspects of security: usability and education. 
Please note that cryptanalysis aims at understanding the threats against 
existing cryptographic primitives, in order to be ahead of malicious adversaries. 
Cryptanalysis is thus the foundation of confidence we can have on these  primitives, 
and the knowledge of state-of-the-art cryptanalysis can be seen as the backbone 
for the design of secure primitives. Cryptanalysis per se is therefore not a threat, 
but a way to achieve a better security level. It is presented in §3.1.2. Malware 
analysis and malware detection are presented in §4.5.1.
2.1  Hardware attacks
 [ Summary ] 
Physical attacks against the hardware are a real threat, even for implementations of 
algorithms that have been mathematically proven secure. Attacks by observation and 
attacks by perturbation are two common classes of attacks that require a physical 
access to the device. More recently, hardware has also been attacked through the 
soware, which is even more dangerous, as it does not require physical access to the 
device. Nowadays, a serious but unfortunately possible attack scenario is an hardware 
attack triggered by a JavaScript application embedded in a web page.
When discussing the security of an algorithm, numerous mathematical tools 
allow developers to assess its security. Unfortunately, those tools cannot consider 
the interaction of the computing unit with its physical environment. Physical 
 attacks are a real threat, even for algorithms proven secure mathematically. These 
attacks can be classified as observation attacks, perturbation attacks, and a new 
field known as hardware-targeted soware attacks. The first two assume the 
 insider attacker model i.e., the device is under the attacker’s control, while the last 
one assumes the outsider model. The outsider model requires fewer hypotheses 
for the attacker and thus can be considered as more dangerous.
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2.1_Hardware attacks
 Observation attacks 
Side-channel analyses (SCA) are physical attacks based on the observation of 
the circuit behavior during a computation. They exploit the fact that some physical 
quantities depend on intermediary values of the computation in the device. This 
is the so-called information leakage. The most classic leakages are timing, power 
consumption, and electromagnetic emissions (EM).
SCA are threats for all standard cryptosystems such as Data Encryption Standard 
(DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), RSA cryptosystem, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) and for critical applications not using cryptography, e.g. PIN 
verification. SCA can also be used to reverse engineer algorithms.
 Perturbation attacks 
Fault attacks are now a well-known class of physical attacks where a device 
undergoes a modification of physical parameters in order to obtain an incorrect 
behavior. Most classical fault injection means are power glitches, clock glitches, 
laser pulses, and electromagnetic pulses. Fault attacks have been shown  extremely 
efficient against cryptography, e.g. the Bellcore attack allows any fault, at the 
correct time, on an RSA-CRT signature to recover the secret. What fault can be 
achieved and what is the fault model is an active area of research.
This class of attack is chip dependent, i.e. what has been learned of a SoC is 
not valid for other chips even if they are highly similar (same core). The success 
of the attack relies essentially on the experiment set up due to the large amount 
Studying fault attacks – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
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of parameters (type of the EM probe, distance of the probe on the circuit, form 
and amplitude of the EM pulse, etc.). Another challenge in this class of attacks 
is the effects observability. To understand the precise effect, one has to explore 
the internal state of the chip which is oen not available. Most of the counter-
measures are related with either temporal or spatial redundancy. The cost of 
such a redundancy is not affordable for low end devices. Research is focusing on 
lightweight redundancy to ensure the integrity of the execution.
 Hardware-targeted soware attacks 
In addition to soware attacks against soware and physical attacks against 
hardware-targeted soware attacks, appeared in the mid-2000s soware attacks 
against hardware  components. For example the Rowhammer attack aims at flipping 
memory bits while reading and writing another cell. The insider attacker model 
moves to an outsider one when using a JavaScript program executed in a browser 
to perform this attack remotely. Recently it has been shown to be effective when 
applied on SSD disks (NAND flash technology).
Perturbation can also be generated in multicore SoC using the Dynamic Voltage 
and Frequency Scaling (DVFS), i.e., the energy management technique that saves 
energy by regulating the frequency and voltage of the processor cores. It has 
been shown that a misconfiguration of these two parameters can be used to 
induce faults in the hardware. Each core being individually controlled, one core 
can inject a fault in another core. Even if it has not yet been demonstrated, this 
attack should be achievable from within a browser.
Soware-based attacks against hardware make it possible to circumvent 
security mechanisms implemented at the soware level. In fact, the soware 
protections consider that the hardware is working properly, “simply” executing 
instructions to produce a result. Of course, this is not so easy and errors that can 
be exploited by attackers can also occur at the hardware level.
More generally speaking, the traditional approach of computer science and 
technologies, constantly adding new more and more powerful levels of abstraction 
naturally leads, when proposing a security mechanism at a given level of  abstraction, 
to consider that the lower layers are correct and safe. This is however not the 
case; this is why the attackers have had a tendency these last years to target less 
and less abstract layers, successively attacking by soware the applications, the 
OS, their kernel, the firmware, and now the hardware.
These low-layer attacks typically exploit flaws from optimization  mechanisms 
implemented in modern OS’s and processors, such as caches, branch  prediction, or 
speculative execution. Indeed, these optimizations create differences in  program 




attack exploits branch prediction and speculative execution and exfiltrates  information 
through a covert channel based on cache access. To mitigate this attack, one could 
refresh the cells (read and re-write their values) periodically. This solution would of 
course come at the price of performance limitations, as other read operations asked 
by programs would not be possible during the refreshes. More generally,  protection 
against attacks of this type would involve the limitation, if not the complete 
elimination, of certain optimizations, of course at the cost of lower performance.
The Rowhammer attack evoked above is a soware attack that actually  exploits 
a physical property of matter. Each DRAM cell is composed of a capacitor and a 
transistor that electrically implement a bit of information. By repeatedly  accessing 
cells, the charge of these cells leaks and electrically interacts with the charge of 
other neighbor cells. It is thus possible to change the value of a cell (and  therefore 
to violate the integrity of this cell) without having ever accessed it. Here, the 
protection against the attack should be physical: for example, one could consider 
limiting the reduction of the component’s surface, even if the cost would be of 
course very important.
Notice that these attacks are not easy to detect as they leave no trace at the 
operating system or application levels.
Finally, it is difficult to know whether attacks of this type have already been used 
in reality. At the time of this document’s writing, it seems much simpler to use much 
more classical attacks against the soware or against users (social engineering).
 [ Research challenge 1 ] Hardware-targeted soware attacks 
Attacks against information systems do not usually involve the hardware layer but 
 exploit a soware vulnerability. However, recent attacks, such as Rowhammer, Spectre, or 
Meltdown, have shown that attacks implemented in soware can exploit performance 
optimizations of the hardware. This new type of attack is especially dangerous as it 
makes hardware attacks possible at a distance, as opposed to classical side channel 
attacks. It is not yet completely clear how the current proof of concept attacks can be 
“industrialized,” but they pave the way to a new class of serious attacks. Therefore we 
need to get a better understanding of how such attacks could possibly be deployed, 
propose a clear typology of this new kind of attack, and propose countermeasures, 
both at the hardware and the soware levels. This task requires expertise at the 
hardware, firmware, and operating system levels. The countermeasures can also be 
difficult to design as they may require to revisit crucial optimizations used for years, 
such as speculative execution.
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 [ Inria teams ] Hardware attacks 
↗ The CAIRN team works on efficient computing architecture. They do not address 
explicitly the security issues related to this optimization process, but they know how 
the SoC architecture can help.
↗ The CIDRE team analyses the impact of EM faults on the soware stack on modern 
SoC but also on low end devices. The team also uses circuit observation to optimize the 
fault injection process. The objective is to evaluate the possibility to move from a high 
end platform to a low cost platform with the same result. The team characterizes the 
impact of the fault during the secure boot process to identify potential vulnerabilities. 
In a collaboration with the PACAP team, it verified the robustness of a countermeasure 
that uses a dedicated compiler to generate fault resistant code. To resist against side 
channel attacks they evaluated on the fly compilation solutions to increase the number 
of traces an attacker has to capture to extract the secret. They have also proposed a 
template attack against PIN verification implementations.
↗ The PACAP team evaluates the possibility to eradicate leakage in a code at compile 
time thanks to code annotation (compiler that generates resistant implementations 
to side-channel analyses attacks). Their solution is evaluated within the Rennes LHS 
facilities.
↗ The TAMIS team develops new side-channel distinguishers based on machine learning 
techniques due to their precise knowledge of the underlying leakage measurements 
and modeling of sensitive information.
2.2  Network threats
 [ Summary ] 
At the network level, many examples of attacks exist. Here are two examples  targeting 
the Internet. Finding a path for each packet sent on the Internet, no matter its source 
and its destination, is a key service known as “routing” a: attacking this basic and  essential 
network service can, for instance, isolate a whole country or at the  opposite redirect all 
the traffic of a country through a surveillance point. Another crucial network service, 
DNS, translates readable hostnames into IP addresses. An attack against this service 
can redirect a user to a fake banking web site in order to steal the user’s credentials. 
A secure extension to DNS, called DNSSEC, is now available, but its deployment will 
take time and will not solve all the problems, in particular those related to privacy.
a. See for example this simple introduction: https://interstices.info/internet-le-conglomerat-des-reseaux/
37
2.2_Network threats
Any type of network may be attacked, taking advantage of its characteristics. 
We focus here on the Internet and some of its specificities: domain name, routing, 
and potentially non-encrypted payload.
The Internet is a complex assembly of an extremely large number of devices, 
from user machines or devices to routers, linked by a huge array of wireless and 
wired networking technologies. Its operation requires a vast range of information 
resources, protocols, and services, from low-level routing databases, forwarding 
policies, low-level MAC address/IP address/host-name mapping protocols (i.e., the 
ARP/NDP/SEND and DNS/DNSSEC protocols), or link-layer specific  technologies 
(e.g., to create and manage a Virtual LAN) up to high-level services, like Web 
 services. This inherent complexity of the Internet constitutes many facets that 
are all subject to threats. Hereaer, we consider a small subset of these threats 
and discuss trends to mitigate them, both from the academic and standardization 
viewpoints, e.g., as done by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 2.
 Attacks against the Domain Name System (DNS) 
The DNS is a hierarchical decentralized naming system for the Internet, with 
scalability and flexibility as key design goals. DNS is used for address resolution, 
i.e., hostname to IP mapping (e.g., “www.example.com” resolves to IPv4 address 
“1.2.3.4”), as well as the inverse mapping. It is also used by such services as email 
(DNS records enable a search for mail servers) and blacklisted email hosts.
A typical attack against DNS consists in flooding a DNS server by a huge number 
of queries, leading to a Denial of Service i.e., the server cannot handle the load 
and thus does not respond to legitimate queries. A more subtle attack consists 
in poisoning or spoofing a DNS cache. Indeed, when a system queries a DNS 
 server and receives an IP address as a response, it saves this information in a local 
cache for a given period of time, such that the system can answer a new similar 
query without having to retrieve the information from the server. If the cache is 
compromised, then anyone who uses it may be misguided to a fraudulent site.
Being one of the cornerstones of the Internet, the security of DNS is essential 
and security services have been added under the name “Domain Name System 
Security Extensions” (or DNSSEC) in 2005. DNSSEC enables any host to be confident 
in the address resolution results, the IP address (or any information returned by 
a DNS query like mail servers).




 Attacks against the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) interdomain routing 
Each IP datagram (or packet) needs to be “routed” through the Internet, from 
its source to its destination (sometimes multiple destinations). This  operation 
is done hop-by-hop by routers: for each incoming packet a router finds a path 
and forwards the packet to next router until it reaches its destination. Finding a 
path within a router is the goal of routing protocols, and these routing  protocols 
 leverage a distributed database that contains routing and reachability  information. 
Two types of routing protocols exist: some protocols are meant to operate  within 
Autonomous Systems (or AS), controlled by a single organization (e.g., a  university), 
while others are meant to operate at the interconnection level, between  autonomous 
systems, i.e., at the Internet backbone level. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the 
 protocol currently in use on the Internet for the exchange of routing and reachability 
 information among autonomous systems. It is therefore of utmost importance since 
any misbehavior, perhaps caused by an attack, can isolate a whole country from 
the Internet, or redirect all of a given country’s traffic through a surveillance point 3.
BGP has long suffered from security weaknesses. For example, an attacker can 
forge a false BGP response that will allow him to hijack further traffic. Addressing 
these weaknesses requires:
• setting up a dedicated public key infrastructure to distribute certificates that can be 
verified by any BGP router. This is the role of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 
(RPKI), managed by the various Internet registries (IANA and Regional Internet 
Registries);
• leveraging on this RPKI to issue certificates, called Route Origination Authorization 
(or ROA), that attest that an AS controls certain IP address ranges and is authorized 
to originate route advertisements for these IP address ranges.
Although these mechanisms are required, an ROA by itself does not prevent 
an attacker (e.g., a malicious BGP router) to forge or propagate malicious route 
announcements. The underlying problem of validating an AS path for a specific 
destination is complex and multidimensional: it requires to check the AS validity, 
the AS neighborhood, the compliance of the AS path listed in the message with 
the message propagation itself, and the compliance of the AS path with the  actual 
routing policies of each AS. The BGP security extension BGPsec (see below) is 
meant to provide some guaranties from this point of view.
The Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) IETF working group has  specified the 
RPKI and BGP security extensions. However, deployment takes time,  especially 
with BGPsec that requires major upgrades, and enjoying a fully secure  interdomain 
 routing remains a distant dream. Partial deployment being the rule, several 
 academic works focus on the consequences of attacks that originate from 
 unsecured parts of the Internet and techniques to mitigate them.
3. Isolating a geographic area could also be motivated by the desire to disconnect a certain number  
of servers involved in distributed services and thereby facilitate an attack (e.g., a blockchain-based service.)
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[CWSR02]. D. Clark, J. Wroclawski, K. Sollins, and Braden R. Tussle in cyberspace: Defining tomorrow’s 
internet. In proceedings of SIGCOMM, 2002. 
4. https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tcpinc/about/ 
5. https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/quic/about/
Another aspect of BGP is the geostrategic importance of routing information. 
Their analysis can help identifying or understanding attacks (e.g., when a subset 
of the Internet becomes suddenly unreachable) or surveillance practices (e.g., 
when a subset of the Internet traffic is redirected through a certain domain).
 Encryption by default and mass surveillance attacks mitigation 
“Peeking is irresistible. If there is information visible in the packet, there is no 
way to keep an intermediate node from looking at it. So the ultimate defense of 
the end to end mode is end to end encryption.” [CWSR02]. Following this wise advice, 
research and standardization activities have been carried out in order to facilitate 
the use of encryption within the Internet and to thwart passive  eavesdropping 
in particular.
This is the case of TCP encryption, for instance as developed by the TCP 
Increased Security (tcpinc) IETF working group 4. The idea behind TCP encryption 
is to design TCP extensions that are likely to provide unauthenticated  encryption 
and integrity protection of TCP streams. In this case, the unauthenticated key 
exchange mechanism enables both ends to encrypt and check the integrity of 
each TCP packet, very easily, without relying on any external service (e.g., PKI 
 infrastructure), nor user solicitation (as with SSL when connecting to a new host), 
nor any modification to applications for whom this extension is fully transparent. 
Such an extension, once sufficiently deployed, will enable all TCP flows to be 
encrypted by default. However, since there is no end-to-end authentication, there 
is a risk of Man-in-the-Middle attacks: the attacker impersonates the remote node 
and proposes its own keying material which allows them to decrypt, peek, and 
 re-encrypt all traffic. For this reason, it is viewed as a “better than nothing” security.
Encryption as a default tends to become the rule, as is the case in the new 
QUIC transport protocol, now developed within the QUIC IETF working group 5. 
Initially proposed by Google as a high-performance replacement for HTTP over 
TLS/TCP connections, this protocol already represents a significant part of Internet 
traffic (more than 30% of Google’s egress traffic, or 7% of Internet traffic, by the 
end of 2016). Among many innovations, this protocol provides by default secure 
 communications: QUIC packets are always authenticated and the payload is typically 
fully encrypted, thereby preventing mass surveillance and other forms of attacks.
 [ Inria teams ] Network threats 
↗ The DATASPHERE team works on the analysis of BGP data to identify or understand 
attacks or surveillance practices.
2.2_Network threats
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2.3  The human factor
As in many other fields, there is a well-known adage about security that says 
that the main threat lies between the chair and the keyboard. This adage may 
be exaggerated, and at the very least it deserves further study, but it must be 
recognized that the users are indeed sometimes a source of security problems. 
Firstly, they can be the target of the attack (see Section 2.3.1). In addition, They 
can try to avoid using the available protection mechanisms due to the (real or 
perceived) excessive complexity of their use (see Section 2.3.2). Finally, their level 
of education and training is too oen insufficient (see Section 2.3.3): they are 
therefore not aware of the real risks, or on the contrary overestimate them. In 
either case, they do not know what mechanisms are to be used when.
 2.3.1 Attacks against the user: social engineering and phishing 
 [ Summary ] 
Social engineering aims at convincing the user to perform an action, such as  revealing a 
password, by gaining their trust. Closely related, phishing aims at obtaining information 
like passwords, credit card numbers, etc. It is oen based on massive email campaigns 
(spam) or messages over other communication media (chats, social networks) to 
request that people provide sensitive information by either replying to an email or 
connecting to a website.
Social engineering aims at convincing a person to perform a forbidden or  sensitive 
action by gaining their trust. The attacker can impersonate a person’s identity or can 
pretext a fake urgent matter. Social engineering is not strictly limited to the Internet. 
However, the Internet allows to scale up phishing attacks, a major representative 
of social engineering attacks. Phishing usually aims at  obtaining information like 
passwords, credit card numbers etc. It is oen based on massive email campaigns 
(spam) or messages over other communication media (chats, social media) re-
questing that people provide sensitive information either by replying to the email 
or by connecting to a website. At first phishing campaigns were quite simple and 
naive because the same email was massively sent without any customization. Spear 
phishing is more advanced and leveraging higher social intelligence to make people 
confident in the legitimacy of the request they received. Hence, the request can 
be customized regarding the country, the location, or the company of the victims. 
Actually, this kind of information can be easily found on the Internet.
The FBI estimates that money extorted by phishing was about half a billion 
dollars a year between 2013 and 2016 6, based on complaints collected in USA. Even 




take over a legitimate website, attackers usually prefer relying on social engineering 
techniques, that are a much easier way to achieve the same end.
Although massive naive social engineering might be easily detected, it is challenging 
to detect spear phishing even if carried out at a large scale, due to the automatic 
personalization for each email sent. Defense occurs at several levels. First, phishing 
attacks rely on a communication channel to reach the victims. For large campaigns, 
attackers leverage botnets. Therefore, fighting botnets indirectly limits phishing 
attacks. Second, an analysis of users’ messages, the content itself, and the correlation 
among them, is another option. Third, most of the time, the victim is redirected to 
a website. Detecting or preventing such websites to exist or to be accessed is also 
an effective counter-measure. Both the second and third approaches are relevant 
to social engineering as, in these cases, the attacker needs some social intelligence 
to make the victims confident in the legitimacy of the email or the website.
Analyzing message content of an email is problematic due to privacy concerns. 
In addition, with the use of encryption, only end-users or their email servers may 
have access to the content, making impossible the correlation of multiple emails 
sent to different users. Hence, only individual email analysis is possible. That is 
why blacklisting domain names or URLs is widely used. Moreover, blocking access 
to a single such website means protecting thousands of users in one go. The main 
challenge is actually to block early a phishing website or URL and even predict 
it when possible. Indeed, the attacker needs to setup its infrastructure before 
effectively starting their campaign. Of course, websites can only be analyzed once 
a potential URL is known. More active and reactive techniques are thus required 
to automatically discover and verify potential phishing websites.
 [ Inria teams ] The human factor 
↗ The RESIST team works on automatic blacklist construction of potential phishing 
websites. This work includes a reactive approach and a proactive approach.
 2.3.2  Improving security mechanism usability 
 [ Summary ] 
One of the main sources of computer security failures are still human errors. A major 
reason for this is that user interfaces of many applications or soware systems have 
oen not been designed for the purpose of security. A good user interface for security 
should consider that the user is rarely a security expert; it should always ensure that 
the user is well aware of the consequences of their actions and be designed to avoid 
unintentional errors that compromise security. Designing security mechanism with 
good usability calls for interdisciplinary research with experts in cognitive sciences.
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Human errors are a major source of computer security failures. While increasing 
the users’ awareness of security risks is crucial, supposing that users are well-
trained is neither realistic, nor sufficient. One major reason for human errors is 
that user interfaces of soware systems are not well designed for the purpose of 
security, even if design principles that are suitable for other applications are applied. 
Indeed, security is not the user’s main goal unlike browsing the web, or purchasing 
goods and services. Ideally, users want security to work without them doing any 
specific actions; oen it is easier to ignore or circumvent security mechanisms if 
this makes achieving their main goal easier. A classic example is a web site with a 
bad certificate; simply ignoring the warning allows a user to continue browsing, 
at the risk of visiting a fake, phishing website. Another example is deactivating 
the whole firewall, to ensure a given port used by a specific application is not 
blocked. Oen users do not understand, or misunderstand, the consequences of 
their actions. Therefore, security mechanisms must be designed with usability 
in mind. The user interface should consider that the user is not a security expert 
(and does not understand, for example, the underlying mechanisms of access 
control), ensure that the user is well aware of their actions’ consequences, and 
avoid that user make errors that compromise security. Designing usable security 
mechanism calls for interdisciplinary research with experts in cognitive sciences.
 [ Inria teams ] A usability to be improved 
↗ The CIDRE team works with ergonomists and psychologists to evaluate how a user 
is perceiving the importance of a message, to increase the chance that the user is 
clearly aware of their action.
 [ Research challenge 2 ] Security and usability 
Very oen, when users request a service, they are willing to sacrifice security, and 
bypass an annoying security mechanism, if it prevents them from using the service. In 
order to avoid this problem, security must be as transparent as possible. Even though 
complete transparency is not always possible, security services must be as simple as 
possible to use. Work is needed to propose interfaces and security mechanisms that 
are suitable for nonexpert users, that ensure the user is well aware of the consequence 
of their actions, and that prevent users from making errors that compromise security. 
Designing such usable security mechanisms calls for interdisciplinary research including 
typically experts in cognitive sciences.
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2.3_The human factor
 2.3.3 A lack of education and awareness 
 [ Summary ] 
Users are oen viewed as the weakest link in the security chain, too oen being 
unaware of security issues and therefore easily deceived by even very simple attacks.
This is why the education and awareness of “good practices” and “cyber hygiene strategy” 
of every computer user (at work or in the home) is crucial. Each young citizen should be 
introduced to the basics of computer science and  cybersecurity. Each professional actor 
should know about the risks related to economic  intelligence and cyberattacks, and 
be informed of the possible defenses. In addition, system and network  administrators 
should follow periodical training to be kept up to date regarding the most recent 
threats—and the solutions to mitigate them.
The industry needs experts on cybersecurity, although it is facing a shortage of skilled 
cybersecurity experts at all levels. Even if cybersecurity curricula are now offered by a 
large number of institutions, efforts must still be made to train more experts.
Users (citizen or professional actor) are impacted more or less consciously 
by cybersecurity or the lack thereof. Too oen a victim of cyberattacks, they are 
considered by many as the weak link of the chain, being unaware of security issues 
and therefore easily deceived even by technologically very simple attacks such 
as phishing or social engineering. Insufficiently informed of the importance of 
protecting themselves, they may for example use passwords that too weak or too 
predictable. Finally, a given functionality may be more important for them than 
security, thus they tend to systematically click on a web link or use an unsigned 
certificate. Thus, an important challenge is to make security tools more easily 
usable (see §2.3.2).
More generally, most successful attacks leverage well-known security problems 
and a vast majority of cyberattacks are the result of poor cyber habits within the 
victims’ organizations.
In this context, the education and awareness of each user is essential. Users 
must be educated about “good practices” for domestic and professional situations 
and should be able to enforce a “cyber hygiene strategy” in order to reduce the 
risks of becoming a victim or spreading an attack.
As a first step, each young citizen should be introduced to basic security concepts 
and tools, at the same time when being introduced to the basics of computer 
science. Examples of topics include the importance of updating the soware or the 
operating system to avoid keeping too many vulnerabilities, the importance of an 
antivirus, the definition of a good password or an electronic signature.
A second step is to educate each professional actor, in each educational 
 program, whatever the domain, introducing additional good practices relative to 
the professional context. Each professional should be explained the economic 
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intelligence risks, be taught about the separation of professional and personal data 
and applications, about the partitioning of networks, and about the importance of 
backups and business continuity plans. In France, a good example of what could 
be done is ANSSI’s (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) 
CyberEdu project 7 that aims to develop pedagogical material facilitating the 
integration of digital security in higher education for non-specialists.
A third step targets the operational teams, especially, but not only, within small 
and medium sized businesses. These teams must be aware of the state of the art 
in cybersecurity and must therefore follow periodical training on recent risks and 
threats, on the fine-tuning of systems, on security  reinforcement, on  maintaining 
a global safe condition, and on legislation and regulation. Several initiatives are 
following this path: in France, ANSSI has produced the “40 Essential Measures for 
a Healthy Network” guide 8 dedicated to people in charge of  information  systems 
security. At EU level, the ECSO “Cybersecurity Human Resources Network” is looking 
at raising the awareness levels through various cyber hygiene initiatives, and the 
ENISA issued its own document 9.
Finally, the education of cybersecurity professionals is of course a main 
issue. Today, the industry already faces a shortage of skilled workers in  cybersecurity, 
as proved by the number of job offers published on APEC 10 for cybersecurity 
 positions, which in France has quadrupled from 315 offers to 1,133 offers 11 between 
2014 and 2016. Worldwide, the Frost & Sullivan business consulting firm fore-
casted a lack of 1.5 million professionals by 2020, according to the 2017 Global 
Information Security Workforce Study 12.
Addressing this problem represents a long term effort in education and  training. 
The inherent difficulty is that cybersecurity requires both an extremely solid 
background in computer science, together with additional skills relative to the 
threat landscape, security concepts and tools, and a good understanding of law, 
human factors and psychology, social sciences, economics, and risk management.
Technical curricula are now proposed by a large number of institutions. In 
France, ANSSI launched SecNumEdu 13, whose objective is to certify some curricula 
to provide assurance to students and employers that training in the digital security 
field meets criteria defined by ANSSI in collaboration with industry and higher 
education institutions. A first list of programs are already labeled 14. A similar job 
7. https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/formations/cyberedu/ 
8. https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/guide_hygiene_v1-2-1_en.pdf 















has been done by the NATO mainly for US and UK universities 15 and the ENISA for 
EU universities 16. One can also cite at the European level, the EIT Digital Activities 
in Cyber Security that includes Professional 17 and Master schools 18.
The interdisciplinary nature of cybersecurity may require novel teaching 
 methods and strategies. Here, practical (and not just theoretical) learning is crucial. 
Programs could also take advantage of MOOCs and specific technical professional 
training such as large scale Cyber Defense Exercises (CDXs). An example of the 
latter is NATO’s Locked Shields 2017 19.
 2.3.4 Manipulating users and public opinion 
 [ Summary ] 
Data and technologies can be used to influence opinions or decisions online, through 
profiling and well-targeted fake news. This requires technical solutions to deter 
unwanted profiling and enable easy verification of information as well as validation 
of its source.
A serious issue, actually only loosely connected to security but very oen 
linked to security, at least in the minds of the general public, is that data and 
technologies are also used to motivate, influence, or shape people’s opinions or 
decisions online. The better understanding of users’ behaviors combined with 
the capacity of building accurate psychological profiles create opportunities to 
develop techniques that influence users online, by shaping their opinions. These 
technologies try to impact the user’s reasoning and decisions by manipulating 
their “cognitive biases,” e.g., their emotions, memory, or beliefs.
One particular way to manipulate public opinion is fake news. Globally speaking, 
disinformation through the Internet is seen today as a major issue that requires 
technical solutions to enable easy verification of information as well as validation 
of its sources. In the media industry, a number of recent initiatives have started 
to identify, track, and debunk fake news and wrong claims that circulate over the 
Internet, for instance creating a shared repository of fake news or lists of trusted 
and non-trusted information sources (see, e.g., the Decodex database 20 from Le 
Monde in France).
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 [ Inria teams ] Manipulating users and public opinion 
↗ The PRIVATICS team investigates how personal data is being used to manipulate 
people online.
Inria, together with partners in the media industry as well as in the defense sector, 
studies how to fight against user manipulation and fake news, by leading projects on 
fake news detection. 
↗ At the content analysis level, the LINKMEDIA team investigates image retrieval 
and tracing as well as image forensics, in conjunction with text mining to help in the 
detection and tracking of fake news. 
↗ The ALMANACH team applies natural language processing techniques to identify 
fake news. 
↗ At the data and knowledge management level, the CEDAR and GRAPHIK teams work 
on easy access to heterogeneous data sources to facilitate information cross-checking 
and validation in complex environments. 
↗ The DANTE team focuses on graph analytics to identify the networks of diffusion 
for fake news and the accounts that legitimate fake news. 
↗ Visualization teams such as ILDA study the mechanisms needed for human analysts 
working in a collaborative and dynamic fashion to make the most of data, its related 
processing, and management algorithms, in an effort to increase information security 
in the media industry and beyond.
2.4  Modeling threats and attacks  
with attack trees
 [ Summary ] 
To represent all kind of attacks, one can use a graphical representation called “attack 
trees.” In this representation, each leaf of the tree expresses a step that the attacker 
has to perform in order to carry out their attack. Each non-terminal node contains a 
label expressing how its children are connected (and, or, sequence). Globally, an attack 
tree represents the sequences of possible actions that the attacker can perform to 
reach their objective. Attack trees are largely used during the risk analysis step: risks 
(threats) are identified, a security policy is designed, and then security mechanisms 
are chosen to enforce that policy.
In the safety field, so called “fault trees” have been proposed in the early 
80’s [VGRH81] to graphically represent the safety risks a system faces. In 1999, Bruce 
[VGRH81] William E. Vesely, Francine F. Goldberg, Norman H. Roberts, and David F. Haasl. Fault tree handbook. 
Technical report, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC, 1981.
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Schneier adapted this representation to the security field, introducing “attack 
trees.” [Sch99]
As with any tree, an attack tree is composed of nodes and leaves. A node’s 
label (AND or OR) expresses how the children of the node are connected. Each 
leaf expresses a step that the attacker has to perform in order to carry out their 
attack. To be able to express more subtle links between the different steps of an 
attack, more evolved operators have also been introduced, such as the “Sequential 
AND” that imposes a time order between the operators of a logical AND.
Common attack trees bring a qualitative representation of an attack. Some 
research works to enrich attack trees by adding quantitative attributes that  include 
the impact of the attack, the costs of countermeasures, etc.
The semantics of attack trees have been largely extended over the last decade. 
One of the main extensions considers not only the description of an attack, but also 
of the actions that the security administrator can carry out to stop its  progression. 
This class of trees are called attack-defense trees [KMRS10]. The originality of this 
representation relies on the fact that the leaves are heterogeneous and represent 
both the attacker and the defender perspectives. The link between attacker and 
defender views has also been investigated in the domain of alert correlation.
Due to the difficulty of building attack trees, various attempts have been made 
to generate them automatically.
Many other graphical modeling techniques have been proposed, from small 
variations on the original attack trees to changes of representation, as in attack 
graphs, Bayesian attack graphs, or Petri Nets. For more detailed information on 
the various graphical models that are used in security to model an attack and 
their subtleties, the reader should refer to [KPCS14].
 [ Inria teams ] Modeling threats and attacks with attack trees 
↗ The CIDRE team proposes a solution to automatically build correlation rules starting 
from existing attack trees and the description of the monitored systems.
↗ The DIVERSE team works on the synthesis of attack trees for supporting computer- 
aided risk analysis.
↗ The PRIVATICS team uses attack trees for the quantification of privacy.
↗ The TAMIS team uses attack trees for the quantification of security.
[Sch99] Bruce Schneier. Attack Trees: Modeling security threats. Dr. Dobb’s Journal, 24(12):21-29, December 1999.
[KMRS10] Barbara Kordy, Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic, and Patrick Schweitzer. Foundations of Attack-Defense  
Trees. In Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 80-95.  
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, September 2010.  
[KPCS14] Barbara Kordy, Ludovic Pietre-Cambacedes, and Patrick Schweitzer. DAG-based attack and defense 
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Cryptography aims at providing techniques and tools to secure  communications, 
even in the presence of an adversary. Historically, the main goal of cryptography 
was to ensure the confidentiality of messages through  encryption, i.e.,  information 
remains hidden to non-authorized people. Early  methods of encryption were 
 generally rather naive, such as Caesar’s cipher which consists in shiing each letter 
by a constant (e.g., replacing ’A’ by ’D’, ’B’, by ’E’, and so on) and can be easily broken 
using techniques such as a frequency analysis. A substantial advance occurred 
 during World War II with the Enigma rotor  machine used by Germany. Breaking the 
Enigma cipher required significant effort and resources. Nowadays,  cryptography 
is based on firm mathematical grounds and aims at guaranteeing many more 
 properties than just confidentiality:  cryptography provides tools to protect the 
integrity and authenticity of messages (avoiding for instance that the amount in 
a financial transaction is changed), to ensure non-repudiation (the sender cannot 
deny being the author of a message) and anonymity. Moreover, these tools may 
be combined to ensure even more  complex goals. The aim of cryptanalysis is to 
“break” the  cryptographic techniques that are meant to ensure security and is 
actually used to check their robustness.
The chapter is structured in three parts:
• cryptographic primitives are the most basic building blocks; such primitives 
allow to encrypt or digitally sign a message;
• cryptographic schemes generally build on primitives to provide stronger 
security goals, guaranteeing the integrity and authenticity of arbitrarily sized 
messages;
• cryptographic protocols rely on schemes to achieve more complex security 
goals, e.g., establishing a secure communication channel that may be used for 
confidential and authenticated message exchanges.
Close-up of an Enigma rotor assembly. – TedColes via Wikipédia, CC0 
3_Cryptographic primitives, schemes and protocols
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3.1  Cryptographic primitives
 [ Summary ] 
Cryptographic primitives, such as encryption functions and digital signatures, are 
the basic building blocks for designing secure systems. They can be divided in two 
families: symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Symmetric cryptography supposes 
that communicating parties privately share a secret key. This kind of cryptography is 
more efficient than asymmetric cryptography, but requires a preliminary secure key 
exchange. Asymmetric, or public-key, cryptography does not require sharing a secret 
key, as the public key (used for encrypting or verifying signatures) does not need to 
remain secret. The use of these two kinds of primitives is complementary. A typical 
approach is exchanging a symmetric key using asymmetric cryptography in order to 
encrypt later communications more efficiently with symmetric cryptography using the 
exchanged key. Hence, both types of cryptography are required in most applications.
Today we have mature constructions for both symmetric and asymmetric 
 cryptography. Nevertheless, there is still a need for research in both  cryptanalysis 
and design. The aim of the cryptanalyst is to find weaknesses and assess the 
 strength of existing constructions. On the one hand, this work consists in  carefully 
assessing the difficulty of solving the underlying assumed  algorithmically 
hard  problems, considering both the evolution of computing power and the 
 improvement of algorithms. On the other hand, this work must also explore 
new attack methods, such as attacks relying on a possible quantum computer 
or attacks that exploit side channels. The design of new primitives may be driven 
by (foreseeable)  cryptanalytic breakthroughs (e.g., due to the construction of a 
quantum  computer) or a new demand or need from industry. New demands 
 include lightweight cryptographic schemes that can operate on low-power devices, 
as well as new functionalities, such as the need for functional or homomorphic 
encryption that permit computations on encrypted data, typically required when 
computation on sensitive data is outsourced, which is a current trend.
Cryptographic primitives come in two different flavors. On the one hand, the 
primitives that rely on a unique secret shared by all the protagonists are known 
as secret-key cryptography, also called symmetric cryptography. This family also 
includes cryptographic hash functions: as any hash function, a cryptographic 
hash function maps an arbitrarily sized value to a fixed size one, but additionally 
ensures properties such as being a one-way function (it is difficult to find the 
pre-image of a hash value) or collision resistance (it is difficult to find two values 
that map to the same hash value). Hash functions do not rely on any secret but are 
based on similar design principles as symmetric encryption. On the other hand, 
the primitives that use asymmetric keys (as the signing key and the verification 
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key in signature primitives) are gathered together under the name public-key 
cryptography, also called asymmetric cryptography.
Symmetric primitives are very efficient in both software and hardware 
 implementations, and are thus usually well-adapted to constrained  environments. 
Conversely, asymmetric primitives require heavy mathematical tools to be 
 implemented, and their efficiency is several orders of magnitude worse than 
symmetric cryptographic primitives. However, they do not require a previous 
agreement between users. Therefore, symmetric and asymmetric primitives 
offer  complementary security features, so they oen have to be associated 
in concrete applications to achieve both appropriate security properties and 
 efficiency requirements. For instance, in most applications, data is encrypted 
by an efficient symmetric encryption scheme under a secret key. This (short) 
secret key, which needs to be shared by the users, is either transmitted with an 
asymmetric encryption scheme or obtained by a key exchange protocol (e.g., 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange).
 3.1.1 Cryptography today 
Most of the basic cryptography needs are met today with a relatively small 
number of standardized primitives, namely AES [DR02] (together with some mode 
of operation like CTR or GCM) for symmetric encryption and SHA-2 and SHA-3 
for cryptographic hashing. For digital signature, key exchange, and public-key 
encryption, most primitives, like RSA  [RSA78] or Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH76], are 
based on number theory assumptions (e.g., computational hardness of factoring 
or computing discrete logarithms).
WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 
In addition to the exploration of new features (e.g., functional encryption), 
one of the main tasks of cryptographic research is to maintain confidence in the 
existing primitives and to devise new ones whenever necessary. This confidence 
stems from the understanding of the threats and their evolution due to new 
cryptanalytic methods or to technological breakthroughs. Therefore, existent 
primitives must be continuously scrutinized in order to check that all these 
threats are adequately addressed.
Cryptanalysis tells us when and why primitives must evolve (e.g., with larger 
keys, more rounds) or be replaced (e.g., due to algorithmic or technological 
breakthroughs). It provides the designer with evaluation tools and design criteria 
[DR02] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard. 
Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, 2002. 
[RSA78] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key 
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM, 21(2):120-126, 1978. 
[DH76] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 
22(6):644-654, 1976.
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that help to adapt existing cryptographic primitives or propose new ones that 
are resistant against the new attacks.
 3.1.2 Cryptanalysis 
The aim of academic cryptanalysis is to understand the threats to security 
of the existing primitives in order to be ahead of malicious adversaries. One 
 difficulty is that the threats may evolve over time with the progress of algorithms, 
mathematics, or computers (e.g., Moore’s law or quantum computing), but the 
attacker’s capabilities evolve as well (e.g., physical access to an implementation, 
which was not always considered, must now be taken into account in the case of 
lightweight primitives for IoT). Cryptanalysis is the foundation of confidence we 
have in these primitives: the more we analyze them, the more we can trust them. It 
provides an empirical measure of security thanks to a thorough and never-ending 
scrutiny, searching for possible weaknesses. The knowledge of state-of-the-art 
cryptanalysis is thus the backbone for the design of secure primitives. In what 
follows we will distinguish mathematical cryptanalysis, focusing on the design, 
and implementation cryptanalysis, exploiting particular implementation details. 
We will also distinguish classical, as opposed to quantum cryptanalysis.
CLASSICAL CRYPTANALYSIS 
Cryptanalysing a cryptographic primitive consists in solving a problem that 
is claimed to be hard in the security model (e.g., recover the secret key, decrypt 
or forge a signature without the key, find a collision). The attack succeeds if it 
is more efficient than expected from the security claims. Cryptanalysis usually 
only succeeds in breaking reduced versions of the primitive (e.g., smaller key, 
smaller block size, fewer rounds). The security margin of a given primitive is then 
quantified by how much the reduced versions differ from the original primitive.
The state-of-the-art cryptanalysis is actually the only security criterion to 
decide at what point a primitive must evolve or be replaced. For instance, aer 
a 10-year cryptanalytic effort by several research teams, a collision has recently 
been found for the SHA-1 hash function 1, that is now considered unsafe from a 
cryptographic point of view and is slowly being replaced in applications. Another 
recent spectacular cryptanalytic breakthrough, strongly affecting the security of 
some pairing-based cryptosystems, is a quasi-polynomial algorithm for computing 
discrete logarithms in finite fields of small characteristics.
As modern cryptography advocates for security by knowledge, i.e., having 
a public design rationale, including justification of the design choices, public 




standardization effort is preceded by a long and intensive cryptanalysis phase that 
is necessary to evaluate the future standard. Moreover, analyzing new proposals 
oen leads to the definition of new attacks that could also be considered as new 
threats to existing primitives.
 [Highlights] Cryptanalytic record computations 
Inria has been a key actor in several record computations for cryptanalysis:
↗ In 2010 a 768-bit RSA key has been factored. The computational effort was about  
1500 CPU years and 2 calendar years. This record computation was led by EPFL and 
Inria’s CARAMBA team. At about the same time, credit card keys were increased from 
896 to 960 bits and ANSSI released a recommendation to use 2048-bit RSA keys in 2010.
↗ In 2013, researchers from the CARAMBA and OURAGAN teams in collaboration with 
A. Joux designed an efficient algorithm to break discrete logarithms in finite fields of 
characteristic 2, as well as pairings for algebraic curves based on binary finite fields.
↗ Since 2014, researchers from CARAMBA and GRACE have solved discrete logarithms 
in several finite fields of the GF(pk) for k≤6.
↗ In 2015, the FREAK attack (PROSECCO team) highlights how factorizing 512-bit RSA 
keys (in combination with a common implementation bug) can be used to break 
TLS connections affecting about 25% of the web. This work led to fixes in major web 
browsers and websites.
↗ In 2015, the LogJam attack on TLS (PROSECCO and CARAMBA teams) highlights 
that using a pre-computation for a specific 512-bit group, Diffie Hellman keys can be 
effectively broken and (the still widely used) keys in 768-bit groups are now within 
reach of academic research teams.
↗ In 2016, the SLOTH attack (PROSECCO and SECRET teams) highlights how hash 
collisions in MD5 and SHA-1 can be used to break signature-based authentication in 
protocols like TLS. This work led to the deprecation of MD5 and SHA-1 in TLS 1.3.
↗ In 2016, researchers from the CARAMBA team, in collaboration with colleagues 
from the University of Pennsylvania, showed how to solve Diffie-Hellman for specially 
 craed prime numbers. As a result, a few months later, an RFC (Request For Comments) 
that did not provide details about the generation of the parameters was withdrawn.
QUANTUM CRYPTANALYSIS 
Aer a couple of decades of study mostly limited to the academic world, 
quantum computing is now at the center of a race between high-tech companies 
like Google, Microso, or IBM. While the prospect of a large universal quantum 
machine is arguably still many years away, dismissing its potential impact for 
cryptography has become a rather untenable position. Indeed, the American 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, has recently launched a 
call for quantum safe cryptosystems that would resist attacks implemented with 
the help of a quantum computer.
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Common wisdom in the field says that public key cryptography relying either 
on the difficulty of factoring or discrete logarithm, e.g., RSA or elliptic curves, is 
irremediably broken in a quantum world because of Shor’s algorithm [Sho]. Symmetric 
cryptography looks at first much more immune to quantum cryptanalysis since 
the main applicable speed up seems given by Grover’s algorithm in exhaustive 
search, a task for which quantum computers only provide a quadratic advantage, 
i.e., the cost of an exhaustive search drops from N to N where N is the number 
of keys. In particular, one could naively think that doubling the secret-key size 
is sufficient to take care of quantum attacks against symmetric cryptography. 
Unfortunately, this assessment is not backed up by the many years of effort 
required to gain confidence in the security of cryptosystems through dedicated 
cryptanalysis. New results have recently appeared in this direction, for instance 
showing that, in certain models, Simon’s quantum algorithm for period finding 
completely breaks the security of the most widely used modes of operation (such 
as CBC-MAC or GCM) for authentication and authenticated encryption.
The lesson is that quantum cryptanalysis deserves much more attention 
than it has received so far. Standards take many years to evolve because of new 
threats. Therefore, a better understanding of the impact of quantum computers 
on cryptography is definitely called for now in order to see how quantum attacks 
should be modeled, to understand how secure post-quantum solutions based on 
lattices or codes really are, and more generally to integrate quantum techniques 
in the toolbox of cryptosystems designers.
IMPLEMENTATION CRYPTANALYSIS 
The security of a cryptographic primitive relies both on the soware and the 
hardware that implements the primitive and the hardware the code runs on. The 
attacker of cryptographic primitives may just have access to the soware, e.g., by 
remotely running some other process on the same machine, or may also have 
access to the hardware and be able to measure some physical quantity during 
execution, such as the precise timing or voltage, or even perform fault injection. 
However, the distinction between soware and hardware is not so significant for 
the cryptographers who establish a model of the threats that is usually abstracted 
over the low-level details and the differences between soware and hardware. 
A more practice-oriented discussion of this kind of attacks is given in §2.1.
When a cryptographic algorithm is implemented on a physical device (a 
smart card, a cell phone, a computer, …), an adversary can measure the physical 
properties of the system during the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. 
The accuracy of these measures depends on whether the attacker has physical 
access to the hardware. In this case, they are able to measure the variations of 
[Sho] P. Shor. Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring. In IEEE FOCS’94.
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the power consumption or of the electromagnetic radiations during execution. 
They may even be able to perform fault injections. If the attacker just has access 
to the soware, e.g., by remotely running some other process on the same device, 
they may obtain only some timing information. However, in both cases, these 
physical measures are correlated to the secret key manipulated by the system 
and the key can be efficiently extracted unless special countermeasures are used. 
An important research area thus focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of these 
attacks and devising effectual countermeasures. In particular, we now have a 
good understanding of the protection offered by masking, using techniques from 
multiparty computations to split the secret into shares that are not correlated 
to the actual secret.
Physical attacks also include fault attacks, where an attacker manipulates the 
circuit to induce a fault (e.g., by tampering with the power supply or with a laser 
shot) and exploits the difference between a normal output and a faulty one to 
recover the secret key. Most implementation attacks require physical access to 
the system, but attacks are also possible when an adversary can just run code 
on the same machine as the victim. In particular, cache attacks and fault attacks 
based on the Rowhammer technique [KDK+14] can be very effective and have been 
demonstrated from JavaScript code running in a web browser.
 3.1.3 Design 
New primitives are designed either aer some cryptanalytic breakthrough 
(e.g., the breaking of most standardized hash functions in 2004 and 2005) or 
to answer some pressing demand from the industry (e.g., lightweight primitives 
for low-cost devices). In modern cryptography, new primitives come with design 
 rationale and security arguments. Such arguments do not provide an unconditional 
guarantee of security and may take different forms. In asymmetric cryptography, 
the argument will typically ascertain that any adversary breaking the primitive 
with given parameters will solve a problem that is widely believed to be difficult 
(e.g., factoring a 2048-bit number corresponding to the product of two primes, 
generic decoding for a linear code, or finding a short vector in a lattice of given 
parameters). In symmetric cryptography, the arguments are based on properties 
of the underlying building-blocks that guarantee (or tend to guarantee) their 
 resistance to known classes of attacks (e.g., linear, differential, or algebraic attacks).
[KDK+14] Y. Kim, R. Daly, J. Kim, Ch. Fallin, J.-H. Lee, D. Lee, Ch. Wilkerson, K. Lai, and O. Mutlu. Flipping bits in 
memory without accessing them: An experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors. In ACM/IEEE ISCA’14, 2014.
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 [Highlights] International Cryptographic Competitions 
For more than 20 years, the main new cryptographic standards have been specified 
aer open competitions initiated by standardization bodies or international projects. 
These competitions attract submissions from many countries, from both academia 
and industry. The candidates are then scrutinized during several years by the whole 
cryptographic community in a public security evaluation process. Inria has submitted 
several primitives to these competitions and has contributed to the evaluation process.
↗ Two stream ciphers were submitted by the SECRET team to the eSTREAM project 
launched in 2004 by the ECRYPT Network of Excellence. One of them, Sosemanuk, has 
been selected (among 34 submissions) in the final portfolio of recommended ciphers 
for soware-oriented environments a.
↗ The Shabal and the SIMD hash functions, designed by the SECRET and CASCADE 
teams together with several partners, are two of the 64 candidates to the SHA-3 
competition b launched by the NIST in 2007. Both of them were selected among the 
11 semi-finalists of the competition.
↗ The ARIC, GRACE, POLSYS, and SECRET teams are involved in the design of 10 (out 
of 68) candidates to post-quantum cryptography standardization process c initiated 








In the last decades, we have seen a huge increase in the number of low-cost 
smart devices: e.g., contactless cards, key fobs (RKE), sensor networks, home 
 automation, NFC/RFID tags, or medical implants. Most of them transmit sensitive 
information wirelessly (e.g., contactless cards are oen used for payment, access 
control, or fee collection) and require cryptography to do it securely. Unfortunately, 
hardware constraints of embedded devices limit their computing abilities and 
power budget (being powered by a battery or even passively), preventing the 
use of conventional cryptography. Therefore, many industrial products use weak 
homemade cryptography (e.g., MIFARE Classic, KeeLoq, Megamos, Hitag2) or no 
cryptography at all (e.g., medical implants, wireless mice). To fill this gap, secure 
lightweight ciphers have been designed to run with low consumption of critical 
resources (energy, power, execution time). These harsh implementation constraints 
may have downsides, like a smaller block size forcing to renew keys more oen 
or a low latency. Several designs have been introduced and standardized in the 
last decades, such as KASUMI (UMTS), PRESENT (ISO/IEC 29192-2), or HIGHT (ISO/
IEC 18033-3). Lightweight symmetric cryptography is a very active research area, 
with several new proposals every year and an ongoing standardization effort by 
NIST 2. An important effort is also needed for designing lightweight key exchange 
and asymmetric primitives. One of the specificities of lightweight cryptography is 
that, in most applications, the low-cost devices are highly vulnerable to  physical 
attacks. Therefore, lightweight primitives should not only have a lightweight 
specification but also a secure and lightweight implementation.
In such a constrained environment, randomness generation is also an issue. 
While random coins are required in most of the cryptographic schemes and also 
for securing their hardware implementation, they are quite hard to generate, 
especially at a low cost. Pseudo-random generators allow to expand a random 
seed into a larger stream of random bits, but both the entropy of the seed and the 
quality of the expansion have to be studied. Any weakness at any point can weaken 
the whole system. This is even worse if the adversary can have some control on 
the device, which could allow them to reduce the entropy of the internal state.
POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The availability of quantum computing will render obsolete all cryptographic 
primitives based on number theory that are routinely and almost exclusively used 
today for securing communications. Even though quantum computers will not 
appear before one or more decades, the research community needs to line up now 
and start preparing alternative primitives notably for key exchange  mechanisms 
and digital signatures. In particular, replacements must be ready soon if one 
2. https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/lightweight-cryptography
58
wishes to insure long-term confidentiality 3. An action was initiated by NIST 4 to 
standardize quantum safe cryptographic schemes (public-key encryption, key 
exchange, digital signature). The five-year public analysis phase within the NIST 
standardization process is expected to provide a better view on the security level 
and performance of these techniques.
The oldest quantum safe technique for asymmetric cryptography, the McEliece 
encryption scheme, was proposed in 1978 and is contemporary to RSA. Its security 
relates to the hardness of decoding an arbitrary linear code and is the seminal 
work of code-based cryptography. Later, multivariate cryptography, relying on the 
hardness of polynomial system solving, and lattice-based cryptography, relying on 
the hardness of finding short vectors in a Euclidian lattice, were  developed. The 
past decade has been extremely productive, in particular with the emergence of 
LWE [Reg] and its much more practical cyclic variants (Ring-LWE). Those  techniques 
are reaching maturity and will assert themselves as a practical alternative for 
asymmetric cryptography in the coming decade. To be complete, let us mention 
that other techniques are being considered for quantum safe cryptography, 
one of the most notable being hash-based cryptography (based on the Merkle 
tree technique) allowing quantum safe digital signature schemes provided the 
 cryptographic hash function it is built upon is collision-resistant.
 [ Research challenge 3 ]  Post-quantum cryptography 
Building a universal (i.e., as opposed to special purpose) quantum computer is widely 
believed to become feasible in the next decades. Therefore, it is important to think 
now about quantum-resistant cryptography, as some information that is encrypted 
today may still be sensitive in, say, 50 years. Most asymmetric cryptography used today 
is based either on the hardness of factoring or computing discrete logarithms, these 
problems are both known to be efficiently solvable by a quantum computer. Hence, 
there is a need for alternatives: lattice-based, code-based, and multivariate-based 
primitives are the most prominent candidates. It is urgent to perform an in-depth 
security analysis of these new schemes.
CRYPTOGRAPHY BASED ON THE LAWS OF PHYSICS 
Most cryptographic proposals rely on computational assumptions and are 
 therefore vulnerable to algorithmic and hardware breakthroughs. A way to stop 
relying completely on those computational assumptions is to use quantum 
3. Note that the situation is critical for confidentiality since an adversary may store encrypted documents today 
that need to be protected during decades, even aer a quantum computer becomes available.  
The situation is different for integrity which can be enforced by resigning documents when the quantum threat 
becomes real. 
4. https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography 
[Reg] O. Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. In Proceedings 
of the 37th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2005).
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cryptography. Using quantum communication, it is possible to construct an 
 unconditionally secure key distribution protocol (known as the BB84  protocol). This 
means that even an all-powerful (potentially quantum) adversary  cannot break the 
scheme. This offers a very-long-term security, but can only be used for a limited 
number of applications such as key distribution because of  deployment constraints 
and is thus usually combined with standard or quantum-safe  cryptography. In 
Europe and in Asia, quantum networks are developed in order to be able to  perform 
unconditional quantum key distribution protocols. Currently, these protocols 
only work on a limited distance of about 50-150 km. In order to create large scale 
networks, we require trusted nodes, which can be dangerous from a cryptographic 
point of view, or quantum repeaters. Quantum repeaters are technologically out 
of reach today, but seem much easier to build than a full quantum computer and 
could arrive in a near future.
Another solution to obtain unconditional cryptography is to use other laws of 
physics. Relativistic cryptography [Kan15], for instance, uses space-time constraints 
between the agents to perform cryptographic protocols with unconditional 
security. These constraints limit the possible applications, but, unlike quantum 
cryptography, can be developed on a large scale with today’s technology. It is 
 important to follow the advances of unconditional cryptography, which can 
be seen as a safe backup plan in case we lose our trust in the computational 
assumptions used in standard cryptography.
3.2  Cryptographic schemes
 [ Summary ] Cryptographic schemes 
Whereas cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks, cryptographic schemes 
achieve stronger properties with specific modes of operations. Some applications, 
such as outsourced computation may also require more advanced functionalities 
than classical encryption. So-called homomorphic and functional encryption schemes 
permit working on encrypted data, and cryptographic proofs (“proofs of knowledge”) 
may be used to get evidence that outsourced computation was performed correctly. 
With the increasing complexity of cryptographic schemes and their security proofs, 
there has been a recent trend, called computer-aided cryptography, which consists in 
developing tools to check security proofs and achieve higher confidence in the security 
of some constructions.
3.2_Cryptographic schemes
[Kan15] J. Kaniewski. Relativistic quantum cryptography. PhD thesis, Centre for Quantum Technologies, 
University of Singapore, 2015. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.00602.pdf.
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The security of a block cipher, such as AES, or of a trapdoor one-way function, 
such as the RSA function, does not generally provide secure encryption schemes on 
their own. For example, these basic functions are not randomized and encrypting 
twice the same will yield two identical ciphertexts, hence leaking the information 
that the two plaintexts were identical. Encryption schemes or signature schemes 
are thus usually defined by a primitive together with a mode of operation that 
specifies how to use the primitive in order to accommodate arbitrary-length 
messages and to reach a specific security goal. Examples of these constructions 
include standardized block-cipher modes for symmetric encryption (e.g., CBC, 
CTR) or for authenticated encryption (e.g., CCM, GCM), some padding schemes 
for asymmetric encryption (e.g., OAEP [FOPS01]) or for signatures (e.g., PSS). The 
security level offered by such constructions is evaluated under the assumption 
that the underlying primitive has an ideal behavior. The aim is to guarantee that 
a given scheme is secure as long as no specific weakness has been identified for 
the primitive. There are two complementary approaches to analyze the security 
of a mode of operation: the search for generic attacks (i.e., independent of the 
underlying primitive) provides upper bounds on the security level, while security 
proofs provide lower bounds.
 3.2.1 Provable constructions 
The area of provable cryptography, initiated in the seminal work of Goldwasser 
and Micali [GM84], is rooted in computational complexity theory. Adversaries are 
modeled as arbitrary probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines, that have 
access to oracles (for encryption or decryption). Security is then typically  expressed 
as the adversary’s inability to distinguish (with probability significantly better 
than 1/2) whether they have access to an encryption oracle or to a function that 
always simply returns a random string. Proofs are then performed by reduction: 
an adversary who can win such an indistinguishability game can be used to 
 efficiently construct an adversary who can invert the underlying one-way function 
or distinguish the underlying block cipher from a random permutation. Hence, the 
proof essentially shows that breaking the construction is as hard as solving the 
underlying problem that is supposed to be hard. Such results have been obtained 
for classical modes of operation used to achieve authenticated symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption. However, there is still an important line of research on the 
design of new efficient modes of operation for symmetric encryption with a high 
security level. Indeed, most block-cipher modes of operation have their security 
limited by the so-called birthday-bound: they become insecure if the number of 
[FOPS01] E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, and J. Stern. RSA-OAEP is secure under the RSA 
assumption. In Proceedings of Crypto ‘01, volume 2139 of LNCS, 2001.  




[Gen09] C. Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In Proceedings of the 41st ACM 
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC’09), 2009. http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm? id=1536414.1536440 
[BSW11] D. Boneh, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Functional encryption: Denitions and challenges. In Proceedings  
of Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC’11), 2011. http://ia.cr/2010/543..
calls to the underlying block cipher is close to 2n/2 where n is the block size. This is 
a major issue for lightweight cryptography since block ciphers operating on 64-bit 
blocks are preferred in these applications. This implies that the amount of data 
that can be encrypted under the same key must be much lower than 32 GBytes. 
This issue has been recently demonstrated on the CBC mode of operation used 
in HTTP over TLS and OpenVPN in an attack named Sweet32 5 that led the NIST 
to lower the limit before rekeying 3DES to 8 MBytes. Designing an efficient mode 
of operation with a higher security level is therefore an important open problem.
While this approach has been widely used for proving the security of public-key 
encryption schemes and signature schemes under well-known assumptions, it is 
now required for any new constructions, and namely for the advanced  constructions 
such as fully homomorphic encryption and functional encryption.
 3.2.2 Homomorphic and functional encryption 
With the development of outsourced storage and computing, classical 
 encryption is not enough: when encrypted, the privacy of the data is guaranteed, 
but no processing can be performed on the data. In 2009, Gentry [Gen09]  proposed the 
first encryption scheme that allows homomorphic operations: from the encryption 
of two messages, it is possible to produce the encryption of the sum or of the 
product, without any secret information. More concretely, it is possible to send 
encrypted data to the cloud, and let the cloud evaluate a circuit on this encrypted 
data. The cloud can then send back the encryption of the result, without having 
learned any information about the result. The owner of the decryption key can 
then decrypt the result. Whereas the initial construction of fully homomorphic 
encryption was prohibitive at both the computational and communicational 
 levels, many improvements have recently been proposed, and some small circuits 
can now be concretely evaluated.
However, the result output by the cloud is still encrypted under the same key 
as the inputs, thus it can only be shared with those who could already decrypt 
the inputs. This is the reason why, Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW11] proposed the 
notion of functional encryption: an authority can distribute functional decryption 
keys that help to compute the evaluation of a given function on the plaintext. 
The keys do however not leak the full input, but only the result of the computed 
function. The authority initially encrypts the data under a master key and  derives 
a  functional key kf for a chosen function f. The function f is evaluated on the 
plaintext data when decrypted with kf. This allows, for example, to do some 
 aggregation on data (statistical analysis) without revealing the data.
62
While classical techniques (discrete logarithm) allow to instantiate functional 
encryption for simple families of functions, such as the inner-product [ABDP15], it 
seems that lattice-based techniques will be required for advanced functions. 
Similarly, ElGamal encryption is (simply) homomorphic, but to achieve fully 
homomorphic encryption, lattice-based encryption, or some approaches with 
noise/error look necessary. Hence the huge activity on lattice-based and code-
based cryptography.
 [ Research challenge 4 ]  Computing on encrypted data 
The need for computing on encrypted data has emerged, in particular, with the 
 appearance of the cloud and outsourced computation. In cryptography, this problem 
can be solved using homomorphic or functional encryption. Gentry showed in 2009 in 
his breakthrough paper that it was indeed possible to construct a fully homomorphic 
encryption (FHE) scheme. However, this construction remained theoretical and was 
completely impractical due to its poor performance. Since then, significant progress 
has been made on FHE schemes, achieving approximately a still very low speed of 
50 logical gates per second. Significant progress will have extremely useful applications 
for privacy preserving cloud computing, where any technical advance may quickly be 
exploited as an economical advantage.
 3.2.3 Proofs of knowledge 
For verifiability of outsourced computations performed by the cloud that we do 
not trust, proofs are required to convince the user of the cloud’s honest behavior. 
There has been a huge activity in zero-knowledge or witness-indistinguishable 
proofs for privacy concerns. However, in the context of outsourced computing, 
the soundness and the succinctness of the proof are the most important issue, 
since there are no privacy concerns with respect to the user, hence the new SNARG 
(succinct non-interactive argument) primitive that provides succinct proofs for 
complex statements.
Still, usual zero-knowledge proofs are of major interest for anonymous 
 credentials and any kind of advanced authentication mechanisms that preserve 
anonymity. New techniques have recently been developed with the Smooth-
Projective Hash Functions (SPHFs).
Also, to limit interactions, Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs (NIZKs) 
have become more effective, first with the Groth-Sahai methodology, making it 
possible to prove many kinds of relations between committed scalars or groups 
elements, or more recently with the Quasi-Adaptive NIZKs, based on SPHFs that 
are more specific but more compact and efficient.
[ABDP15] M. Abdalla, F. Bourse, A. De Caro, and D. Pointcheval. Simple functional encryption schemes for inner 
products. In Proceedings of Public Key Cryptography (PKC’15), 2015
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 3.2.4 Computer-aided cryptography 
Carrying out reduction proofs in a rigorous way is extremely difficult  because 
they manipulate complex probabilistic algorithms. Indeed, the literature contains 
many examples of subtle errors in proofs, a famous example being the OAEP 
construction, “proven” in 1994 with an error discovered in 2001. In a position pa-
per, Halevi [Hal05] advocates the use of proof assistants to verify the correctness 
of the mundane parts of cryptographic proofs automatically. As for reductions 
in complexity theory, proofs consist of a creative part for finding the reduction 
and a mundane, but difficult, part which consists in verifying the correctness of 
the reduction. In recent years, several tools, including CryptoVerif 6, CertiCrypt, 
and EasyCrypt 7, have shown that these parts are indeed amenable to automated 
proof verification. The most mature and versatile of these tools is EasyCrypt: the 
tool consists in a dedicated interactive theorem prover that shows relational 
 properties on schemes modeled as probabilistic programs. While the tool offers  solid 
 guarantees it also requires a high level of expertise. For specific  applications, such as 
chosen plaintext or ciphertext security of encryption schemes, full  automation has been 
achieved with the dedicated ZooCrypt tool, resulting in the verification of numerous 
schemes and in the design of new ones proven secure. The area of computer-aided 
cryptography is currently expanding by widening its scope, including security of pri-
mitives against side channels, constructions based on pairings, applying these ideas 
to cryptographic protocols rather than schemes (see §4.3) and improving automation.
 [ Inria teams ] Cryptographic primitives and schemes 
↗ The ARIC team is working on lattice-based cryptography (LBC). Lattice algorithmics 
is an established research area that is being revived by LBC and by the new tools and 
concepts that it introduced. Their goal is to contribute to the major technological 
switch, from conventional to lattice-based cryptography.
↗ The CARAMBA team studies mathematical, algorithmic, and high-performance 
soware aspects for asymmetric cryptography based on number theory (RSA and 
Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems, elliptic curves). Their cryptanalytic work demonstrates 
the urgent need to increase key sizes for several of these primitives. The team is also 
involved in the design and cryptanalysis of symmetric cryptographic primitives (in 
particular in the lightweight context).
↗ The CASCADE team focuses on the provable security aspects of the advanced  primitives 
or in advanced settings. They namely study the privacy-preserving primitives (such 
as FHE, functional encryption, etc.), but they also consider powerful adversaries, with 
side-channel attacks and quantum computers.
[Hal05] Sh. Halevi. A plausible approach to computer-aided cryptographic proofs. Technical Report 181, 




↗ The GRACE team works in algorithmic number theory and the computational issues 
related to algebraic curves over various fields and arithmetic rings. They also build 
codes for error correction. Their goal is to provide better cryptosystems and better 
security assessments for their key sizes.
↗ The LFANT team researches algorithms in number theory and arithmetic geometry. 
They cover all aspects from complexity theory over optimized implementations up to 
cryptologic applications.
↗ The goal of the MARELLE team is to study and use techniques for verifying 
 mathematical proofs on the computer to ensure the correctness of soware. They 
have applied their techniques in the context of cryptographic proofs by contributing 
to the development of the EasyCrypt special purpose proof assistant.
↗ The OURAGAN team works on effective computations of algebraic objects with 
 applications to cryptology.
↗ The POLSYS team develops efficient algorithms for computing the complex or real 
solutions in finite fields. Cryptology is one of the many applications, where it can be used 
in the emerging topic of algebraic cryptanalysis. This consists in reducing the security 
of a cryptosystem to the solving of an algebraic system with coefficients in a finite field.
↗ The SECRET team works on the design and analysis of symmetric primitives, of 
 asymmetric primitives based on error-correcting codes and on cryptographic schemes 
based on the law of physics. They have contributed to the design of several primitives 
(stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions, code-based encryption and signature 
schemes, and key-exchange), and too many cryptanalytic works in these areas. They 
notably focus on the design quantum-safe primitives and investigate the use of  quantum 
algorithms for attacking both symmetric and asymmetric schemes.
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3.3  Cryptographic protocols and services: 
towards provable security
 [ Summary ] 
Security of communications and transactions is nowadays ensured by the means 
of cryptographic protocols, e.g., TLS. The security of the underlying cryptographic 
 primitives and schemes is however not sufficient to guarantee overall security goals, 
such as  confidentiality, authenticity, or anonymity. Even careful scrutiny of these 
 protocols by  experts, cannot guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities: rigorous, 
 possibly  computer-aided, security proofs are therefore absolutely needed at the 
level of  specifications and implementations to further increase the confidence level.
We can distinguish three approaches in this area. The first one uses proofs by reduction 
to show that breaking the security of a protocol would imply  breaking the underlying 
cryptographic primitives. These are mathematical, generally handwritten, proofs 
 although a new trend consists in using techniques from theorem proving and program 
verification to achieve computer checked proofs. The second direction uses automated 
verification tools to analyze the protocol specifications and find vulnerabilities in 
the protocol logic, such as man in the middle attacks. These tools are able to analyze 
 complex protocols, but idealize the underlying cryptography. Finally, the third approach 
aims at producing verified implementations. This approach relies on expressive type 
systems for special purpose programming languages and requires high expertise, but 
can result in an end-to-end verified implementation. A major success in this area is a 
completely verified implementation of TLS.
Strong cryptography is itself not sufficient to  ensure security goals at a  higher 
level, e.g. securing  communications or web transactions. Correctly using and 
 programming with cryptography is a complicated task and there are many  examples 
of security vulnerabilities that do not require breaking the underlying  cryptography 
(see the Heartbleed, French Passport, and TLS attack examples below). It is 
 therefore important to design and analyze protocol standards and libraries that 
make use of cryptography to guarantee higher-level properties.
Cryptographic protocols, such as TLS (Transport Layer Security), IKE (Internet 
Key Exchange), or Kerberos, are in charge of securing our connections and web 
transactions. They are distributed programs that use cryptography to ensure, 
for instance, the confidentiality of transmitted data and the authentication of 
communications and entities. With the increasing diversity of electronic services 
they are quickly spreading out: for instance, they are the basis for the security of 
messaging applications and of RFID enabled objects, such as electronic passports; 
they are also central in security services such as the widespread Single-Sign-On 
(SSO) or cloud-based services.
3.3_Cryptographic protocols and services: towards provable security
66
Securing data exchange on the internet – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
The design of protocols and security standards requires expertise in  several 
areas of computer science including cryptography, computer networks, and also 
secure implementation. This task is difficult, even for experts, who may miss 
 attacks due to the high complexity of these protocols. One of the difficulties in 
 correctly designing and implementing cryptographic protocols comes from the 
fact that security must be guaranteed in the presence of an arbitrary attacker that 
controls the network and may compromise protocol participants. Vulnerabilities 
may arise at all levels. For instance, the famous Heartbleed 8 attack is due to an 
implementation error, allowing a memory overflow, in the popular OpenSSL 
 implementation of TLS: this attack did not reveal an error in the protocol  specification, 
nor did it break the underlying cryptography. An early version of the French  electronic 
passport 9 was shown to be vulnerable to a linkability attack, enabling passport 
holders to be traced. The vulnerability was due to  imprecisions in the protocol 
specification regarding the error messages: the French e-passport used detailed 
error messages, effectively allowing to differentiate a particular, previously  observed 
passport, from another one, by using a replay attack. Finally, the FREAK 10 and 
LogJam 11 attacks on TLS mix vulnerabilities at different levels to downgrade the 
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed 





cryptographic key lengths. Dealing correctly with legacy code to guarantee backward 
compatibility, but avoiding downgrade attacks is extremely tricky.
As illustrated by the above examples, designing protocols and services  correctly 
and guaranteeing their security is a difficult task. Therefore, rigorous security 
proofs and formal analysis techniques are needed to further improve their security. 
There have been different complementary approaches and research directions: 
some analyze protocols at the specification level, whereas others directly analyze 
the protocol implementation; the analysis may focus on the protocol logic or the 
underlying cryptography; the degree of automation may also vary, ranging from 
completely hand-written proofs, to fully automated analysis, as well as interactive 
computer-checked proofs.
 3.3.1 Provable security for cryptographic protocols 
The provable security approach, initially introduced to give solid security 
guarantees for cryptographic schemes, relies on reductionist proofs (inspired 
by the proofs in computational complexity): typically, one shows that breaking 
the cryptographic primitive is at least as difficult as breaking an underlying 
 computationally hard problem, such as factoring, computing discrete logarithms, 
etc. This approach has been applied to protocols, where the reduction shows, for 
instance, that breaking an expected security property is as hard as breaking an 
underlying cryptographic primitive. The adversaries that are considered are  arbitrary 
 probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines that may interact in  different ways 
with legitimate protocol participants and compromise some of them.
There have also been proposals for general frameworks for rigorously designing 
security protocols. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols provide a 
general model for computing the result of a function, allowing different parties 
that do not trust each other to provide confidential input. MPC protocols make it 
possible to implement a variety of protocols, but efficient constructions, secure 
against strong adversaries, are still an active and challenging research topic. 
Another family of frameworks, called universally composable, or simulation-based, 
aim at being highly modular and showing security of components that can be 
assembled into larger systems. Being able to split the proof of a complex system 
into proofs of its components can pave the way for creating secure-by-design 
protocols that can be used as building blocks for larger systems.
In the work described above, proofs are generally carried out by hand, making 
them error-prone. As for cryptographic schemes, there have been initiatives to 
automate proofs in these models, e.g., through the CryptoVerif tool, or to use 
dedicated interactive theorem proving, e.g., EasyCrypt. Improving the scope and 
the automation of these tools is still a challenging, active research field.
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 3.3.2 Symbolic automated analysis of cryptographic protocol specifications 
Symbolic automated analysis of cryptographic protocols focuses on the 
 protocol logic and its concurrent behavior and can be applied to complex  protocol 
 specifications. While the goals are similar to those described in the previous 
 section, the techniques and the underlying models differ. In symbolic models 
the so-called Dolev-Yao [DY81] attacker is supposed to control the communication 
network  comple tely: an attacker can read any message sent on the network, 
 remove messages, and insert (or modify) messages. The attacker is computationally 
 unbounded, but the cryptographic primitives are idealized: the way an attacker can 
manipulate messages is explicitly given by a set of rules. Such rules typically specify 
that when the attacker knows an encryption and the corresponding decryption 
key the plaintext can be extracted —however, no other unspecified operation 
(such as cryptanalysis) is allowed. Hence, these models manipulate cryptographic 
 primitives at an abstract, axiomatic level. However, so-called soundness results [AR07] 
link this approach to the provable security approach (showing that a symbolic 
proof implies the existence of a computational one), even though their scope is 
rather limited. Relying on techniques from automated reasoning and  concurrency 
theory, proofs in symbolic models can oen be completely automated, exploring 
all possible attacker behaviors. Mature, automated tools, e.g., ProVerif 12, as well as 
Tamarin 13 and AVISPA 14 exist nowadays for analyzing many security goals. Major 
research areas in this field consist in applying these tools to a larger class of security 
properties (technically this requires showing behavioral program equivalences) 
that allow us to analyze anonymity and privacy-like properties, to consider  protocol 
executions on partially compromised platforms, and to scale to protocols with a 
complex underlying control flow.
 3.3.3 Verified protocol implementations 
As illustrated by the Heartbleed attack, implementation bugs may introduce 
 serious vulnerabilities. Therefore, techniques from the field of programming 
 languages have been used to study the security of implementations directly. This 
approach primarily relies on the use of expressive type systems to state security 
theorems directly at the implementation level. One particular successful approach in 
this area relies on the F* language 15, a strongly-typed higher-order effectful  language 
especially designed for developing proven implementations. For instance, the F* 
[DY81] D. Dolev and A. Yao. On the security of public key protocols (extended abstract). In Proceedings 
of FOCS’81, 1981. 
[AR07] Martn Abadi and Phillip Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational 






language has been used in the miTLS project 16, a collaboration between Microso 
Research and Inria that resulted in a completely proven, reference  implementation 
of the TLS 1.2 protocol and the new candidate protocol for TLS 1.3, going down to the 
level of the implementation of the cryptographic primitives. Currently, this approach 
only applies to carefully written  implementations with many type  annotations. A 
major challenge in this area is to make it applicable to more general code, which 
might not have been written by a formal methods expert. Another direction 
consists in extracting models directly from  implementations, either by specifying 
small language subsets, or in a more dedicated setting by probing the system in a 
black-box manner. These models can then be automatically analyzed.
 3.3.4 Electronic voting over the Internet 
We finish this chapter with a particular application of cryptographic  protocols: 
e-voting. Elections are arguably a cornerstone of modern democracies and a 
 security critical process. Estonia has been pioneering this practice since 2005, and 
using Internet elections even for national parliament elections. Some regions in 
Switzerland and Australia also offered the use of Internet voting. In France, Internet 
voting was proposed to French citizens living abroad in the 2012  national election, 
but in the 2017 elections, this offer was not renewed, because of security concerns.
The main security guarantees an election must offer are vote secrecy and 
 correctness of the result. Vote secrecy should ensure that nobody knows how 
a given voter voted (unless this can be deduced from the election result, e.g., 
in case of a unanimous vote). Correctness ensures that the result corresponds 
to the tally of the votes, as expressed by all eligible voters. In traditional paper 
elections, at least in France, these properties are ensured through a voting ritual, 
with a transparent ballot box, a voting booth which provides the necessary  privacy 
to cast a vote secretly, and observers monitoring the box and the tally. The use 
of computers and machines significantly complicates this task, as computer 
programs may contain errors and correctness of a system is difficult to ensure. 
Moreover, the soware may be intentionally tampered with, or a malware may 
alter its functionality. This may both change the votes, as well as leak the individual 
votes of persons, hence breaking both fundamental properties of an election.
To overcome the above-mentioned problems, cryptographically enforced 
secret, end-to-end verifiable elections have been proposed. Secrecy is  generally 
achieved by casting an encrypted vote. This vote is then either mixed with other 
ballots before decryption, so that it can no longer be linked to the voter’s  identity, 
or the tally is performed homomorphically, i.e., the tally is computed on the 
encrypted votes providing an encryption of the result, without a decryption 
of individual votes. This ensures that even the tallier and server collecting the 
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votes are unable to break vote secrecy. Correctness is achieved by the notion 
of end-to-end verifiable elections: the voter can verify that their vote has been 
correctly recorded and that the tally was performed correctly. For this, the system 
generates  cryptographic proofs that the operations were performed correctly. 
This property actually avoids having to verify the correctness of the soware 
performing the tally, as it generates evidence, i.e., mathematical proofs that can 
be verified  independently of the result correctness.
 [Highlights] The Belenios e-voting system 
The PESTO team has been working on precise definitions of the properties a voting 
system should guarantee and the formal verification of these properties. This work 
permitted the discovery of an attack on the popular Helios voting scheme and also 
clarified the trust assumptions of many protocols. The PESTO and CARAMBA teams 
 develop the Belenios voting system: a free, open-source voting system that guarantees 
vote secrecy and verifiability, including verifiability of the casted votes’ eligibility, hence 
avoiding ballot stuffing. Still, this system, as many others, has short-comings: it does 
not prevent coercion, as a voter can prove how they voted. The system is therefore only 
recommended for low coercion elections. Moreover, it is vulnerable to malware that 
may be installed on the machine running the voting client: such a malware could leak 
the vote, breaking secrecy, or change the vote before it is encrypted (and verifiability 
only allows to track the encrypted ballot). Solving coercion-resistance and malware- 
resistance in a satisfactory way are still open research questions.
Moreover, one should note that Internet voting removes the privacy guarantee of a 
voting booth and requires a means to identify voters remotely. This is actually the 
case for any remote voting scheme, including paper-based ones, such as postal voting. 
Finally, cryptographic e-voting schemes also require voters to trust some experts as 
they rely on advanced mathematical notions, making their understanding difficult. 
Therefore, these systems seem not yet ready for high stakes, e.g., political, elections.
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 [ Research challenge 5 ] End-to-end formally verified cryptographic protocols
As the security of cryptographic protocols is extremely difficult to ensure (pencil and 
paper proofs regularly contain errors), the use of rigorous, formal methods appears 
increasingly as the only way to achieve the expected security level for this class of 
 systems. Therefore, the area of computer-aided security proofs is an increasingly 
important topic and must include all aspects from the specification down to the 
implementation. Recent work, in particular around TLS 1.3, have shown that this is 
now achievable.
However, such proofs still require carefully craed code and a very high level of expertise. 
Leveraging the proof techniques to make them applicable to more general code and 
usable by a wider audience is now the main challenge. Different protocols oen ensure 
different security properties, but existing tools for verifying certain properties, such 
as anonymity, do not yet have the same maturity as tools for verifying authentication 
properties. Yet another challenge is to consider stronger adversary models, e.g., an 
adversary that may control part of the computer through malware.
 [ Inria teams ] 
There are several Inria teams working on formal proofs and analysis of cryptographic 
protocols:
↗ The CASCADE team, in addition to their work on cryptographic primitives, also works 
on the design of protocols and their security analysis in computational models.
↗ The aim of the PESTO team is to build formal models and techniques, for  computer-aided 
analysis and design of security protocols, using techniques from automated reasoning, 
concurrency theory, and programming languages. They are particularly interested in 
automated analysis of anonymity properties and e-voting protocols. They contribute to 
the development of several tools, including AVISPA a, DEEPSEC b, and the Tamarin c prover.
↗ The PROSECCO team conducts formal and practical security research on  cryptographic 
protocols, soware security, web security, and hardware protection mechanisms. To 
this end, they design and implement programming languages, formal verification 
tools, dynamic monitors, testing frameworks, verified compilers, etc. They develop the 
automated protocol prover ProVerif d and contribute to the design of the F* language 
that they used to develop a completely verified implementation of TLS. They have also 
worked on extracting models from implementations of the PKCS#11 key management 
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4
Security services  
and mechanisms
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When a user starts using a computer system, she first identifies  herself 
 (identification), then she proves that she really is who she claims to be 
 (authentication). This proven identity is then used by the system to grant or 
restrict access to a resource or service only to authorized users or entities (access 
control), or to avoid a specific information to flow to a given destination (flow 
control) through the actions of a user. When a user needs to execute a program 
on an untrusted machine, a hardware-based solution may guarantee isolation 
and soware integrity. All these security services are  preventive. Unfortunately, 
they can sometimes be bypassed by attackers and therefore reactive security is 
also needed. The user actions are therefore monitored to verify that they do not 
violate the security policy (intrusion detection and alert correlation). Of course, 
such a policy violation may have occurred without the user’s knowledge, who 
may have been attacked by a malware acting on her behalf. Malware analysis and 
detection are thus other security services to offer. Ideally, if ever an intrusion or 
a malware is detected, the system should react and at least reconfigure itself to 
avoid another similar attack.
In the remainder of this chapter, we successively present the security services 
that have been introduced above: identification and authentication (§4.1), access 
and flow control (§4.2), trusted computing (§4.3), intrusion detection and alert 
correlation (§4.4), malware analysis and detection (§4.5), and reaction (§4.6).
4.1  Identification and authentication
 [ Summary ] 
Identification and authentication are generally the first two security services used 
when initiating a cyber exchange, either between a human being and a machine or 
between two machines.
Identification, for a given entity (i.e., a user, service, device, etc.), is the act of stating its 
identity. Authentication, for this entity, is the act of proving that it is really the entity 
it previously claimed to be.
Authentication is used to restrict access to a resource or service only to authorized users 
or entities. Authentication is achieved by presenting an authenticator that  generally 
belongs to one of the following three classes: what you know, e.g., a password or pin; 
what you have, e.g., an access card; what you are, e.g., mechanisms based on biometry. 
These authenticators are oen combined in so-called multi-factor authentication. 
Despite their numerous drawbacks, passwords remain the most common means of 
authentication.
Another form of identification is the ownership of a piece of data. This can be 
 achieved through watermarking, which consists in hiding messages in the data. A 
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good  watermarking technique must create a robust link between the piece of media 
and the hidden message, such that distorting the media does not erase the message. 
Watermarking is used in copyright management and copy protection, mainly focusing 
on multimedia content even if the spectrum of applications is larger and it may be 
used, e.g., to protect source codes, e.g., to protect source codes, or databases.
Identification, for a given entity (i.e., a user, service, device, etc.), is the act of stating 
its identity. For example, a user would provide their login. As such,  identification is 
not really a security service, as the entity can lie and give the wrong information. 
That is why the authentication service is needed ; it is the act of proving that it really 
is the one it claimed to be. For example, a user could reveal the password that is 
associated with their login.
Notice that some authors consider that authentication is a service related to iden-
tification. As such, the word identification can be used for “identity authentication.”
 4.1.1 User authentication 
Authentication is used to restrict access to a resource or service only to 
 authorized users or entities. For example, to access a system a login and password 
are required 1. Many on-line services provided by private companies or public 
administrations also require user authentication. In such cases, identification 
happens through a network and the means for identification may be coupled 
with a cryptographic protocol such as TLS (Transport Layer Security).
Authentication is achieved by presenting an authenticator that is generally in 
one of the following three classes:
• what you know, e.g., a password or pin;
• what you have, e.g., an access card;
• what you are, e.g., mechanisms based on biometry.
These authenticators are oen combined in so-called multi-factor  authentication. 
For example, cash withdrawal with a credit card requires both possession of the 
credit card and knowledge of the pin. Creating a new user identity, letting the 
user manage it, offering a password recovery service, and perhaps multi-factor 
 authentication is however a highly complex task.
Passwords remain the most common means of authentication. Unfortunately, 
password  management is complicated, both for the user who wants to be  identified 
and the system that grants the access. On the system side, passwords need to be 
stored. However, passwords must not be stored as plaintext 2, as a leak of the stored 
1. Data authentication is different from entity authentication and is generally achieved using cryptographic 
means, e.g., by a key exchange protocol, and the use of a message authentication code (MAC) with the resulting 
key, see Chapter 3. 
2. See, e.g., Recommendation R22 in ANSSI Note technique - Recommendations pour la securisation des sites 
web. [in French] https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/NP_Securite_Web_NoteTech.pdf
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list would directly compromise all user accounts and passwords. It is  therefore 
highly recommended to store only the hash value of the passwords, using a one-
way hash function. Moreover, as passwords need to be easily remembered by 
humans, they are vulnerable to dictionary (or guessing) attacks, i.e., brute-force 
attacks by enumeration. We distinguish online and offline guessing attacks. In 
online guessing attacks, an attacker tries all possible passwords by executing 
the identification mechanism for each trial. These attacks can be thwarted by 
adding an additional delay aer an unsuccessful trial or limiting the number of 
attempts, making this approach infeasible. Offline guessing attacks are possible 
when a list of hashed passwords is leaked. To avoid the same brute-force attack 
being applied to all passwords at the same time, a salt value is used: for each 
user, one stores a random value, called salt, and the hash value of the result of 
the concatenation of the password with the salt. Some hash functions are also 
specially designed to be costly in time and memory consumption, in particular 
on dedicated hardware, to slow down brute force attacks.
Ideally, one would like to have a hash function that is fast when verifying 
 correct passwords and slow on incorrect ones: this idea has been partially  realized 
by the notion of pepper. Similar to salt, an additional random value, the pepper, 
is hashed. This value is however not stored, and must be brute-forced: when the 
correct password is provided the expected number of hashes is N/2, where N is 
the number of possible pepper values, while N hashes are needed to discard an 
incorrect password. From the user’s perspective passwords are oen  complicated 
to manage: ideally passwords should be difficult to guess and should not be  re-used 
for different services. Some services require the use of digits or special  characters 
in passwords. However, recent recommendations 3 question this practice and 
recommend longer passwords, also called passphrases. Indeed, studies on real 
data have shown that without constraints, the word “password” appears as one of 
the most popular choices. When adding special characters or digits “password” is 
replaced by “password!” and “password123” in the list of most frequent passwords, 
hence not improving the security. A good practice is therefore to use a password 
manager that encrypts all passwords using one master password. Non-technical 
attacks such as social engineering or phishing are discussed in §2.3.1.
Given the high number of password leaks, there have been efforts to either 
get completely rid of passwords or couple them with a second authenticator. 
More widespread, is the use of two-factor authentication. For online payment, 
the 3D-secure protocol may rely on a confirmation code, sent by SMS to your 
mobile phone, that needs to be re-entered on the device used for the payment. 
The goal is to prove both knowledge of the credit card number and possession of 
the phone. Similarly, the Google 2 Step protocol, can either send a confirmation 
3. NIST Special Publication 800-63B. Digital Identity Guidelines – Authentication and Lifecycle Management – 
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html
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code, require a tap on the phone, or be configured to require the use of a FIDO 
U2F USB dongle plugged in your computer. These multi-factor protocols generally 
offer additional security. However, the increased complexity of both the protocol 
and the recovery methods, e.g., when a phone is lost or broken, may sometimes 
increase the attack surface.
Biometry is another means of user identification that relies on sensors to 
measure biologic characteristics, such as fingerprint, iris, voice, or face specificities. 
An inherent difference with other authenticators is that biological data is a priori 
not secret and cannot be modified, or replaced. Therefore, sensors are becoming 
more sophisticated in order to distinguish the physical presence from a copy (e.g., 
a fake finger with a copy of the fingerprint or a photo of a face). Although these 
means are becoming increasingly popular, e.g., laptops and mobile phones can 
be unlocked using fingerprint or, more recently, face recognition, they still suffer 
from false negatives and false positives. Therefore, it is recommended that they 
are only used as a second factor authenticator.
 4.1.2 Identification of data owner: watermarking 
Data hiding is the art of hiding messages into a cover media. It encompasses 
two branches, steganography and watermarking, where the word ‘hiding’ finds 
two different meanings.
•In steganography, ‘hiding’ messages means that an adversary, the  steganalyzer, 
cannot statistically detect whether a piece of media contains a secret message. 
Thus, changing or not changing the value of a pixel of an image that is shared by 
two or more people is a simple (and actually naive) way of transmitting hidden 
information between these people. Steganography finds application in Intelligence 
services with steganalysis in fight against terrorism for example.
• In watermarking, ‘hiding’ means that secret messages are deeply embedded 
into media. This secret can be invisible to a human being, making the watermark 
a special case of steganography. It creates a robust link between a piece of media 
and the secret such that distorting the media (for example, rotating or cropping 
an image) does not erase the secret. Watermarking finds application in copyright 
management and copy protection. For instance, watermarking identifies the 
owner of a piece of data by embedding in their piece of media their identity as 
a hidden message.
While literature about watermarking mainly focuses on multimedia content, 
the spectrum of the cover media natures is very broad: programs (protection of 
source codes, parameters of Deep Learning classifiers, etc.), databases, maps, 3D 
objects, or DNA sequence.
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Watermarking should not spoil the regular use of the cover media. For multimedia 
content, the user should not perceive any difference. Watermark embedding makes 
a big usage of human perceptual models. For programs, a drop in performance 
(relevance of the output, runtime) should be kept small. For databases, querying 
should yield similar answers.
The robustness of watermarking is gauged by measuring how the probability 
of a hidden message decoding error increases as the protected media is more 
and more distorted. The worst-case attack is defined as the attack maximizing 
this error probability for a given level of distortion.
Watermarking is nothing more than a secret communication scheme. 
Embedding and decoding share a secret key which defines how the message to 
be hidden modulates a given part of the cover media. Security enters the picture 
when the same secret key is used to protect many pieces of media. It amounts to 
answering the question as to whether an adversary can estimate the secret key by 
analyzing these watermarked pieces of media. Once the secret key is disclosed, the 
adversary may erase the watermark (removing any proof of ownership), modify 
the watermark or embed their own watermark into any media to usurp ownership.
The actual trend in watermarking moved away from ownership authentication 
to media consumer identification. This especially concerns confidential and highly 
valuable documents. Thanks to watermarking, the identification code of a user 
is embedded into their copy of the media to make it unique. This will disclose 
the identity of the user who has leaked the content. It does not prevent illegal 
redistribution per se, but it is a dissuasive weapon to avoid leakage. Identification 
codes are designed such that even if a collusion of several users mix their copies, 
the decoding will identify at least one of the traitors.
Another trend is emerging making the connection between data hiding and 
the generation of adversarial samples deluding deep learning classifiers.
Robust watermarking is a mature technology. Many research results have 
already been transferred to real life products. The number of research works on 
the topic has drastically decreased in recent years. The main consumer of water-
marking technology is the entertainment industry. However, a robust and secure 
watermarking doesn’t exist yet. It appears that the entertainment industry has 
little interest in security and is satisfied with the level of robustness achieved 
so far. More research on watermarking as a means to authenticate ownership 
is thus not recommended. The trend is on a cross-layer design of watermarking 
and traitor tracing codes, and on the development of protocols between parties 
(content owners, content distributors and content consumers), who do not trust 
one and another.
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 [ Inria teams ] Identification and authentication 
↗ The LINKMEDIA team and its spin-off company Lamark work on multimedia (audio/
video) protection through watermarking. For example, in the domain of traitor tracing, 
the team proposes identification codes such that even if a collusion of several users mix 
their copies, the decoding will identify at least one of the traitors. From the attacker 
point of view, the team studies how an attacker who has one or several watermarked 
pieces of data can estimate the secret key used by the watermarking scheme.
↗ The MULTISPEECH team studies voice-based authentication and detection of spoofing 
attacks. It co-organizes the international ASVspoof challenge.
↗ The PESTO team applies formal, symbolic verification methods to analyze the security 
of multi-factor authentication protocols.
↗ The PROSECCO team uses symbolic verification in ProVerif to analyze web  authentication 
protocols such as OAuth 2.0 and ACME with respect to a novel web attacker threat model.
4.2  Access control and flow control
 [ Summary ] 
Enforcing security first involves precisely defining which previously identified and 
 authenticated entity may have access to what information and in which way. Classically, access  
permissions (reading or writing) to information are granted if and only if some condition is 
fulfilled (for example, the user who asks for access is correctly authenticated). A  read-write  
sequence engenders an information flow that may also be controlled in some cases.
Preventive security requires to first define precisely which entity may access 
what information and in which way. Classically, permissions to read or write 
 information are granted if and only if some condition is fulfilled. For example, 
the Bell-LaPadula policy states that high level (i.e., secret) information cannot 
flow into low level (i.e., public) containers.
To implement such a policy, each information container (e.g., a file) is classified 
(e.g., secret or public) depending on the type of information it contains and each 
user has a clearance (e.g., secret or public) depending on the type of information 
they need to know, given their role in the organization: a secret-level user can read 
both public or secret containers, but can only write into secret containers. This 
 ensures that previously read secret information will never flow to a public container 
in which a public-level user can read.
Practically speaking, the implementation of a security policy generally builds 
on access control and flow control mechanisms, implemented at the operating 
system level.
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 4.2.1 Access control 
Access control generally refers to regulating the requests to access the resources 
managed by an information system. This regulation can happen in various places 
of the information system: at the network level (in firewalls), at the node level (in 
operating systems), or at the service level (in applications).
At the network level, firewalls allow access to the network resources for 
 authenticated users or legitimate traffic and deny access to unauthenticated users 
or illegitimate traffic. However, bad configuration of a firewall may cause security 
breaches. In particular, conflicted filtering rules can lead to blocked legitimate 
traffic and to accepted unwanted packets.
In operating systems, access control enforces the security policy by granting 
authorizations to subjects (i.e., authenticated users or processes) on objects (i.e., 
resources like data, network, computation facilities, etc.). Many access control 
models have been proposed and some have been widely used for decades, like 
the DAC and RBAC models. Such models typically represent the authorizations 
as triples (subject, object, permission) and are frequently  employed in operating 
systems and databases. Many variants of these models have been proposed in the 
last decade, to capture additional information such as the context of the access 
(time, location, etc.), the purpose of the applications, or the  specificities of the 
organizations; this gave rise to context-based,  purpose-based, and  organization- 
based access control.
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Today such solutions are well established and oen normalized. In general, 
these models consider a centralized architecture, i.e., the resources and  additional 
information required to define the access control policies are located on the server 
side and managed by trusted authorities and administrators.
More recently, cloud computing and the emerging areas of user-centric  systems 
and the Internet of Things (IoT), put a new light on access control  research. 
While the goal is still to define, evaluate, and enforce authorizations, the intrinsic 
 specificities of these contexts induce a deep rethinking of the access control models 
and their enforcement strategies. In cloud computing, data and computations 
being outsourced to potentially untrusted entities, access control management 
must adapt to new trust assumptions. In user-centric systems, the focus is on 
enabling access control management without resorting to IT experts. The IoT 
raises the problem of adapting the access control when the Things, who have 
scarce resources, collect the data.
In addition, Things (e.g., embedded sensors or GPS devices, pedometers, smart 
meters, connected TVs, toys) track the events occurring in their surroundings and 
thus generate sensitive data. A myriad of new applications and services are being 
built by querying this data. Designing access control models for the Internet of 
Things is thus a critical problem, although difficult because of two conflicting 
objectives: (i) the access control model should be generic enough to cover the 
needs of highly diverse applications and (ii) it should be lightweight considering 
the hardware constraints of the Things they target. So far, the data collected by 
Things end up on centralized servers where they are analyzed and queried.
In human centric contexts (e.g., the personal cloud), individuals want to 
 manage their personal data themselves, i.e., under their control and not delegate 
this task to a central administrator. However, designing a well-calibrated access 
control policy, and enforcing it, confronts the individuals with the difficult choice 
between delegating the data administration to a qualified third party and giving up 
their sovereignty or taking charge of it themselves using complex sharing models 
and tricky security protocols that they probably do not master. Hence the need to 
design new access control models, simple enough to be managed by individuals.
To conclude, although access control is a long-lasting research issue, the evolution 
of computing architectures opens important new lines of research. The current trend 
suggests that the access control, usually thought in a centralized context, should be 
considered in a more distributed and global context, i.e., regulating data accesses 
along the whole life cycle of the data, from the Things that collect it to the Cloud 
that stores it. In terms of enforcement, this also calls to complement access control 
with security techniques like encryption, data flow control, and trusted computing.
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 4.2.2 Information flow control 
Information flow control consists in monitoring how a piece of information 
flows through a system or a program. The goal is to ensure either statically or 
dynamically that a piece of private information is manipulated according to its 
security property. A typical property is that a private information does not leak 
towards a public channel.
DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW TRACKING 
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a popular and versatile technique 
for monitoring the flow of information through a system. Typically, data entering 
the system is tagged according to its security levels and tags are propagated through 
the system. This technique can be used to monitor a system and ensure that the 
flow of information abides the security policy. A basic property is that untrusted 
user-provided data is sanitized before being processed. DIFT is also a powerful tool 
for penetration testing and vulnerability analysis: a bug, e.g., a buffer overrun, may 
be considered a security vulnerability if the data is influenced by an untrusted input.
DIFT analysis can be performed at various levels of granularity. At the system 
level, the challenge is to instrument the operating system with security tags and 
get a solution that is correct, precise, and requires some limited maintenance. To 
improve the scalability of DIFT, several hardware solutions have been proposed. 
For instance, the CrashSafe project proposes a novel processor design. There are 
also less intrusive proposals where an independent co-processor is dedicated to 
managing security tags.
DIFT is often limited to direct information flows that can be enforced 
by  monitoring one execution at a time. Remarkably, DIFT can also enforce 
 hyper-properties, such as non-interference, which are trace set properties. As 
this monitoring stops the execution in case of violation, they turn an information 
leak into a termination leak that may be acceptable for some applications.
STATIC INFORMATION FLOW TRACKING 
There is a vast literature of type-systems for information flow. Sophisticated 
type-systems handle rich language features such as exceptions and method 
 dispatch. The JIF system for Java is probably the most impressive implementation 
of static information flow control. The traditional property that is enforced by 
type-systems is non-interference, which basically states that public data does 
not depend on private data. To accommodate programs that leak a controlled 
amount of information, e.g., cryptographic primitives, practical type-systems 
need to include a notion of declassification. Declassification may take on various 
forms but requires some kind of user-provided specification that is trusted by 
the system. In general, it is hard to predict whether the long-term effect of a 
declassification corresponds to the user-intent.
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QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION FLOW  
An alternative to declassification is Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) where 
the goal is to quantify either statically or dynamically the amount of information 
that is leaked by a system, through some observation by the attacker.
To prevent QIF, typical methods of security such as encryption and access 
control are not applicable: the only way is to obfuscate the link between the secret 
and the observable. Ideally, we would like systems to be completely secure, but in 
practice this goal is oen impossible to achieve. Therefore, it is important to have 
a quantitative theory of leakage, so as to measure the vulnerability of a secret, 
assess whether a system is better than another, or evaluate the effectiveness of 
a method to prevent leakage. The quantitative aspects stem from the fact that 
the knowledge of the adversary is typically of a probabilistic nature and that 
the best methods to prevent leakage are oen randomized methods. The most 
successful approaches to the foundations of quantitative information flow are 
based on information theory and on the notion of entropy (in various versions: 
Shannon, Rényi, or guessing). The entropy measures the vulnerability of the 
secret and the choice between various notions reflects the different operational 
adversary models that one is interested in.
A first drawback of QIF is that different definitions of leakage offer different, 
sometimes incomparable, security guarantees. QIF approach captures a large 
 variety of attacks (approximate guess, multiple guesses, or properties of the 
secret) and subsumes most of the information-theoretic approaches considered 
in the literature and their corresponding notions of entropy.
A second problem with QIF is that average probabilistic guarantees may not provide 
an adequate security guarantee in case of an active attacker, i.e., when the attacker 
controls some of the input data and tries to use it to trigger security vulnerabilities.
COMPILERS FOR INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT 
Another research trend aims at preserving high-level information flow  properties 
through the compiler chain. The flow of information matters for multitier languages 
where the compiler has the responsibility to decide which tier stores sensitive 
information and how to ensure the security of the  communications. Information 
flow is also a stringent matter for critical code, e.g.,  cryptographic  primitives, where 
any leakage due to the implementation may break the  mathematical security 
guarantee. In this context, the compiler aims at protecting against side-channel 
attacks, such as timing-attacks or power-analyses.
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 [ Inria teams ] Access control and flow control 
↗ The CELTIQUE team develops certified compiler techniques and analyses for protecting 
against timing-attacks. Together with the INDES team, CELTIQUE develops a theory for 
hybrid monitors that augments a dynamic information flow monitor with a (dynamic) 
static analysis of non-executed branches computing a symbolic and quantitative form 
of information flow. Together with the MARELLE team, CELTIQUE works at providing 
compiler support for constant time programming, a strict programming discipline 
adopted by cryptographers to limit timing leaks.
↗ The CIDRE team has a strong expertise in Dynamic Information Flow monitoring 
both at the system and hardware levels: the team develops the blare tool, an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) allowing, on Linux and Android, to dynamically evaluate the 
legality of information flows. A hardware device has been designed to improve the 
precision of this evaluation.
↗ The COMETE team proposed the theory for grounding security on notions of 
 quantitative information flow and developed the g-leakage framework. They also 
 developed the library Libqif a, a C++ toolkit implementing a variety of techniques related 
to g-leakage, quantitative information flow and differential privacy. This team is also 
investigating an approach based on Game Theory to limit the leakage of information 
in the presence of an active attacker.
↗ The FUN team investigates a way to avoid transmitting all the data collected by 
the Things to a server. The team uses decentralized storage to avoid reconstructing 
all data at once. In addition, it identifies malicious relay nodes to bypass them during 
the data collection process.
↗ The INDES team works at defining, comparing, and evaluating the limitations of different 
information flow policies -including declassification and computational noninterference 
for cryptography-  at the language level.  Applications domains mainly include  JavaScript, 
reactive, and multitier languages for IoT. The team also develops static, dynamic, and 
hybrid sound enforcement mechanisms for information flow security and works on 
preservation by compilation of information flow guarantees
↗ The RESIST team, in collaboration with the PESTO team, works on methods for 
 managing firewall configuration files that automatically reveal anomalies and help 
the administrator to find an adequate position for a newly added filtering rule.
↗ The PETRUS team designs access control mechanisms for the personal cloud that do 
not require the human user to understand the underlying access control  mechanisms 
for enforcing a given security policy. In the IoT context, the team designs control  models 
relying on embedded data management structures and algorithms for Things, so that 
data dissemination decisions can be evaluated closer to the data, within the Things 
that collected them.
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↗ The PROSECCO team aims at designing formally secure compilers for architecture 
with support for dynamic information flow control. The team also studies how hardware 
solutions for dynamic information flow tracking can be exploited to ensure that the 
running code satisfy security policies.
↗ The VALDA team studies both foundational and systems aspects of complex data 
management, especially human-centric data. They proposed a collaborative access 
control model in the context of the language Webdamlog (distributed datalog). This 
model allows individuals to declaratively specify powerful policies governing access 
to their data, dissemination of their data, and delegation of computation.
a. https://github.com/chatziko/libqif
4.3  Trusted computing
 [ Summary ] 
Trusted computing builds on assurances provided by secure hardware. Such hardware 
can ensure platform integrity and secure boot. It is also possible to provide trust at the 
application level rather than at the level of the whole platform by executing code in 
isolated, trusted execution environments, called enclaves. Additionally, these enclaves 
offer the possibility to attest that results were produced by a given code, opening the 
possibility for outsourced computation of secure data-oriented tasks.
Trusted computing consists in building secure hardware in order to derive 
global guarantees about computations made on a platform. The first use of this 
approach aimed at ensuring the platform integrity by using Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) and secure boot. A TPM includes a unique cryptographic key and 
can compute hash functions. This allows it to authenticate hardware devices and 
to verify that soware has not been changed, and thus to certify the integrity of 
the whole boot sequence. This permits the user to provide guarantees to external 
parties that their machine is indeed running a specific OS and specific applications. 
This approach aims at providing full platform integrity under the assumption 
that the OS and applications are trusted. Following this approach, TPM-based 
virtual machine monitors (VMM) have been developed, allowing for isolation of 
multiple guest OS’s and thus isolation of attacks on these OS’s. This led to the 
development of microkernels (e.g., SEL4) and unikernels (e.g., MirageOS), with the 
aim of minimizing the trust required in the OS and applications.
More recently, with the rise of secure areas in main processors (e.g., Intel’s 
Soware Guard Extension (SGX) and ARM’s Trustzone), one can guarantee that code 
and data in memory is protected with respect to confidentiality and integrity. It is 
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thus becoming possible to ensure trust at that application level rather than at the 
level of the whole platform. Indeed, these isolated execution environments offer 
the capabilities to execute code in enclaves, whose memory and control flow is 
protected from the environment (including the OS). Additionally, these enclaves 
provide attestation capabilities, i.e., means for an external party to check that 
claimed messages were indeed produced in an enclave running a specific piece 
of code. This much more versatile approach leads to many interesting research 
directions for securing computations both in the cloud and on home devices. 
Typical applications include secure licensing, which leverages guarantees provided 
by enclaves to ensure that licensed soware is not illegally used.
An important challenge related to this disruptive technology is studying 
its applicability in the case of secure outsourcing of (possibly distributed) data 
 computations. As Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) provide in hardware 
 security guarantees like confidentiality, integrity, and attestation, the code  running 
inside a (local or remote) TEE enclave can be considered as sticking close to a 
fully honest behavior. This opens up the field to generic, efficient, scalable,  secure 
data-oriented computation tasks. VC3 is a typical preliminary attempt by Microso 
towards trustworthy data analytics based on Intel SGX enclaves in the cloud. Two 
main research issues must however be overcome. First, the hardware security 
 properties provided by TEE enclaves cannot be considered as  unconditionally 
unbreakable and should lead to investigating slightly different threat models. 
Second, the most common data-oriented tasks (e.g., private search on the Web, 
secure data stream processing in the IoT, privacy preserving machine learning) 
must be  efficiently transposed in secure counterparts based on TEE’s. The challenge 
here is to optimize and secure the execution of data-oriented primitives according 
to the TEE constraints.
These lines of research are currently emerging. The current trend suggests 
that the availability and diversity of TEE technologies will increase in the near 
future. New solutions are forthcoming, with multicore platforms in which security/
isolation-oriented cores (à la SGX) would cohabit with other all-purpose cores, 
thus allowing for separation of tasks inside the CPU. This suggests that trusted 
computing will become ever more prominent in the near future, and Inria will 
contribute to the research efforts into this direction.
 [ Inria teams ] Trusted computing 
↗ The PETRUS team works on new properties to reason about secure hardware 
 computation in the context of distributed database computations, e.g., limiting the 
amount of data accessible to each agent/enclave. The team also studies database 
processing using secure elements or more advanced TEEs, like Intel SGX.
4.3_Trusted computing
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4.4  Intrusion detection and alert correlation
 [ Summary ] 
Nearly any system contains, generally unintentional, flaws. An attacker can exploit 
them to bypass existing preventive security mechanisms, e.g., access control. Therefore 
 system monitoring is of crucial importance to identify any violation of the security policy.
In order to detect intrusions, the main and largely deployed approach consists in 
 defining malicious symptoms and looking for their occurrences in various information 
sources (network, OS and application logs, etc.). An alternative consists in defining the 
normal activities of the monitored system and measuring the potential deviations 
from this normality. In both cases the challenge is to detect all intrusions but only 
the intrusions. In practice however, detection is far from being so perfect, leading to 
numerous false positives (false alerts) or false negatives (attacks not detected). This 
is why several Inria teams explore different ways of producing alerts.
Intrusion detection leads to a huge number of alerts, many of them being false positives. 
Thus an additional step is needed: alert correlation. This step consists in applying to the 
alert flow a series of transformations to improve the content of the alerts  progressively 
(for example by adding information on the success of the corresponding attacks, on 
the origin of the attacks, on the vulnerability that has been exploited, on related alerts, 
etc.) and thus increase the “situation awareness” of the administrator.
Numerous flaws (i.e., vulnerabilities) are introduced in any system during 
its design, implementation or configuration. Generally, this introduction is not 
intentional, but the malicious introduction of vulnerabilities is still a possibility. 
These vulnerabilities may be exploited to bypass preventive security mechanisms 
used to enforce the security policy. In addition to preventive security, a second 
line of defense, namely intrusion detection, is thus mandatory. It consists in 
monitoring systems in order to detect any violation of the enforced security 
policy. By “intrusion” we thus mean “violation of the security policy” which breaks 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Using a malware (virus, worm, logic bomb, 
etc.) is of course a good way to implement such a violation.
Intrusion detection is a reactive security service that consists in collecting 
 information on the operation of the system under surveillance and analyzing 
these activities to produce alerts if they are considered to be malicious. As the 
analyzer is very oen prone to generate false alerts, a second step of analysis 
considers the flow of alerts and tries to eliminate the false alerts from this flow. 
In addition, alerts are correlated in order to identify multi-step intrusion scenarii. 
Finally, once the remaining alerts can be trusted, reaction to detected intrusions 
can be considered.
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 4.4.1 Intrusion detection paradigms 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) analyzes data coming from either the 
network traffic (Network-based IDS, NIDS), the operating system or the  applications 
(Host-Based IDS, HIDS).
The analysis of these two categories of data follows two different detection 
paradigms: misuse-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection. Anomaly 
detection consists in defining normal activities of the monitored entity and in 
identifying any deviation from this normality; while misuse detection consists 
in modeling malicious activities and detecting occurrences of these activities.
The most classic misuse detection approach, popularized in the late 1990s with 
the snort NIDS 4, is to search for traces of known attacks in network packets. It 
involves constantly updating an attack-signature database; zero-day attacks 5 are 
usually not detected. Furthermore, a compromise has to be made between the 
selectiveness of the signatures and the risk of false positives and false negatives. 
Very selective signatures increase the risk of missing attack variants, while more 
generic signatures may result in high false-alarm rate. In practice, signatures have 
oen been very simple, thus very generic, in order to allow real time analysis of 
every event, usually leading to a higher rate of false positives.
Anomaly detection is less frequently used than misuse detection. Here,  defining 
the normality through a behavior model is of course the critical point. If the 
model is too precise, the detector raises a high number of false alarms; if it is 
too lax, it misses attacks. Finding a good balance is difficult, especially when the 
model is built using statistics or machine learning, because of the possibility of 
under training or over training. In addition, a good balance for a given activity 
may later become unacceptable when the activity evolves. In any case, dealing 
with legitimate but unplanned behavior is problematic for anomaly detection.
The information gathered in network packets can sometimes be too poor 
 semantically to allow for a good detection process. Therefore, intrusion and 
anomaly detection must also be addressed at both the application level and the 
operating system level. The most common anomaly detection mechanisms at 
application level consist in detecting a deviation of the control-flow of a program. 
A popular method to detect such anomaly is the use of application sequences of 
system calls. However, such methods can be bypassed by either mimicry  attacks [WS02] 
or attacks against the integrity of the system call parameters.
4. https://www.snort.org/ 
5. A zero day vulnerability is one that is unknown to those who would be interested in mitigating  
the vulnerability. 
[WS02] David Wagner and Paolo Soto. Mimicry attacks on host-based intrusion detection systems. In Proceedings  
of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (CCS), pages 255-264, New York, NY,  
USA, 2002. ACM.
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 [ Research challenge 6 ] Intrusion detection for encrypted networks 
Nowadays, intrusion detection is essentially realized at the network level. If, as 
 expected in the near future, the traffic were more systematically encrypted, which 
would of course be a good practice for security and privacy, the analysis of the 
network packets would become de facto inoperative, apart from the header analysis. 
Therefore, it  becomes important to study and design new mechanisms for monitoring 
information systems and producing alerts, at the application, middleware, operating 
system, and even firmware or hardware levels.
 4.4.2 Alert correlation 
We distinguish implicit and explicit alert correlation approaches. Implicit alert 
correlation uses data-mining paradigms to fuse or aggregate alerts, simply building 
on the similarity between alert features (e.g., IP addresses of the victim and the 
attacker), or using more advanced techniques to extract relevant  information from 
alert groups (mining rules between attributes of alerts). Explicit alert  correlation 
relies on security experts to specify logical and temporal constraints between 
alerts that correspond to complex attack scenarios, which generally require 
 several steps to achieve their ultimate goal. When a complete or partial intrusion 
scenario is detected, a higher-level alert is generated.
Additional information about the characteristics of the attacks and about 
the context in which they occur is also useful to the correlation process. This 
knowledge allows one to take the context into account while processing the 
alerts, to identify false positives or to evaluate if a given attack has any chance 
of being successful given the context in which it occurs.
Unfortunately, it often remains difficult to write correlation rules that 
 correctly exploit all the information available and that correctly translate the 
system  administrator’s expertise relative to possible attacks against the system. 
Automating the rule production is thus a current issue for research.
 [ Inria teams ] Intrusion detection and alert correlation 
↗ The CIDRE team has extensively studied intrusion detection (application level and 
network level) and alert correlation. At the application level, the team has proposed an 
approach to detect the corruption of data items that have an influence on the system 
calls. This approach consists in automatically building a data-oriented  behavior model 
of an application by static analysis of its source code that is used to build constraints on 
data manipulated by the program. The application is then instrumented with executable 
assertions to check these constraints at runtime. At the OS level, the team proposed an 
anomaly detection approach in which the behavior model is not learned but given in the 
form of an information flow policy. The basic idea is to define where each  information 
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(for example, the information contained in each file at the  initialization of the system) 
can be stored, potentially mixed with another information. As for correlation, the team 
introduced an attack description language allowing one to define alerts to be produced 
by the attack and the logico-temporal rules between these alerts. These rules are used 
to configure a correlation engine realized by the team. CIDRE also proposed with its 
partners a data model to represent a system under monitoring: this model can be used 
during the correlation process to bring contextual information, for example for false 
alert identification. As these correlation rules are sometimes hard to define, the team 
also proposed, in collaboration with the DGA, a comprehensive process to generate 
such rules as automatically as possible, starting from attack trees (see §3.4) that have 
usually already been realized by the administrator to evaluate the threats against its 
system during the risk analysis phase.
↗ The LACODAM team tackles the analysis of large network data to identify potential 
advanced persistent threats (APT) by discovering symptomatic patterns in the metadata 
of IP-packets. Finding such complex patterns over a large volume of streaming data 
implies revisiting the existing stream mining algorithms to improve their throughput 
dramatically, while guaranteeing a manageable false positive rate.
↗ The MYRIADS team investigates misuse detection in cloud environment contexts. This 
is particularly tricky as the information system can be dynamically and  automatically 
reconfigured. Security monitoring mechanisms should then be placed under control 
of the cloud provider and should follow the dynamics of the environment. In such a 
context, the team proposed a self-adaptable misuse detection system for IaaS clouds, 
which monitors changes in the virtual infrastructure of a cloud environment and 
 reconfigures security probes accordingly. In addition, the team proposed a method to 
enable a cloud customer to verify that a network intrusion detection system located 
in the operator infrastructure is correctly configured, according to the Service Level 
Objectives figuring in the Service Level Agreement.
↗ Focusing on network data, the RESIST team works at building solutions to  characterize 
and detect unwanted network behavior. The team proposed a clustering and  visualization 
method that allows one to analyze a large number of IP packets in order to make 
 malicious activity patterns easily observable by security analysts. The team also  proposed 
a technique to investigate https (thus encrypted) traffic. The team defined dedicated 
features for https traffic that are used as input for machine learning algorithms 
 processing full tls sessions. This allows the early identification of encrypted web  services 
in the tls session with a high degree of accuracy, which then enables anomaly  detection 
in the usage of identified services. Another interesting contribution of the team is 
related to quantification of the number of monitoring nodes required to ensure an 
acceptable false positive rate for different network topologies. The team has shown 
that the false positive rate can be reduced by strategic monitoring node placement.
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 [ Summary ] 
Malware (viruses, worms, ransomware, spyware, adware, trojan horses, keyloggers, 
rootkits, etc.) is of course a major threat to our information systems (OS, applications, 
and data), especially on the client side (PC’s or smartphones).
The goal of malware analysis is to obtain full understanding of a suspected malicious 
code: identify the targets (e.g., a particular end-user, a machine running a particular OS), 
attack actions (e.g., leakage of information, or encryption and ransom), techniques to 
bypass security mechanisms, and its own protection mechanisms to avoid detection. 
To succeed, the analysis must first defeat the anti-analysis protections put in place by 
the malware creator (obfuscation).
Malware detection is usually based on a the analysis of any information received 
by a device (a machine, a phone, a firewall) or even on the complete scan of the files 
contained in a machine. The detection engine compares the data retrieved to a database 
of known features symptomatic of malware (i.e., malware signatures). The challenge 
is to maintain an up-to-date signature database since malware authors constantly 
generate new versions based on the same malicious code in order to escape scrutiny. 
Therefore, research projects propose detection techniques based on the concrete 
behavior of the malware, which remains constant across versions.
 4.5.1 Malware analysis 
Malware analysis intends to dissect any piece of code identified as suspicious 
and potentially malicious, targeting a full understanding of the malicious code in 
order to enhance existing security mechanisms or to design new counter-measures.
More precisely, malware analysis aims at identifying the malware’s targets (a 
particular end-user, a company, any machine under a specific operating system, 
etc.), the actions it intends to perform to attack the targets (sensitive  information 
leakage, encryption and ransom, etc.), the way it succeeds in bypassing the security 
mechanisms protecting the targets, the way it protects itself against malware 
detection engines.
Given the potential impact of a malware, it is crucial that the analysis takes 
place as quickly as possible. With respect to this perspective, scientific  contributions 
on malware analysis are twofold. First, some approaches focus on automatic 
classification. Their goal is to distinguish benign code from malicious code and 
then to classify the malicious code into one of the known families. Significant 
efforts have been made in this area that have permitted to decrease the human 
workload by reducing the number of samples to be analyzed manually. Remaining 
samples are generally either issued from unknown malware or too protected to 
be automatically processed. Other approaches thus aim to help the experts to 
reverse engineer and understand the malicious code.
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An analysis can be performed statically, without executing the malware. It 
offers several benefits. Firstly, static analysis is safe for the host-architecture as 
the malicious code is not executed. Secondly, static analysis brings insights about 
all possible executions of the code and thus of about all possible behaviors of 
the malware.
Unfortunately, since malware authors are aware that their code will probably 
be confronted with a static analysis, they use various techniques to make static 
analysis and reverse engineering much harder. They use obfuscation techniques 
like packing, control flow flattening, or opaque predicates. All these techniques 
make the control flow graph computed from the malicious code irrelevant for 
most static analyzing tools.
An analysis can also be performed dynamically, which means that the  malicious 
code is executed as far as possible. The main goal of this kind of analysis is to 
observe the real and concrete effects of the attack on its target. A difficulty here 
is to trigger the execution of malicious part of the code.
 4.5.2 Malware detection 
We distinguish here two kinds of malware. Regular commercial-grade malware 
intends to cause damage to an important population of end users as quickly as 
possible and can be found on popular platforms such as Windows or Android. By 
contrast, target-specific malware intends to cause damage to specific  platforms, 
such as the Stuxnet worm that targeted programmable logic controllers of Iranian 
nuclear plants. Target-specific malware are built with great care and are therefore 
especially hard to detect 6. In addition, being more stealthy, they are oen only 
tardily identified, when external symptoms reveal their existence: Stuxnet was 
revealed in 2010 but it is thought to be have been deployed in 2005 or even earlier.
Regular, commercial-grade pieces of malware were initially and mostly 
 developed to target the Windows operating systems and applications, as it 
was the most widely used operating system. Nevertheless, during the last ten 
years, Android has also become a popular target for malware authors. A piece of 
malware may infect its target from different entry points, such as user- downloaded 
 applications, visited websites, or email attachments, and can oen spread through 
different networks. The detection of malware usually occurs during the scan of 
either network traffic (files attached to mail, for example) or machines. In both 
cases, the detection engine compares the data to analyze with a database of 
malware signatures (known features that are symptomatic of malware). The 
main challenge consists in building and maintaining an up-to-date signature 
6. The former Carte team lead a deep analysis of Duqu (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu), one of the most 
sophisticated malware in 2011, and developed a malware detector based on morphological analysis, a technique 
based on control flow graph comparison. The activity on malware analysis is carried on in the Carbone team  
of LORIA.
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database. This is a cat and mouse game: on the one hand, malware authors try to 
avoid detection as long as possible while minimizing the production code effort, 
and, on the other hand, defenders have to produce malware signatures that are 
as accurate and complete as possible by deep analysis of known malware, as 
explained in the previous section.
Malware authors usually build on malware kits and additional armoring 
 techniques to generate new executable files based on the same malicious code. 
This way, a huge number of variants can be generated from a single, original 
sample. For instance, new variants of Cerber are generated every 15 seconds. The 
detection of a new malware or a new variant of a known malware remains an 
open problem. A recent advance is to use behavioral approaches, instead of static 
signatures, by monitoring any deviation from a model of the normal behavior, for 
instance by modeling information flow at the operating system level.
Starting from around 2012, scams relying on ransomware have grown inter-
nationally. A ransomware is a specific type of malware that restricts access to a 
computer system or to its hosted data (classically by enciphering the data). A 
ransomware requires the user to pay a ransom to the attacker to remove the 
restriction. Emergence of ransomware are probably linked to the Bitcoin system, 
which permitted anonymous payoffs and made massive attacks profitable.
Detecting unwanted network behavior – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
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 [ Inria teams ] Malware analysis and detection 
↗ The CIDRE team works on malware analysis, malware detection and malware 
 de- obfuscation. Regarding malware analysis they target the Android environment. The 
idea is to use information flow tracking to analyze the malware behavior and,  potentially, 
generate a signature of the malware based on its real activities (i.e.,  engendered 
 information flows). Like all dynamic analysis, this work is relevant only if the malicious 
part of the code is really executed. The team thus focuses on the automatic triggering 
of malicious code. The malware detection tool monitors the usage of filesystem data 
to check for data deviations with respect to their normal use. Moreover, a postmortem 
action using an unclassified Machine Learning algorithm provides clues to clearly identify 
the detected malware. The work on malware de-obfuscation aims at circumventing 
protections of the malware itself against static analysis.
The LHS Rennes collects ransomware (Malware’O’Matic platform). As this kind of 
malware has a short lifespan, this requires to periodically renew the database and 
verify which ransomware are still alive.
4.6  Reaction to detected attacks
 [ Summary ] 
Ideally, intrusion and malware detection, as well as alert correlation should lead to 
the detection of all attacks without false alerts. Therefore, the next obvious step 
is to respond (possibly automatically) to the detected attacks through appropriate 
actions: modification of the security policy, new configurations of existing security 
mechanisms, implementation of new security mechanisms, patch deployment, etc. 
Of course, it is important to prevent the countermeasures from having similar or even 
worse consequences than those of the attack itself.
Ideally, alert correlation should lead to the detection of all attacks without 
false alerts. Therefore, the next obvious step should naturally be to respond 
(potentially automatically) to the detected attacks. Automatic response is also 
made necessary by the speed with which an attack may propagate, and the 
considerable damage it could make before manual response. Considering that 
the security policy has been violated although preventive mechanisms have been 
used to enforce this policy, two levels of reaction can be considered: (1) the attack 
may have succeeded because the policy was incorrect, in which case the policy 
must be amended, and new configurations of existing security mechanisms or 
even new security  mechanisms must consequently be put in place; (2) the attack 
may also have succeeded because the enforcement of the policy was incorrect, 
4.6_Reaction to detected attacks
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in which case configuration errors of the security mechanism must be identified 
and corrected. Using formal methods can help in guaranteeing that the security 
properties requested by the policy are effectively insured at the policy level and 
at the enforcement level. Of course, it is important that the countermeasures 
 (modification of the policy, new configurations, new security mechanisms, patching, 
etc.) are not similar or worse than those of the attack itself. For example, when 
trying to stop a DDoS attack, legitimate packets may also be discarded: the service 
is then unavailable to legitimate users, which was the very objective of the attack.
 [ Inria teams ] Reaction to detected attacks 
↗ The CTRL-A team targets the relatively little-studied topic of models and control 
 techniques for the automated reaction to attacks. The team uses detection information 
to identify the appropriate defense and repair actions, so that the system can remain 
operational, entirely or in a degraded mode. In terms of Autonomic Computing, this 
capacity is referred to as self-protection.
↗ In reaction to DDoS attack, legitimate packets may be discarded. The service may then 
be unavailable to legitimate users. This is why the RESIST team proposes scattering 
the DDoS traffic in time and space: by introducing voluntary delays and longer routes, 
whereas performance can be degraded, service is not discontinued.
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Privacy is oen defined as the ability for individuals to control their personal 
data and decide what to reveal, to whom, and under what condition. There is 
however no single definition since the notion of privacy remains intimately linked 
with our cultural roots. For instance, the notion of personal data, the cornerstone 
of privacy, has received several definitions, not always compatible, depending on 
countries. In France, personal data is defined by the “Loi Informatique et Libertés” 
from 1978, as information that can be directly or indirectly linked to a person, by 
the data controller (in charge of data processing), or any third party, using any 
type of means. Therefore, it has a very broad scope, irrespectively of the nature 
of data. Additionally, Sensitive Personal Information is personal data related to 
such domains as health, politics, religion, or sexual orientation, that cannot be 
collected and processed except under well-defined situations. These notions and 
the associated obligations constitute the cornerstone of the French and European 
regulations (e.g., through the European General Data Protection Regulation, 
GDPR), as will be discussed in this chapter. The notion of Personally Identifiable 
Information (or PII), widely used in the U.S. 1, is close to that of personal data as 
defined above, but is not equivalent.
Privacy considerations have become a central topic in our connected world. 
Several domains, as yet unaffected by this trend, will soon generate huge amounts 
of personal and sometimes sensitive data, without leaving users any option to 
opt out. Privacy is therefore a key question, as important as security.
Being naturally multi-faceted, the work on privacy encompasses several 
dimensions:
• part of it is legal: harmonized rules are needed, that apply in the largest  geographic 
area possible, in order to favor good practices and ban the others. In order to be 
applicable, guidance may be needed to implement these harmonized rules and 
this can be really challenging;
• part of it is technical: advanced privacy tools are needed in both theoretical and 
applied areas. They can help analyzing and improving existing systems or help 
designing privacy preserving systems from scratch;
• part of it is economic: understanding the underlying ecosystem is essential, 
since it oen determines the practices in terms of personal data collection and 
processing. A sustainable ecosystem respectful of European regulation in terms 
of data protection is needed;
• part of it is cultural: the peoples of different geographical areas can have different 
approaches to privacy, due to their cultural roots, and these differences impact 
the local regulation in terms of personal data;
• finally, part of it is sociological: the end user is oen inclined to declare herself 
concerned by privacy while at the same time behaving in an opposite manner. 
1. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf
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This well-known “privacy paradox” highlights the need for sociological studies 
to better understand human behaviors in this domain and potentially improve 
awareness and practices.
This chapter essentially covers the technical aspects and the legal dimensions 
up to a certain point, since the other aspects are out of Inria’s research scope. We 
first present the high-level principles and regulations around privacy. We then 
present tools and privacy enhancing technologies. Finally, we discuss privacy leaks 
on existing systems, where personal data is either deliberately communicated by 
the user or collected without the user’s knowledge.
5.1  Privacy principles and regulation
 [ Summary ] 
To take into account the major changes that took place during the last decade in terms 
of collection and use of personal data, the European Union adopted the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) that came into effect in May 2018. The main change 
is the emphasis put on the responsibility of the data controllers, i.e., the organizations 
processing personal data, as well as their sub-contractors, if there are any. Any data 
controller must conduct data protection impact assessments, implement privacy by 
design and be accountable. If the impact assessment indicates that the processing 
is likely to severely impact the rights and freedom of physical persons, the measures 
taken will have to be strengthened. The rights of a data subject are also strengthened 
with better information and control over her data, following the user empowerment 
philosophy.
However, the GDPR provides very little guidance about the effective implementation 
of these concepts. An interdisciplinary work is needed to reduce this gap between legal 
and technical instruments, for instance by defining rigorous privacy risk analysis and 
privacy by design methods, or by defining techniques to strengthen accountability, 
transparency and enhance the user’s control over her personal data. In any case, privacy 
comes with a price since tensions exist with several other considerations and privacy 
is sometimes regarded as a limiting factor.
A certain number of fundamental principles and legal considerations govern 
privacy. This section discusses them, in particular those associated to the new 
European regulation (GDPR) and other legal texts (e.g., the ePrivacy regulation 
that particularizes and complements the GDPR).
 5.1.1 Tensions between privacy and other considerations 
Privacy comes with a price. In a context where many commercial services 
depend on personal data (e.g., many free services are supported by targeted 
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advertising), where big data can offer highly valuable services (e.g., the study of the 
flu virus propagation through the analysis of medical acts), where several countries 
 deploy mass-surveillance systems meant to help fight terrorism, where a certain 
form of user traceability is needed in order to enable respectful relationships 
between citizens, privacy can be regarded as a limiting factor. This is the sign 
of a fundamental tension between privacy, that requires to minimize personal 
data collection, and other considerations like utility, security, or accountability, 
where the higher the volume and accuracy of data, the better. A compromise is 
therefore needed and the idea of finding an appropriate balance is central for 
instance to data protection regulations. This balance of course heavily depends 
on cultural aspects, hence the importance of having a European regulation in the 
domain in order to preserve our sovereignty. The following sections will address 
and illustrate this tension according to several angles.
 5.1.2 Evolution of the regulatory framework 
The notion of privacy is complex and multifaceted. In addition, its  perception 
evolves through time and space and is affected by the adoption of new  technologies. 
To take into account the major changes that have taken place during the last  decade 
in terms of collection and use of personal data, the European Union adopted in 
2016 the “General Data Protection Regulation” (or GDPR) taking effect in May 
2018, throughout the State Members in a uniform manner.
The biggest shift introduced by the GDPR is the emphasis put on the 
 responsibility of the data controller (i.e., the private or public organization or 
 association processing personal data) as well as its sub-contractor (if there are any). 
Any data controller must:
• conduct data protection impact assessments;
• implement privacy by design;
• and comply with the accountability principle.
If the impact assessment indicates that the processing is likely to impact the 
rights and freedom of physical persons severely, the measures taken will have to 
be strengthened. The rights of the data subjects are also strengthened in order to 
improve their information and control over their personal data, following a user 
empowerment approach. For instance, the data controller must be in position 
to prove they have obtained explicit user consent, users have the “right to be 
forgotten” on search services provided in Europe, a new data portability right is 
added in order to enable a user to switch to a different platform while reusing 
their data, and children under the age of 16 are better protected.
However, the GDPR provides very little guidance about the effective imple-
mentation of these new provisions and some of them raise a number of  technical 
challenges. Before describing research on privacy enhancing technologies in 
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§5.2, we provide an overview of the challenges raised by legal requirements 
and interdisciplinary works to reduce the gap between legal and technical 
instruments.
 5.1.3 Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) 
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA), or simply Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIA), are used by organizations to assess any privacy issue that 
 might arise when developing new products or services that involve the processing 
of personal data. Conducting a DPIA is made mandatory in Europe by the GDPR 
for certain categories of personal data processing. Beyond legal requirements, 
conducting a DPIA is in the interest of any organization to ensure that privacy 
risks are properly understood and addressed before deploying any new product 
or service. There is already a large body of contributions on DPIAs and a number 
of DPIAs for specific products have been published. The Commission Nationale 
Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), the French data protection agency, has also 
recently released a tool to help data controllers prepare a DPIA 2.
All these contributions are very useful to define the DPIA process (including 
planning, stakeholders consultation, resource allocation, or audits) and its main 
goal (evaluating the likelihood and severity of privacy threats). However, they 
do not define very precisely how the technical part of the DPIA, the privacy risk 
analysis, should be performed.
There are of course a number of commonalities between privacy and  security risk 
analyses. However, privacy is a more complex and multifaceted concept  aiming 
at the protection of people (i.e., individuals, groups, and society as a whole) 
rather than resources or organizations. These dimensions must be considered 
in a  privacy risk analysis, especially the notion of privacy harm that has been 
extensively discussed by lawyers.
Even if privacy risk analysis frameworks are being defined, work remains to 
be done. First, dedicated privacy risk analysis frameworks for specific application 
areas would be very useful in practice. On the theoretical side, it would also be 
interesting to establish formal links with privacy metrics. Last but not least, beyond 
legal compliance, a great benefit of a privacy risk analysis should be to provide 
guidance for the design of a new product, following the privacy by design approach.
 5.1.4 Privacy by Design (PbD) 
The philosophy of privacy by design, made mandatory by the GDPR, is that 
privacy should not be treated as an aerthought but as a first-class requirement 




• privacy includes a variety of dimensions (such as collection limitation, data 
quality, purpose specification, use limitation, or security) which are generally not 
defined very precisely;
• then, these requirements may seem to be in tension with other requirements 
such as functional requirements, ease of use, performance, or economic viability 
of the product or service.
In order to implement privacy by design, a wide array of Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) are available, as discussed below. Each PET provides  different 
guarantees based on different assumptions and therefore is suitable in  different 
contexts. As a result, it is quite complex for a soware engineer to make  informed 
choices among all these possibilities and to find the most appropriate  combination 
of techniques to solve their own requirements. Solutions have been proposed 
in different application domains such as smart metering, pay-as-you-drive, or 
 location-based systems but the next challenge in this area is to go beyond  individual 
cases and to establish sound foundations and methodologies for privacy by design.
A formal framework, for example based on epistemic logic, can be helpful to 
express data minimization requirements as properties defining for each  stakeholder 
the information that she is allowed to know or not. But conflicting requirements 
oen have to be met simultaneously, for instance guarantees about the  correctness 
of a computation’s result. In fact, the tension between data minimization and 
correctness is one of the delicate issues to be solved in many systems involving 
personal data. A formal framework is also useful for reasoning about  architectures. 
Its axiomatization can be used to prove that a given architecture meets the 
expected privacy and integrity requirements.
 5.1.5 Accountability 
In line with previous regulations (e.g., the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data), the GDPR 
 integrates accountability as a principle that requires that organizations put in 
place  appropriate technical and organizational measures to demonstrate their 
compliance with the regulation.
A distinction can be made between three main types of accountability:
• Accountability of policy can be seen as the first level of accountability: the 
 organization should be able to demonstrate that it has defined a clear and  properly 
documented privacy policy;
• Accountability of procedures, which refers to the demonstration of  organizational 
mechanisms such as documented processes to cope with user consent or to 
address complaints or personal data requests;
• Accountability of practice is the a posteriori demonstration of the effectiveness 
of the procedures’ accountability. This is a proof that the privacy policies have 
been effectively met.
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The first type of accountability is purely declarative and provides at best a form 
of legal guarantee (binding commitment). The second type adds guarantees at 
the organizational level but only the third type can deliver the full promises of 
accountability. However, focus has been placed on the first and second types of 
accountability so far, resulting in superficial guarantees.
For accountability to contribute effectively to the enhancement of privacy 
protection, it is necessary to be able to translate its general principles into  practical 
measures and to consider its various dimensions. For instance, collecting and 
keeping detailed processing logs can contradict privacy if those logs contain 
 personal data. An appropriate balance between these requirements must be found.
 5.1.6 User empowerment through control and transparency 
A service that is compliant with the legislation and for which the data controller 
is accountable, is not necessarily in line with user expectations. Empowering the 
user is required in order to gain user acceptance.
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH USER CONTROL 
Privacy is increasingly seen as the ability for a user to control their personal 
data. However, even if this notion is predominant in the privacy literature and plays 
a central role in the GDPR, clear definitions are still missing. The word “control” is 
usually used in a very vague way in this context, both by lawyers and by computer 
scientists. For example, such notions as “access control” or “usage control” in 
computer science do not really encapsulate the intuition underlying the notion of 
control over personal data. This lack of precision may lead to  misunderstandings 
and makes it difficult to check compliance. A multidisciplinary study of the notion 
of control as used by lawyers and computer scientists has led to identify three 
dimensions, corresponding to the capacities for an individual:
• to perform actions on their personal data;
• to prevent others from performing actions on their personal data;
• to be informed of actions performed by others on their personal data.
On the practical side, two main conditions must be met to make it possible 
for data subjects to exercise control over their personal data:
• the user must be properly informed about the collection of their data, its purpose, 
the entity collecting the data, and for instance the retention delay (transparency);
• the user must be able to express their choice to have their data collected or 
not for a given purpose and have guarantees that this choice is actually followed 
(consent).
In fact, the explicit consent of the data subject, which is a cornerstone of most 
data protection regulations, is a typical example of a legal requirement that is 
very difficult to put into practice. This is the case with Internet of Things (IoT) 
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where many data communications occur without user notice, or social networks 
for instance, and several proposals have been made to help a user to exercise 
their control.
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is an essential concept to design privacy preserving systems and 
services. The data controller should provide clear and complete information on 
what information is collected, how oen, for what purpose, how data is processed, 
how data is stored (where, how long, with what security), and whether data is 
likely to be communicated to third parties. The same questions recursively apply 
to third parties to whom data may be transferred.
Transparency is a challenge in various domains where data collections  happen 
in an invisible manner. This can be the case with Internet of Things (IoT) systems 
that measure and collect continuously personal data. The information  provided to 
the data subjects should be as visible and intelligible as possible (which  excludes 
simple signs on walls that generally remain unnoticed). A new design space for 
effective privacy notices is required, which is an active research topic in the 
privacy area.
Beyond the transparency of data collection, a new major challenge is the 
transparency of algorithms. This need for more transparency is another illustration 
of a legal requirement (in the GDPR and also in the law for a digital Republic 3 
adopted in France in October 2016) which raises many technical challenges and 
can be a source of interdisciplinary research topics.
Algorithm transparency is central in many automated systems with societal 
impacts (e.g., with an automated assignment system, once all candidates have 
posted ordered preferences): the question of a possible algorithmic bias, whether 
intentional or not (e.g., bug), is unavoidable. Transparency of algorithms is  necessary 
to enable third parties (including citizens) to analyze their internal behavior. This 
is the role of the TransAlgo 4 French initiative led by Inria.
Since transparency requires detailed information to be communicated to 
the user, the way it is achieved is non-trivial. The usual approach, through the 
General Terms and Conditions of Use, is usually far from satisfying, being non-user-
friendly: this legal document is oen meant to protect the company rather than 
 informing the user. Research is in progress on analyzing practices, on trying to 
have a  standardized format understandable by everybody (like Creative Commons 
did in a different domain) and perhaps amenable to mechanized treatment, and 
on the impacts of transparency on user behavior.
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 [ Research challenge 7 ] Understanding privacy and deriving practical tools 
Understanding privacy principles and regulations is the foundation of any activity 
in privacy. Although this is not a new domain (e.g., the “Loi Informatique et Libertés” 
was adopted in 1978), this area has recently experienced major evolutions with the 
new GDPR European regulation and at the same time new opportunities to collect 
 personal data. As a consequence, understanding the concepts and the regulation is a 
first necessity. Being able to derive practical tools is another one: even though the GDPR 
promotes several concepts and goals, it provides little guidance about the effective 
implementation of these new regulatory provisions.
In particular the GDPR introduced the right to data portability whereby a user can 
retrieve their data in a human readable and machine portable format. This right 
opens new research areas around individualized management and control over one’s 
 personal data. The goal is to empower citizens to leverage their personal data for their 
own good, which calls for secure, extensible, and sovereign personal cloud platforms, 
three conflicting goals that open new research challenges (see e.g., §5.2.4).
 [ Inria teams ] Privacy principles and regulation 
↗ The CIDRE team works on privacy policies and the right to be forgotten in  collaboration 
with lawyers.
↗ The INDES team works on the relationships between web tracking and the ePrivacy 
Regulation, in relationships with lawyers. In particular the team evaluates the privacy 
impacts when the Regulation doesn’t require user consent for tracking and builds 
tools that detect violations of the Regulation.
↗ The PETRUS team works on control over personal data and data minimization and 
has strong collaborations with research groups in other disciplines such as economy, 
law and social sciences.
The team also contributes to enhance individuals’ control over their personal data 
from an architectural point of view. This is the case of PlugDB, a secure personal server 
that allows individuals to exercise control over their personal data, while preserving 
durability, availability, and sharing.
↗ The PRIVATICS team works on most subjects, with a strong emphasis on 
 inter disciplinarity through collaborations with lawyers and economists. For instance, 
the team has contributed to a framework and methodology for conducting a privacy risk 
analysis in a rigorous and systematic way, compatible with most DPIA recommendations.
Concerning privacy by design, the team has proposed a formal framework based on 
epistemic logic that enables one to express data minimization requirements. This 
framework has been used to formally compare different architectures for biometric 
access control.
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Concerning accountability, the team has defined a set of practical measures to be taken 
at each phase of the personal data life cycle, from collection to deletion,  including 
 storage, usage, and forwarding to third parties. On the formal side, the team has 
 proposed a framework based on privacy friendly logs, showing that compliance can 
be checked based on logs that do not contain personal data.
Concerning user control, aer a multidisciplinary study of this notion as used by lawyers 
and computer scientists, a formal model has been derived to formally characterize 
each type of control.
On the particular case of IoT and user control, the team has proposed an architecture 
based on “Privacy Agents” implementing the choices of the data subject, expressed in 
a restricted natural language that can be easily understood by non-experts.
5.2  Privacy tools
 [ Summary ] 
Tools for different types of publics, from a data protection officer down to an end-user, 
are needed in order to transition from the high-level principles of GDPR to privacy 
compliant products and services. Some of them focus on such principles as data 
 protection impact assessment, privacy by design, and accountability.
Other tools are meant to anonymize a database before releasing it for open data access. 
However, this is a complex task that requires an appropriate trade off to be found: 
increasing privacy usually reduces the utility of an anonymized database. From this 
point of view, the differential privacy concept turned out to be a key tool in order to 
provide provable privacy guaranties.
The advent of personal clouds, meant to give users a full control over their own data, 
is another major tool for user empowerment.
Finally, techniques have been designed to provide unlinkability, i.e., the guarantee that 
no one can link several uses of a service by a given user. This is particularly important 
for systems that embed an RFID token, like electronic passports. Concerning commu-
nications, the Tor system tries to guarantee anonymous communications (no one can 
identify the source of a packet), although in practice this is less usable.
 5.2.1 Tools related to DPIA, privacy by design, and accountability 
Several tools have been designed in order to address the needs for data 
 protection impact assessment, privacy by design, and accountability. Some of 
them are respectively discussed in §5.1.3, §5.1.4 and §5.1.5.
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 5.2.2 Database anonymization: a necessity for open-data and big-data 
A strict regulation applies to any data controller in charge of a database containing 
personal data. Evading this regulation is possible by anonymizing this database, since 
the resulting database no longer contains any personal data. For instance, this is a 
prerequisite for releasing a public dataset in the context of an open-data initiative.
Data anonymization consists in altering the dataset in order to remove any 
 information that could be used to re-identify any participant of the dataset or to 
infer personal attributes. This is not an easy task. A first reason is that anonymization 
is intrinsically complex and domain dependent: there is no universal solution. Certain 
types of data, such as mobility traces, are highly unique and therefore identifying. For 
instance, the knowledge of four spatiotemporal points may be enough to uniquely 
identify 95% of the individuals in a large cell phone operator mobility database [dMHVB13].
A second reason is that anonymizing a database is one thing, preventing 
re-identification through side information (the “inference” problem) is another 
one. The AOL de-anonymization of pseudonym No. 4417749 [BZ06] is famous from 
this point of view. By analyzing the detailed records of searches she made, her 
identity has quickly been found. In general, replacing names by pseudonyms is 
now known to be highly vulnerable to re-identification attacks.
Last but not least, an appropriate trade-off between privacy and utility is 
needed (see §5.1.1). Guaranteeing meaningful privacy requires the distortion of the 
original dataset which mechanically yields imprecise, coarse-grained knowledge 
even about the population as a whole.
Data anonymization can be achieved through various types of approaches. In 
2014 the G29 group, gathering the European data protection agencies,  published 
a technical document on the topic [Art14]. This document discusses the  effectiveness 
and limits of various techniques: permutation, differential privacy (see §5.2.3), 
 aggregation, k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness. In terms of privacy 
 guaranties, these techniques can be classified into two categories: syntactic and 
 semantic  privacy models. Syntactic models focus on syntactic requirements of 
the  anonymized data (e.g., with k-anonymity each record should appear at least 
k times in the anonymized dataset), without any guarantee on what sensitive 
information the adversary can exactly learn about individuals. Semantic models, 
on the other hand, are concerned with the private information that can be inferred 
about individuals using the anonymized data as well as perhaps some prior (or 
background) knowledge about them. A higher level of privacy can be expected 
from the semantic models. This is the case of differential privacy that is discussed 
in the following section.
[dMHVB13] Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Cesar A. Hidalgo, Michel Verleysen, and Vincent D. Blondel. Unique in the 
crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility. Scientific Reports, 3:1376, 03 2013.  
[BZ06] M. Barbaro and T. Zeller. A face is exposed for aol searcher no 4417749. New York Times, August 2006. 
[Art14] Opinion 05/2014 on anonymisation techniques, April 2014.-
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 5.2.3 Differential privacy 
Differential privacy [DMNS06] was originally proposed in the area of statistical 
databases and it is nowadays one of the most successful approaches to privacy. 
The goal is to protect an individual’s data while publishing aggregate information 
about the database. This is obtained by adding controlled noise to the query 
outcome in such a way that the data of a single individual will have a negligible 
impact on the reported answer. Differential privacy has several advantages: (1) it 
is independent from the side-information of the adversary, meaning one does 
not need to take into account the context in which the system will operate; 
(2) it is compositional, i.e., if we combine the information that we obtain by 
 querying two differentially-private mechanisms, the resulting mechanism is also 
 differentially-private; and (3) differentially-private mechanisms usually provide 
a good trade-off between utility and privacy.
A successful variant, called local differential privacy, has the advantage of 
 requiring no trusted third party: users obfuscate their personal data, adding noise 
by themselves, before sending it to the data collector. Local differential privacy is 
particularly suitable when data is collected for statistical purposes, as it usually 
achieves a good trade-off between privacy and utility. Local differential privacy has 
the same advantages as differential privacy (independence from side-knowledge 
and compositionality). It had a considerable impact aer large companies like 
Apple and Google adopted it for privacy preserving data collection systems (e.g., 
Google uses a particular implementation in the RAPPOR crowdsourcing technology).
There are many cases in which the data domain features a notion of distance 
(e.g., location, energy consumption in smart meters, or age and weight in medical 
records). Then the privacy/utility trade-off can be greatly improved by exploiting 
the concept of approximation intrinsic in the notion of distance. The idea is to 
allow two values to become more and more distinguishable as their distance 
increases so that more accurate statistics can be made.
 [ Research challenge 8 ] Open data and anonymization 
Open data initiatives may sometimes mean releasing databases that contain sensitive, 
personal information. To ensure privacy of the individuals, data need to be anonymized. 
Robust anonymization, that effectively resists de-anonymization attacks, is an active 
and hot research topic. If differential privacy has become a key scientific tool to achieve 
provable anonymization guarantees, challenges remain on its application, for instance 
in order to improve the privacy/utility trade-off.
[DMNS06] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis.  




 5.2.4 Empowering users with personal clouds 
The time of individualized management and control over one’s personal data 
is upon us. Thanks to smart disclosure initiatives and the right to data portability 
in the GDPR, we can access our personal data from the companies or  government 
agencies that collected them, thus allowing the creation of cross-domain personal 
data repositories. Concurrently, Personal Cloud solutions, also called Personal 
Information Management System (PIMS) or Personal Data Server (PDS), are 
flourishing (see, for instance, the French startup Cozy Cloud 5). Their goal is to 
empower us to leverage our personal data for our own good, opening the way to 
new value-added services by crossing data issued from different data silos or by 
sharing our data for social/societal benefits (e.g., contribute to an  epidemiological 
study, compute queries based on shared data within communities of users).
However, managing our own personal data constitutes a considerable  burden. 
We must ensure the security of the data we gather and manage the disclosed data 
and control its usage. We inherit the combined responsibility of an  information 
security expert and a database administrator. Therefore, personal cloud  providers 
propose solutions to manage personal data on behalf of their customers, thus 
 creating genuine honeypots (centralizing huge amounts of personal data 
 belonging to millions of individuals). Thus, paradoxically by empowering users, 
smart  disclosure and personal clouds push them towards even more delegation 
over even more data, thus exposing them to a larger risk than ever.
Dedicated personal cloud prototype – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
5. https://cozy.io/en/
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To escape this paradox and truly achieve the empowerment of the user, a set 
of expectations should be fulfilled: (1) sovereignty: the system must offer the user 
the ability to exercise her data disclosure decisions under her own authority and 
without any form of delegation; (2) security: the system must provide tangible 
guarantees about the enforcement of these decisions whatever the type of attacks 
or misuse the system could face not only to the personal cloud holder but also 
to the other users and to third parties; and (3) extensibility: the system must not 
impede the development of new services using the data of a single  individual 
(‘Personal Big Data’) or of large groups of individuals (‘Big Personal Data’). However, 
these statements introduce two forms of tension, a first one between sovereignty 
and security: to reconcile the absence of delegation to central IT experts or 
 administrators with high security guarantees; and another one between security 
and extensibility: to reconcile security, which calls for closed systems, with the 
need for extensibility to support new data services, which by definition are not 
fully trusted. Deriving an architecture to fulfill these three requirements altogether 
is an intrinsically difficult issue.
Another important problem linked to users’ empowerment is to allow for 
novel big personal-data applications (e.g., participatory sensing, epidemiological 
studies, and personalized recommendation systems). Distributed personal-data 
processing is not a new issue. However, the personal cloud is distributed at the 
individual level and is expected to scale up to nationwide populations. In this 
context, the first issue is to prevent or minimize the effect of personal data leaks 
during computations performed at such scale. Also, decentralization emphasizes 
the central role of the individual in the architecture. This calls for the emergence of 
new forms of decentralized computations where individual profiles and  individual 
privacy settings are integrated by construction.
Beyond the privacy and security perspective, many important research  problems 
around personal clouds remain to be addressed: foundational and systems 
 aspects of complex data management, especially with human-centric data, and 
orchestration of queries to the various services.
 5.2.5 Privacy preserving protocols and communication technologies 
UNLINKABILITY PROTOCOLS 
According to the ISO/IEC 15408-2 standard, unlinkability, also referred to as 
untraceability, “ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or  services 
without others being able to link these uses together.” Of course, this notion of 
unlinkability applies both in the physical world (i.e., tracing a person) and in the 
virtual world (i.e., linking transactions of a person).
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Unlinkability is getting increasingly important with the widespread use of RFID 
tokens for authentication. If the authentication protocol guarantees unlinkability, it 
should indeed be impossible to place an unauthorized RFID reader that can decide 
whether a given token is the same as a previously seen token. For instance, since RFID 
tokens are used in electronic passports, an attacker who eavesdrops a first legitimate 
protocol execution for a target, say Alice, should not be able to setup a reader that 
distinguishes Alice’s passport from others. Similarly, the authentication protocols 
implemented in 3G/4G/5G mobile telephone networks prevents an eavesdropper, 
other than the operator, to link different communications made by the same device.
Similarly, digital transactions may require unlinkability. A typical example is 
a blockchain based electronic currency where the ledger is completely public. 
Such systems generally provide pseudonymity (i.e., use of a pseudonym rather 
than a real identity). However, by linking several transactions made by the same 
user, user profiling is trivial and then reidentification may be possible with side 
information. That said, Zerocash 6 is an example of an electronic currency that 
provides unlinkability guarantees.
More generally, authentication and authorizations are sometimes required 
while guaranteeing anonymity and unlinkability. In that case, Direct Anonymous 
Authentication (DAA) protocols provide anonymous authentication tokens,  allowing 
remote anonymous authentication.
Finally, Fingerprinting is a direct threat to unlinkability. Browser fingerprinting 
is discussed in §5.3.4. However, even devices may be fingerprinted: for example, 
the length of the encrypted message containing personal data, in particular the 
JPEG photo of the electronic passport can be effectively used for tracking 7.
ANONYMIZED COMMUNICATIONS 
Tor is an anonymizing system that aims at preserving the anonymity of 
Internet users. This is achieved thanks to so-called “onion routing”: instead of 
 direct  connections from a host to a destination, an application-level virtual circuit 
is created that goes through a certain number of relaying nodes spread throughout 
the world and chosen randomly. Traffic is encrypted by the client as many times as 
there are relays in this virtual circuit. Then each node decrypts the outer part of the 
packet received, thereby revealing the IP address of the next relay, and forwards the 
packet to this relay. Thereby, Tor prevents any eavesdropper to identify the source 
and destination hosts by looking at the packet source and destination IP addresses.
However, even if theoretically interesting, this solution is severely flawed for 
the general public because of the amount of knowledge required to correctly 
operate on top of Tor. Indeed, several types of de-anonymization attacks against 




 [ Inria teams ] Privacy tools 
↗ The COMETE team works on differential privacy and its variants, in particular 
when a notion of distance exists, as well as techniques to measure the utility of the 
result. For instance, the team has implemented dX-privacy and works on a tool to 
retrieve as accurately as possible the original distribution from the noisy one. The 
team also develops a tool to measure the result’s utility in terms of the quality of the 
true distribution’s approximation. Finally, the team also works on the unlinkability 
definition and its formal verification.
↗ The DIANA team has worked on de-anonymization attacks on Tor.
↗ The PESTO team works on the unlinkability definition and its formal verification.
↗ The PETRUS team works on solutions and architectures for personal cloud systems 
and on trusted environments for privacy preserving decentralized computation. In 
particular the team works on a new reference architecture where potentially complex 
manipulations of personal data rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). The 
objective is to limit the side effects in terms of data leaks since only expected results 
are declassified to third parties, without any direct access the raw data.
↗ The PRIVATICS team works on various tools for privacy risk analysis, privacy by design, 
accountability, and user control. The team also works on different aspects and models 
for data anonymization. The team developed several anonymization schemes for mobile 
traces and set-value datasets under the k-anonymity or differential privacy models. 
The team also worked on a novel technique for privately releasing high-dimensional 
datasets using generative neural networks. The idea is to produce a synthetic dataset 
that resembles the original training data as much as possible while complying with 
privacy requirements. Differential privacy has been applied to protect the user’s privacy 
in several domains, including smart meters, sequential data publication, generative 
neural networks, and data storage in Bloom filters.
↗ The VALDA team studies both foundational and systems aspects of complex data 
management, especially human-centric data, in the context of personal clouds. They 
focus on personal clouds under the angle of data integration and service orchestration.
↗ The WIDE team works on the use of gossip protocols for privacy preserving decen-
tralized computations and seeks to extend this work to the protection of privacy for 
decentralized machine learning systems.
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5.3  Privacy analysis of existing systems
 [ Summary ] 
Our connected world is at the origin of many privacy leaks, and as time passes, domains 
that are today leak-free will also be impacted. Some of the leaks are deliberate. This 
is the case with social networks where users massively share (sometimes overshare) 
personal data. The consequences are numerous for the user’s privacy. For instance, the 
profiling it makes possible enabled the rise of dedicated companies that commercialized 
services meant to influence users (e.g., their votes).
Geolocation information is another type of information that is shared with either the 
tacit or the informed consent of the user. However, the record of a user’s location over 
time is particular in the sense that a lot can be inferred, from home and work locations 
to sensitive personal information (e.g., religion if she regularly goes to a place of worship). 
In order to benefit from geolocalized services without leaking too much information, 
several solutions have been designed. For instance with spatial  obfuscation, the position 
precision is reduced by reporting a zone. Geo-indistinguishability, which leverages on 
differential privacy, is a promising technique to achieve spatial indistinguishability 
with additional good properties.
The user can also be invited to provide biometric features, such as fingerprints, in order 
to permit their identification and authentication, in case of access control systems or 
secure national identity documents. However, these highly discriminating and stable 
features (they cannot be changed) create major security and privacy risks. Biometric 
systems must be carefully designed and, in order to investigate design options, various 
frameworks have been developed to define privacy architectures, to formally reason 
about them and to justify design choices in terms of trust assumptions.
But very oen, privacy leaks happen without the user’s consent. This is the case when 
browsing the web. Every visit to a web site can trigger a wide variety of hidden data 
 exchanges across multiple tracking companies. Information can then be used for  targeted 
advertising, but also to discriminate users (e.g., through customized prices) or worse. 
Several privacy solutions have been proposed, from protective regulations (e.g., with the 
GDPR) to client-side mechanisms like advertisement and tracker blocking tools. However, 
the domain is in constant evolution, new techniques appearing to better  protect users 
and, simultaneously, to improve tracking within a browser or across devices.
With the advent of smartphones and IoT, privacy leaks have reached an  unprecedented 
level in volume and precision, both within the digital and physical worlds, and  oen 
without the user’s knowledge. This trend will be reinforced in the coming years, 
 encompassing new domains. The goals of research in this domain are to analyze these 
systems, to give transparent information of hidden behaviors, to highlight good and 
bad practices, to propose methods likely to improve transparency and user control, 
and to encourage certain stakeholders to change practices.
5.3_Privacy analysis of existing systems
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As a common denominator of our connected world the Internet can also be the source 
of hidden privacy leaks. A first example is the wireless access network used by most 
devices. We have seen the rapid growth of cyberphysical tracking systems that analyze 
the Wi-Fi frames sent by a smartphone looking for a known access point. Research is 
needed to analyze these technologies and propose privacy preserving versions whenever 
possible. Another example is the DNS service used to map host names to IP addresses. 
A motivated attacker could eavesdrop DNS traffic (under certain circumstances) and 
potentially identify websites of interest. Unfortunately, the road is long before a privacy 
friendly version of DNS is standardized and deployed.
Finally, the safe browsing techniques used to detect blacklisted URLs (e.g., known to 
contain a malware) are potentially intrusive: storing the whole list of blacklisted URLs 
on the host is impossible and relying on an external service too intrusive since this 
latter would collect all the visited URLs. Intermediate solutions are used that need to 
be carefully analyzed from a privacy point of view.
This section focuses on privacy leaks in various existing systems. It starts with 
leaks for which there is either a tacit or informed consent of the user and then 
presents data collections that take place without the user knowledge.
 5.3.1 The visible side: the case of social networks 
Social networks are places where users are incited to share personal data 
 massively. Very often, personal information, and even sensitive personal 
 information, is shared to a group of people that is significantly larger than what 
the user would think. Several reasons can account for this situation. First of 
all, the “Privacy Paradox” is a well-known phenomenon whereby users explain 
they are concerned by their online privacy but at the same time behave in the 
 opposite way. Many users may not realize that the risks apply to them, particularly 
the  youngest, for whom the risks are either theoretical or for those “who have 
 something to hide”. Or perhaps they consider that the reward obtained by sharing 
personal information is superior to the risks. Second, users may be too confident 
in the protection offered by the social network, omitting the small detail that 
significantly enlarges the group of people with whom information is shared. Third, 
the default settings and behaviors with respect to third parties may also be much 
more permissive than one could expect (e.g., Facebook changed default audience 
to “Friends only” in 2014, before that posts were “Public” by default). And finally, 
mistakes are always possible (e.g., the audience setup in Facebook posts is sticky, 
meaning that if a post is tagged for public audience, so will all the following ones 
until the user changes the audience back to the previous setting).
The consequences are numerous: identity the, social pressure on users (in 
particular teenagers), sexual predation, unexpected consequences of shared 
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information (e.g., to a potential employer), targeted surveillance, or at the other 
extreme massive surveillance of citizens. Users are generally unaware of the 
precision of the story they tell about themselves. On 2009, Le Tigre published 
the life of Marc L* 8, the story of several years of this person’s life, solely collected 
from various social networks. More recently, information extracted from social 
networks has been used by the Cambridge Analytica company to profile users 
and influence their vote via personalized messages 9.
Research is needed to better understand the tendencies, but also protect 
the users, in a context where data mining and machine learning have become 
extremely powerful tools.
 5.3.2 The visible side: the case of geolocation information 
Geolocation information is another type of information that is shared with 
either tacit or informed consent of the user. However, collecting the  geolocation 
of a person over time raises major risks: additional personal data can easily be 
 inferred (e.g., their home and work locations, or their habits), but also Sensitive 
Personal Information (e.g., health concerns if they go to an hospital or religion 
if they regularly go to a place of worship). Protection is therefore needed, for 




Geolocalisation anonymization – © Inria / Photo H. Raguet
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The main methods for the privacy protection of location data are divided in 
two classes: spatial cloaking and spatial obfuscation. In spatial cloaking, the goal 
is trace-anonymity in order to prevent the  identification of an individual. Most of 
the methods of this class are based on group-anonymity, a very popular approach 
in the anonymity literature. The general idea is to make the traces of an  individual 
indistinguishable from those of other individuals; this is typically achieved by 
reporting a cloaked area that is large enough to contain the group size necessary to 
meet the intended anonymity constraint. In order to limit the size of the cloaked 
area, some proposals have combined spatial cloaking with temporal cloaking as 
well. When the system uses pseudonyms, a necessity for certain applications, there 
is the risk of linkability between points belonging to the same user’s trajectory. To 
solve this problem researchers have proposed the so-called mix-zones, which are 
zones in which many users meet and can get their pseudonym renewed, without 
the danger of being traced. All the above measures related to spatial cloaking need, 
of course, the intervention of a trusted party that acts as an anonymity server.
In the second class, spatial obfuscation, the goal is to address the problem 
of identifying the user’s position. In general, privacy is preserved by reducing the 
 position precision. This is done by reducing the granularity of the location  information: 
the user reports a zone rather than the exact coordinates. An  important advantage 
of this approach is that it can be done without the intervention of a trusted third 
party. This method however is not very robust, being subject to trilateration attacks: 
a user sending two consecutive signals from two different zones reveals that they 
are close to the border between them and with three consecutive signals from 
different zones would reveal their position quite accurately. People have therefore 
investigated more effective solutions for spatial obfuscation.
Geo-indistinguishability [ABCP13] is one of them. It extends local differential 
 privacy to arbitrary metrics with the idea that the protection of the user’s location 
 increases exponentially as the distance from the real location decreases. Therefore, 
an  attacker can determine that the user is in Paris rather than London, and be 
 reasonably  confident that they are in the Quartier Latin, but cannot tell where 
 exactly in the Quartier Latin. Geo-indistinguishability inherits appealing properties: 
it is  independent from the side knowledge of the adversary, it is robust with respect 
to composition, and it does not rely on any trusted third party. It can be  implemented 
at the user’s end simply by adding noise to the real location. A low-cost planar Laplace 
function can be chosen for that, which enables its use in  computationally limited 
devices such as smartphones. Thanks to the above properties, geo- indistinguishability 
via the Laplace mechanism has been adopted in several tools for location privacy 
(e.g., LP-Guardian, LP-Doctor, and SpatialVision QGIS plugin).
[ABCP13] Miguel E. Andres, Nicolas E. Bordenabe, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, and Catuscia Palamidessi. 
Geo-indistinguishability: Differential privacy for location-based systems. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC 
Conference on Computer; Communications Security, CCS ‘13, pages 901-914, New York, NY, USA, 2013. 
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 5.3.3 The visible side: the case of biometry 
Biometrics is a powerful technology to identify or to authenticate a person. 
Biometric features, such as fingerprints or iris, are stable over time and highly 
 discriminating; these are key advantages for applications such as security or 
 access control. However, from a privacy point of view, these advantages turn 
into drawbacks: because of their stability over time and because an individual 
cannot easily change their biometrics, the leak of biometric traits to a malicious 
entity gives rise to serious privacy risks, including tracking and identity the.
Many techniques (like encryption, homomorphic encryption, or secure 
 multi-party computation) and architectures have been proposed to take into 
 account privacy requirements in the implementation of privacy preserving  biometric 
systems. Some solutions involve dedicated cryptographic primitives such as secure 
sketches and fuzzy vaults, others rely on adaptations of  existing  cryptographic tools 
or the use of secure hardware solutions. The choice of  particular techniques and the 
role of the components (like the central server, a secure module, terminal, or smart 
card) in the architecture have a strong impact on the privacy guarantees provided.
Considering the variety of options available and the complexity of these 
 techniques, general frameworks have been proposed to define privacy 
 architectures, to specify different options, to reason about them in a formal way 
and to justify their design in terms of trust assumptions.
Biometric systems are also increasingly used by states to secure identity 
 documents. For example, the French government authorized in October 2016 
the creation of a centralized file of “secure electronic documents” (TES). The 
main motivation put forward was the fight against identity fraud. However, the 
decree also authorized access to the database by a variety of police and  officers. 
Several criticisms have been voiced concerning the risks that such a  centralized 
file could pose to individual freedom and privacy. The strengthening of the means 
to fight fraud and criminality, and the requirement to protect privacy should 
not necessarily be incompatible. However, in order to be able to reach a decision 
on the benefits and weaknesses of a secure electronic document system, it is 
necessary to [CM17]:
• clearly define the desired functionalities and the advantages that can be  expected 
from them;
• describe the technical solutions in a sufficiently precise way to enable their 
analysis;
• and rigorously analyze the risks of privacy breaches with regard to the expected 
benefits.
[CM17] C. Castelluccia and D. Le Metayer. Titres electroniques securises : la centralisation des données biométriques 
est-elle vraiment inévitable ? Note d’analyse Inria, Février 2017.
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 5.3.4 Hidden privacy leaks: the case of web tracking 
The massive deployment of the Internet has quickly been accompanied 
with personal data leaks. Every visit to a web site can trigger a wide variety of 
 hidden data exchanges across multiple tracking companies that each collect 
large amounts of data on users’ preferences and habits. Information can then be 
used for targeted advertising, but also to discriminate against users (e.g., through 
customized prices) or surveillance.
Web tracking has been made possible thanks to the discreet addition of 
small components, called trackers, to webpages. Each tracker is owned by a third 
party, usually distinct from the web site owner, and it enables this third party to 
 recognize users across the different websites that embed it. These technologies 
are roughly divided into stateful and stateless types. Stateful tracking techniques 
store  information on the user’s computer that can be retrieved later to  recognize 
them. Third-party cookies are the most prevalent stateful online tracking  technique. 
Advanced features, such as the ability to respawn cookies deleted by a user or the 
synchronization of cookies among different third parties, are oen implemented 
in order to map and exchange user’s profiles.
On the other hand, stateless tracking techniques allow third parties to  recognize 
users , just by fingerprinting without storing anything. Collecting various pieces 
of information about the user’s browser and operating system is sufficient to 
uniquely identify each browser. In 2010, Eckersley first demonstrated that the 
technology was highly effective through the Panopticlick project 10. Recent works 
have demonstrated that today fingerprinting is as effective on mobile devices as 
it is on computers, in particular thanks to recent web technologies (e.g., HTML5 
brought highly discriminating attributes) or websites where a user is connected.
These practices, source of major privacy leaks, raise two complementary and 
complex questions: how to detect them and how to protect oneself?
With stateful web tracking, explicitly blocking third-party cookies within the 
browser configuration or adding ad blocker extensions help a lot. Although not 
perfect, these techniques correctly detect and disable the most common and 
intrusive trackers [MHB+17].
Concerning protection against stateless web tracking (fingerprinting), disabling 
JavaScript is efficient but not practical. The automatic tracker detection question is 
complex and there is no precise methodology today. Most detection methodologies 
ignore many trackers because they only check access to fingerprinting-related 
APIs in the browser or apply very basic static analysis. Language-based security 
techniques can be used to go further: a monitoring is put in place to analyze how 
10. https://panopticlick.eff.org/ 
[MHB+17] Georg Merzdovnik, Markus Huber, Damjan Buhov, Nick Nikiforakis, Sebastian Neuner, Martin 
Schmiedecker, and Edgar R. Weippl. Block me if you can: A large-scale study of tracker-blocking tools. In 2017 
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P 2017, Paris, France, April 26-28, 2017,  
pages 319{333, 2017.
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much information is actually leaked from fingerprinting-related APIs and whether 
this information is sufficient to uniquely identify a user. Another approach consists 
in adding browser diversification at the virtual machine and API levels: by intro-
ducing enough noise during the fingerprinting process, trackers can be fooled.
The previous protection techniques were at the client initiative. Website 
owners may also be interested in protecting their users from web tracking (e.g., 
the GDPR makes website owners liable for the third-party tracking present on 
their websites). This is the goal of newly proposed architectures where additional 
servers automatically intercept and modify web requests thereby preventing 
third-party tracking.
Finally, it should be noted that the business model of web sites is oen based 
on advertisements and blindly blocking everything harms content providers. 
Hence the question of user control and responsible choice: rather than trying 
to block all trackers, authorize some of them, for instance those present on web 
pages considered as less sensitive.
 5.3.5 Hidden privacy leaks: the smart world 
Beyond web tracking, the advent of intelligent and connected devices 
 considerably expended the opportunities to collect personal data, both in  volume 
and precision, encompassing domains that were up to now out of reach.
Smartphones have played a key role from this point of view. These personal 
assistants, easily personalized with applications, always connected, equipped with 
a large variety of high precision sensors, contain and generate a lot of information 
about our activities and centers of interest, both in the cyber world (Internet) 
and the physical world. Smartphones therefore have become ideal targets. The 
 smartphone ecosystem consists of many actors, from application developers 
to advertisers. However, personal data collection is mainly orchestrated by the 
Advertising and Analytics (A&A) companies 11, also known as “third parties.” In a world 
where free  applications represent a large part of the offer, the A&A  companies have 
 developed small tracking soware that developers are invited to integrate within 
their  applications in order to monetize them. These trackers collect personal data 
from several billions application sessions every day and send them to the A&A 
 companies in order to create user profiles whose accuracy keeps increasing every day.
Arguably, collecting personal data in exchange for free applications or 
 services could be acceptable if this collection was documented in a privacy 
 policy  notice,  respectful of the laws of the country where the user resides, and 
if it was  implemented in a “privacy by design” manner with data minimization 
and  accountability guarantees. But many studies report that the opposite is 
taking place. A&A companies tend to collect as much personal information as 
11. http://www.mobyaffiliates.com/guides/mobile-advertising-companies/
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 technically possible 12. However, major differences exist between the various 
operating systems (OS), depending on the decisions taken by the OS editor with 
respect to user tracking possibilities and user control (e.g., in 2013 Apple has been 
the first company to ban the access to stable identifiers and to replace them by 
a dedicated Advertising Identifier, under full user control).
Today the craze for “quantified self” wearable devices, smart home appliances, 
smart cities, and connected cars, or more generally “Connected Devices,” enables 
the collection of personal data in new domains 13. This is all the more worrisome as 
part of data being collected is Sensitive Personal Information and many connected 
devices remain highly vulnerable.
If the business model of companies selling connected devices is different 
from those of smartphone application developers, little is known about the 
actual practices in terms of confidentiality and data exchanges. Also, the privacy 
notice that should be provided with each connected device in order to inform the 
user is oen missing or is unreadable for non-lawyers. The end-user is therefore 
prisoner of a highly asymmetric system.
Academic work is needed in these domains to understand the various facets 
of the problem, including the underlying business models. By giving transparent 
 information of hidden behaviors, by highlighting good and bad practices, by  proposing 
methods to improve transparency and user control, the ultimate goals of these 
works are to reduce the information asymmetry of the system, to  empower users, 
and hopefully to encourage certain stakeholders to change practices.
 5.3.6 Hidden privacy leaks: the case of the Internet 
The Internet, as a complex assembly of diverse technologies, also features 
privacy risks for the users. This section discusses risks associated to the access 
network, to the Domain Name System (DNS) that is central to almost every  activity 
on Internet, and finally to phishing protection services that could be turned into 
privacy intrusive tools.
WIRELESS ACCESS NETWORKS 
In wireless access networks the traffic carried over the wireless link is in  general 
protected by security mechanisms like WPA in IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) networks. 
However, the headers and the content of management frames is not protected 
and is thus available to snoopers. The exposure of this information poses serious 
privacy threats that are made critical by the massive adoption of portable devices 
and the development of wireless networks.
12. For instance the InMobi company has been condemned in 2016 by FTC  
(https://www.c.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/mobile-advertising-network-inmobi-settles-c-
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More precisely, Wi-Fi enabled devices scan for nearby access points by sending 
probe requests. These probe requests can include the name (SSID) of the network 
to which the device has been associated in the past. In that case, the SSIDs emitted 
by a device reveal a lot of personal data, like travel history and identity, and one 
can also infer social links between users. Another aspect with 802.11 frames is the 
MAC address, a globally unique identifier tied to the device. Using this identifier, it 
is possible to detect the presence of people and track them in the physical world.
The opportunity of tracking smartphones users has been seized by  corporations, 
leading to the rapid growth of cyberphysical tracking systems. For instance, they 
are deployed in commercial centers to measure and analyze client movements 
and habits, and attempts have been made to deploy such technologies within 
public equipment in order to display targeted advertising. Measures taken by 
these corporations supposedly to anonymize data and reduce privacy risks have 
proven to have a limited impact.
Solutions to enable privacy preserving analytics for this kind of applications 
are thus needed. A promising approach is to use probabilistic data structures 
based on Bloom-Filters that include a perturbation mechanism to enforce strong 
privacy guarantees while allowing the accurate estimation of the number of 
detected device identifiers. In response to tracking issues, Wi-Fi vendors started 
Picking up IoT waves – © Inria / Photo C. Morel
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 implementing MAC address randomization, a technique in which a random and 
temporary pseudonym replaces the real MAC address in the IEEE 802.11 frames. 
Despite the adoption of this Privacy Enhancing Technology, studies have shown 
that it may still be possible to track users through active attacks that force 
 devices to reveal their real MAC address and through fingerprinting attacks based 
on content and probe request timings that could be used to single-out devices.
A lot remains to be done for Wi-Fi and similar wireless technologies in  order 
to reduce the privacy risks associated with their use; this remains an active 
 research topic.
CORE INTERNET SERVICES 
Beyond the access networks, the DNS protocol, central to the Internet (see 
§2.2), does feature privacy threats that remain unsolved. The progressive transition 
to the “DNS Security Extensions” (DNSSEC) version solves some of the related 
security threats, however it does not address confidentiality requirements. For 
instance, even in the presence of DNSSEC, an eavesdropper present between a 
client and its DNS resolver will be able to analyze DNS traffic and identify most 
of the visited web sites, even in case of encrypted HTTPS web traffic 14. This leaked 
information is considered as personal data (it is associated to a physical person) 
and tells a lot on the user centers of interest. Other risks are discussed in [Bor15].
Several directions are under consideration in the context of the “DNS PRIVate 
Exchange” (DPRIVE) IETF working group 15, leveraging on encrypted  communications 
(e.g. over TLS or DTLS). Research is still needed as practical considerations make 
the real-world situation more complex than it may seem.
MALICIOUS ACTIVITIES DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Browsing the web can lead users to visit malicious websites. The Safe Browsing 
techniques have been setup in order to detect blacklisted URLs (e.g., websites known 
to be involved in phishing attacks or to contain malware). Although very useful to 
the end-user, these  services are also potentially dangerous from a privacy point 
of view. Storing the whole list of blacklisted URLs on the host is impossible, and 
relying on an external service to check visited URLs is too intrusive (the service 
provider would be in position to collect all the URLs visited by a user). Therefore, 
intermediate solutions are used in practice, and there is a need to carefully analyze 
them from a privacy view point.
14. 4DNS traffic between clients and their DNS servers traditionally goes through UDP communications,  
incompatible with TLS protection. 
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The Google Safe Browsing service, in turn reused by most web browsers, has 
been studied from the privacy perspective. Although the company probably did 
their best to anonymize data and be privacy compliant, this Google service lacks 
transparency and accountability. More generally opening and discussing their 
technology with independent, trusted third parties would be highly beneficial.
 [ Research challenge 9 ] Towards a privacy preserving smart connected world 
Our connected world experiences an unprecedented growth in terms of personal 
data collection, with practices that are increasingly intrusive for the citizen’s intimacy. 
Surfing the web, using smartphones and other smart devices, driving a connected —and 
soon to be autonomous— car are activities that generate personal data leaks. The lack 
of transparency (many services and devices behave as black boxes) and lack of user 
control (how to express consent or opposition when there is no information, nor user 
interface) are major issues.
Identification of such hidden behavior is hindered by the number and complexity 
of underlying technologies specific to each domain. For instance, identification of 
tracking practices in a web page requires advanced JavaScript execution analyzes, while 
 monitoring of smartphone applications needs dedicated frameworks, and monitoring 
of certain wireless communication technologies remains mostly unsolved. The analysis 
of these data flows is required to assess potential privacy leaks, e.g., in a smart home.
Such challenging and diverse research activities are essential to bring transparency, 
highlight good and bad practices, and enable regulators to enforce data protection laws. 
As such, this research directly helps in the shaping of our future smart connected world.
 [ Inria teams ] Privacy analysis of existing systems 
↗ The CIDRE team works on user control in the context of social networks. The team 
has proposed a classification of existing social networks based on the type of imple-
mentation (centralized versus distributed) of their functionalities (e.g., communication, 
search, or storage).
The team also worked on location privacy, producing the GEPETO tool a whose goal is to 
enable a user to design, tune, experiment, and evaluate various sanitization algorithms 
and inference attacks and evaluate the resulting trade-offs between privacy and utility.
↗ the COMETE team works on location privacy, proposing the notion of geo-indistin-
guishability [ABCP13], that extends differential privacy to distance metrics: the precise 
location of a device is protected through the addition of controlled noise to the reported 
position. The team has also developed a tool based on geo-indistinguishability, called 
Location Guard b, a browser extension that allows to protect the user’s location while 
accessing location-aware websites, by adding controlled noise to it.
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↗ the DIVERSE team works on web browser fingerprinting. The Am I unique website c 
demonstrates how the situation evolved with the most recent web technologies (e.g., 
HTML5 brought highly discriminating attributes) and shows that fingerprinting is today 
as effective on mobile devices as it is on computers, albeit for different reasons. In order 
to protect against fingerprinting, the team also works on browser diversification, with 
the FPRandom proof of concept d.
↗ the INDES team works on analyzing various forms of web tracking in web applications. 
In a joint work with PRIVATICS, the team also demonstrated that web browsers can be 
fingerprinted through the extensions e that the user installs and the websites where 
they are logged. Finally, the team proposes a server-side technique to protect against 
web tracking: two additional servers respectively rewrite and redirect the original web 
application requests to prevent third-party tracking automatically f.
↗ the PESTO team works on privacy in online social networks, with the goal to inform 
users of latent information that can be inferred from their published information.
↗ the PRIVATICS team works on privacy threats introduced by the information society, 
in particular for biometry, web tracking, smartphones, smart world (IoT), wireless access 
networks, or malicious website detection systems. The goals are to understand the 
situation, analyze the threats, and if applicable design privacy preserving solutions to 
prevent or mitigate them.
For instance, the team proposed a general framework for the specification and  formal 
reasoning of biometric architectures, and applied it to several architectures for biometric 
access control. The team also contributed in [CM17] to the secure electronic document 
systems (TES) debate. Through the MyTrackingChoices project, the team proposed a 
new type of ad blocker that lets the user choose which website categories can track 
them or not. The team also worked on the subject of smartphone and smart world 
(IoT) privacy, following a multidisciplinary approach with lawyers and economists, and 
on the questions of transparency and user control inside a smart city. Finally, the team 
pioneered the problem of privacy leaks within wireless access networks and developed 
the Wifiscanner g and Wombat h Wi-Fi scanning/tracking tools.
↗ the SPIRALS team works on analyzing web browser fingerprints, in particular its 
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In this chapter we look at cybersecurity under the angle of applications. We 
focus on a few selected domains where cybersecurity is likely to have a strong 
impact. We selected in particular security sensitive domains:
• infrastructures: the Cloud, Soware-Defined Networks (SDN), as well as the 
blockchain;
• critical and cyber-physical systems: the Internet of Things (IoT) and industrial 
systems;
• application areas: medicine, robotics (including connected autonomous vehicles), 
and machine learning (ML).
This list is of course not exhaustive, but it illustrates well that many  systems 
and application areas are security critical and that security considerations must 
necessarily be included in the design process. The categorization into  critical 
 infrastructures, critical systems, and critical applications areas is also not  absolute — 
for instance, medical implants are cyber-physical systems — and critical  applications 
may of course build on critical infrastructures or systems.
6.1  Critical infrastructures
Communication infrastructures are primarily designed to offer a service, oen 
with usability and efficiency as their primary goals. However, security is also crucial 
as these infrastructures may be used for storing and manipulating sensitive data. 
Loss of availability (or simply efficiency) and integrity of data may also have strong 
economic impact. We will focus on three examples of such critical infrastructures: 
the Cloud, soware-defined networks, and the blockchain.
 6.1.1 Security and privacy in the Cloud 
 [ Summary ] 
Security remains an obstacle to a wider adoption of Cloud services by organizations 
for their critical services. Privacy has also become an important issue for Cloud users 
in the IoT era. Hence, a major challenge for Cloud providers is to provide their users 
with both security services with associated guarantees in SLAs and privacy preserving 
computing and data storage services. Security and privacy issues are exacerbated 
in the context of distributed Clouds, AKA. edge and fog computing. Trust and other 
security assumptions change over time owing to changes in the technology and the 
 discovery of new vulnerabilities. These evolutions have led necessarily to the  appropriate 
evolution of the threat models in Cloud security considering not only attacks on the 
tenant operating system but also attacks on the hypervisor. Securing hypervisors and 
operating systems and proving security properties on them appear to be timely and 
important research topics.
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Security is one of the main concerns in the adoption of the Cloud model 1. The 
hardware and low-level soware infrastructure is owned and governed by the 
Cloud provider while customers outsourcing their information system have the 
control on the services and the OS running in their virtualized infrastructures. 
Server virtualization enables the execution of different OS’s and/or applications 
from different tenants on the same server in a datacenter. This multi-tenancy 
situation entails specific security and privacy threats.
Cloud environments face multiple security threats originating from  different 
 privilege levels (application, network, and operating system levels) in the 
 infrastructure. In an IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) Cloud environment, the 
 attack surface is expanded with the addition of the highly privileged hypervisor, as 
the building block of a Cloud infrastructure, as well as its web-exposed management 
API. In such a context, security concerns two different actors: tenants, and providers.
Tenants are concerned with the security of their outsourced assets, especially 
if they are exposed to the Internet. Attacks targeting traditional information 
systems could also target applications running inside virtual machines in an 
outsourced infrastructure.
The provider is also concerned about the security of the underlying  infrastructure 
especially since it has no insight regarding the hosted applications and their 
workload. In a Cloud environment, security threats originating from  corrupted 
tenants against other legitimate tenants and their resources, threats against the 




provider’s infrastructure as well as threats towards the provider’s API should be 
considered. Cloud providers need to assess security risks taking into  consideration 
the hosted virtualized infrastructures and vulnerabilities in  virtualization 
 technologies. They need to know which virtual machines can interact via network 
protocols.
In IaaS Clouds, the Cloud provider manages the Cloud’s security monitoring 
infrastructure while Cloud tenants manage their outsourced information system.
Security monitoring is essential in Clouds. A specific challenge is to ensure that 
the security monitoring infrastructure is automatically reconfigured when Cloud 
dynamic events (e.g., VM migration) happen. Tenants are incited to trust the 
provider’s claim (e.g., infrastructure availability) thanks to the assurance given by 
Service Level Agreements (SLA’s), making a trade-off between tenant’s disclosed 
private information and the monitoring service offered.
Although multi-tenancy maximizes efficiency for the Cloud provider’s resources, 
it also offers the possibility that a tenant’s VM can be located in the same  physical 
machine as a malicious VM. This in turn engenders a new threat: breaking the 
resource isolation provided by the hypervisor and the hardware and gaining  access 
to unauthorized data or disturbing the operation of legitimate VMs. One of the 
most prominent attacks that illustrates this threat is the side channel attack 
where an adversary with a collocated VM gains access to information belonging to 
other VMs (e.g. passwords, cryptographic keys). For example, the attackers could 
use shared CPU caches as side channels in order to extract sensitive information 
from a collocated VM.
Cloud providers are usually assumed to be “honest but curious”: given their 
privileged position with respect to their tenants either a malicious provider or 
a provider whose system becomes compromised could threaten their tenants’ 
privacy. Virtual machine introspection mechanisms can be used by the Cloud 
provider to monitor the tenants’ virtual infrastructure. Outsourcing data in the 
Cloud means delegating control over data to the provider. Cloud customers have 
little to no control on where or for how long data is stored and to which third 
parties it is forwarded. Moreover, the Cloud provider may provision resources 
located in different countries with different data regulations resulting in data 
protection depending in where data is stored and this is oen transparent to 
Cloud customers.
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 [ Inria teams ] Security and privacy in the Cloud 
↗ The AVALON team is interested in the modeling of application security properties 
and their automatic enforcement for applications executed in Clouds. They proposed 
a specification-driven approach where the security is expressed as properties in a 
mechanism agnostic language to facilitate the expression of the user’s requirements 
for both the application and its security resulting in the Sam4C toolbox. They also 
developed mechanisms to provide automatic application deployment and automatic 
enforcement of its security, with proven properties. .
↗ The CASCADE team works on privacy for the Cloud, designing a new generation of 
secure multi-party computation protocols enabling computation on encrypted data.
↗ The CIDRE team investigates security assessment in Clouds considering virtualization 
technologies, hypervisors and SDN, in connectivity extraction in Cloud infrastructures 
and Cloud-specific vulnerabilities in attack graph generation.
↗ The MYRIADS team aims at integrating security monitoring terms in IaaS Clouds’ SLA’s 
and designing a self-adaptable Cloud security monitoring infrastructure. The team has 
designed one such framework that is able to alter the configuration of its components 
and adapt the amount of computational resources available to them depending on 
the type of dynamic event that occurs in a Cloud infrastructure.
↗ The STACK team has proposed a compositional approach to the declarative and correct 
composition of privacy-preserving applications in the Cloud. The proposed approach 
provides language support for the composition of three techniques: symmetric cipher, 
vertical data fragmentation, and client-side computations to make Cloud applications’ 
privacy preserving. The team also studies isolation threats in containerized  environments 
investigating side-channel attacks in the context of edge Clouds.
 6.1.2 Security of Soware-Defined Networks (SDN) 
 [ Summary ] 
The sowarization of networks is the ongoing evolution in the networking field. The 
goal is to enhance flexibility and reduce costs. However, these evolutions centralize 
the control of a network, providing a single point of failure for the attacker to target. 
Moreover, the network sowarization enables a better coupling between the network 
and applications thanks to diverse API’s. While previously restricted to a limited 
 number of actors, these API’s significantly ease the development of applications, but 
also create a new attack surface.
Major evolutions have recently occurred in networking technologies. A shi 
towards the sowarization of networks deeply changed the network architectures 
and operations. The most notable emerging paradigms are SDN (Soware-Defined 
6.1_Critical infrastructures
128
Networking) and NFV (Network Function Virtualization). SDN advocates a logically 
centralized and powerful controller to replace distributed algorithms (the former 
panacea) leaving only forwarding purposes to network devices. NFV enables any 
kind of network function to be run as a virtual machine, supposing some central 
controller or management plane to orchestrate the function’s deployment. It is 
thus well aligned with the cloudification of everything. Although core networks 
will continue to rely on high-end specific network hardware, the sowarization 
of networks naturally relies on standard servers in a datacenter-like architecture. 
The final objective is to enhance flexibility in network operations and to reduce 
the costs substantially. However, there are inherent security-oriented challenges 
related to this paradigm shi.
Centralizing the control of a network reduces the attacker’s focus and increases 
vulnerability: the attacker may efficiently disrupt a network by compromising a 
central controller, while distributed algorithms are more robust against  individual 
attacks. Targeted denial-of-service against a single controller may provoke a 
 severe impact. New technologies, new frameworks, and new protocols come 
along with these new paradigms to integrate as many functionalities as possible, 
thus increasing the attack surface. Guaranteeing the security and detecting the 
misuse of these protocols is of paramount importance.
In addition, the softwarization of networks will enable a better coupling 
between the network and applications thanks to diverse API’s. Development of 
applications will no longer be restrained to a very limited number of actors as is 
currently the case with hardware appliances produced by very few  manufacturers. 
Strict quality control will need to meet the market’s usability and flexibility 
demands. Hence, runtime application behavior can mistakenly or intendedly 
lead to open security breaches in network. Moreover, such breaches may be 
the consequences of a set of applications that are only problematic when used 
 co-jointly. Verifying policies and detecting configuration anomalies in sowarized 
networks must take into account that configurations are dynamic, using only 
static  analysis is thus not appropriate. Service Function Chaining (SFC) consists 
in chaining  multiple virtualized network functions (VNF) to deliver innovative 
services, including for instance security services (firewall, intrusion detection, 
deep-packet inspection, proxy, etc.); several chains could even share some VNF’s.
NFV enables a higher flexibility and should make network functions more 
elastic. However, network functions can be collocated on the same physical 
 machines. As the core idea is to take network functions off-the-shelf, knowing or 
predicting exact behavior is challenging. Moreover, expected short development 
and deployment cycles can be the source of dangerous behaviors, mistakenly or 
intendedly introduced. Checking and evaluating the output of a network function 
from a security perspective is essential. Several approaches can be leveraged: 
 static code analysis if possible, dynamic analysis, or testing. Furthermore, isolation 
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between collocated network functions is primordial. Whereas VM isolation has 
been largely studied in the past in order to render sustainable the Cloud model, the 
game changes when it comes to virtualizing network functions. Indeed, achieving 
line-rate operations leads to relaxing strong isolation properties and thus can 
lead to security problems. A good trade-off between security and performance 
needs to be found and might be adjusted depending on the criticality of the 
VNFs. Detecting and preventing a misbehaving VNF (Virtual Network Function) 
that impacts the operation of a collocated VNF is necessary. Similarly, the VNF 
deployment may integrate security constraints rather than just being seen as a 
pure resource allocation problem.
 [ Inria teams ] Security of Soware-Defined Networks 
↗ The COATI team focuses on optimizing resources used by forwarding devices in SDN. 
The goal is to be able to store more forwarding rules in a compressed manner while 
maintaining acceptable performance and limited control overhead.
↗ The DIANA team contributes to the definition of new solutions for the SDN and 
NFV paradigms that take into account security considerations. In addition, the team 
 evaluates the performance of related technologies and so, indirectly, their ability to 
resist to heavy loads created by denial-of-service attacks.
↗ The RESIST team works on the definition and testing of new network  programming 
 abstractions. Runtime and in-switch execution of VNF’s need a new data plane 
 abstraction. Since isolation between VNF’s may not be guaranteed, it becomes necessary 
to introduce safeguards and methods to predict execution time and dependencies.
↗ The RESIST and VERIDIS teams both aim at checking SFC’s by translating  complex 
policies into a formal representation. Verification is needed to detect potential 
 inconsistencies due to the distributed deployment of multiple SFCs.
 6.1.3 Blockchain 
 [ Summary ] 
By proposing a trusted, append-only and immutable ledger with various models for writing 
and managing it (fully decentralized, permissionless, permissioned, consortium, etc.), 
blockchains enable many applications relying on this new security feature and its related 
infrastructures. Yet, their real security and level of trust need to be properly  asserted with 
analysis both from the cryptography and distributed systems communities. Also, as with 
any Internet system, blockchains can suffer for instance from low-level network attacks, 
soware bugs, or failures, that can appear when blockchains are used for higher-level 
applications (smart contracts). Additional features such as strong privacy and anonymity 
may also conflict with security requirements from public and legal bodies.
6.1_Critical infrastructures
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A SECURITY PROMISE 
The quite trendy and emerging blockchain technology, first put in place by the 
Bitcoin protocol, is a security promise. A blockchain, in any of its variants, implements 
a secure electronic ledger, a functionality similar to existing ledgers managed by banks, 
notaries, states, etc., providing the main security property that data registered in the 
ledger cannot be removed or modified. Indeed, the blockchain provides integrity of 
past history, relying on the notion of  cryptographic hash functions: the hash of the 
last trusted block certifies the integrity of the whole ledger since its inception.
SECURITY OF THE LEDGER 
Such a ledger can be guaranteed by a single, centralized entity, trusted for 
 certifying the last block of data on a regular basis [HS91] and for regularly  publishing 
chained integrity checksums of the ledger. Decentralizing the role of certifying 
the blockchain is the main innovation of Bitcoin. The decentralization could 
follow a peer-to-peer model, with unregistered, unknown, and untrusted nodes 
(i.e., permissionless as in Bitcoin or Ethereum). The decentralization could also 
follow a permissioned model, where either some participants are known to have 
the role of signing the last block while controlling each other (e.g., Hyperledger, 
industrial blockchains), or participants are unknown stakeholders that are believed 
to certify the ledger honestly to protect their stake.
As a consequence, the security analysis of a blockchain depends on the 
 social and political model underlying the blockchain: the Bitcoin blockchain 
can be attacked by a powerful adversary controlling 51% of the computing 
power of the Bitcoin network (Namecoin has exhibited this weakness [ANSF16]); 
 consortium blockchains can be completely and quickly rewritten if signing keys 
are  compromised; and blockchain with stakes encounter the risk a non rational 
stakeholder acting against their own financial interests.
DYNAMICS OF THE PROTOCOL 
Besides the integrity properties of the ledger, the problem of dynamically 
 determining the current data block to be appended to the ledger brings into focus 
the domain of distributed algorithms, where issues of liveliness and correctness 
are central. Since the blockchain is replicated between participants, it is crucial 
that all have the same view of the blockchain: failing to do so allows an attacker 
to profit from the divergent views of the blockchain. While most blockchain 
protocols establish that the views are the same aer a certain period of time, 
there is always a period of instability before the agreement is reached. Attacks 
[HS91] Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta. How to time-stamp a digital document. Journal of Cryptology, 
3(2):99-111, January 1991. 
[ANSF16] Muneeb Ali, Jude Nelson, Ryan Shea, and Michael J. Freedman. Blockstack: A global naming  
and storage system secured by blockchains. In 2016 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 16), 
pages 181-194, Denver, CO, 2016. USENIX Association.  
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can thus arise (for instance double spending) and non-cryptographic issues from 
distributed algorithms need to be addressed.
NETWORK ATTACKS 
Network issues are oen not considered, but blockchains can suffer from 
low-level network attacks. Their security cannot be solely guaranteed by the 
crypto graphic protocol itself. Recently, it has been proven that the mining power 
of bitcoin networks is very unbalanced and that a network-level attack is possible 
through the partitioning the overlay network (BGP hijacking) [AZV16]. No exhaustive 
 assessment of network-level attacks and their impact on the blockchain  security 
and  performances has as of yet been realized. A threat assessment model needs to 
be established and adapted to each blockchain technology. Security can be improved 
by adding either security mechanisms by design (network-level  requirements, such 
as topology constraints) or counter-measures at runtime (coupling between the 
network and the blockchain). First, a monitoring scheme is needed to assess the 
security of a blockchain. Second, dynamic mechanisms such as blacklisting nodes 
or  strengthening the consensus model can be dynamically applied (programmable 
networks, with flexible configurations will be helpful). Blockchain-specific network 
policies could be defined, deployed, and verified automatically, for example assuming 
cooperation between autonomous systems exchanging BGP route information.
SOFTWARE FAILURES 
A blockchain system has to be implemented in soware, as must be applications 
using blockchains. These implementations can encounter the same problems as 
any system, such as bugs, attacks, undefined behavior, and so on. These issues are 
much more critical for blockchains, however, because their applications handle 
currency and securities. This means any issue will have direct financial impact, 
giving cyber-criminals strong economic incentive to find or create such issues. 
Furthermore, applications must cope with notoriously error-prone features 
such as concurrency, distribution, authority, and secrecy. While there have been 
no major issues with the Bitcoin or Ethereum systems per se, both clients (the 
MtGox exchange) and applications (the DAO) have suffered devastating breaches.
BLOCKCHAINS AS BUILDING BRICKS FOR HIGHER LEVEL PROTOCOLS 
A blockchain can be used as a building block providing a ledger, on which 
 higher level programs and protocols can be implemented. For instance, Ethereum 
envisions the blockchain as storage with integrity for data and programs, where 
programs can be activated for writing and updating data on the blockchain, 
while not erasing past versions. Similarly, Bitcoin has a weak, yet useful, notion 
[AZV16] Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, and Laurent Vanbever. Hijacking bitcoin: Large-scale network attacks on 
cryptocurrencies. CoRR, abs/1605.07524, 2016.
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of programmable money that allows for instance off-chain transactions and 
cross-chains atomic swaps. Even when considering the underlying blockchain as 
a perfect cryptographic ledger primitive, developing higher level programs and 
protocols has the same pitfalls as developing high level cryptographic protocols 
given simple basic blocks. Because privacy is lacking by default in permissionless 
blockchain, some efforts have been made to ensure privacy using zero-knowledge 
proofs and other advanced cryptography (Monero, Zcash). At this point, monitoring 
requirements or legal constraints, e.g., KYC (Know You Customer), are conflicting 
with the privacy provided by strong cryptography, but this conflict can sometimes 
be dealt with, depending on the blockchain model.
 [ Inria teams ] Blockchain 
↗ The ANTIQUE team is conducting research on the semantics, abstraction, formal proof, 
and automatic analysis of systems, together with verification of security properties, 
on distributed data-structures and consensus protocols.
↗ The AVIZ team develops visualization tools and exploration methods for the  interactive 
analysis of complex and large data sets, in particular the Bitcoin blockchain.
↗ The CASCADE team is doing cryptography with rigorous security proofs and has an 
expertise in protocols for e-cash (centralized and decentralized “cryptocurrencies”) 
and privacy tools for blockchains.
↗ The CIDRE team is designing distributed agreement algorithms to improve security, 
performance, and scalability of permissionless blockchains by focusing on both the 
 underlying peer-to-peer networks and the structuration of the information in blockchains.
↗ The COAST team is doing research on safe and secure peer to peer data sharing 
and service composition for collaborative environments without a central authority.
↗ The DELYS team does research on distributed systems, from theory to algorithms 
to implementations, including blockchain as a core mechanism where they work to 
improve its performance and scalability by reordering operations without  compromising 
safety and by interoperation between blockchains.
↗ The GRACE team studies privacy and secure multiparty protocols and how they can 
be used in the context of blockchains, as well as coding theory for distributed storage.
↗ The PROSECCO team works on the analysis, design and implementation of security 
protocols based on blockchain technology, e.g., smart contracts, through the use of 
formal methods, soware languages and tools.
↗ The RESIST team is designing novel approaches to monitor and configure the 
blockchain infrastructure (network, Clouds, etc.) in order to enhance or guarantee 
performance and security. In addition, the team also investigates blockchain-based 
management to address the evolution of the Internet ecosystem.
↗ The SPECFUN team is doings formal proofs of mathematical theories, as well as formal 
analysis of Ethereum environment and other blockchain enabled execution models.
↗ The TOCCATA team promotes formal specification and computer-assisted proof in the 
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development of soware that requires a high assurance of its safety and correctness.
↗ The VERIDIS team studies mechanized verification techniques applied to concurrent 
and distributed algorithms and systems. It is interested in precise formulations of 
the algorithmic problems that arise in the context of blockchains and corresponding 
verification problems.
6.2  Critical and cyber-physical systems
Critical systems are systems that require very high reliability, because failure 
could have extremely harmful consequences, such as endangering life, causing 
severe damage to an infrastructure, or cause important economic loss. However, 
most safety-critical systems are also security critical and must resist a cyberattack.
A related concept is that of Cyber Physical System (or CPS for short). Wikipedia 
defines a CPS as a mechanism that is controlled or monitored by computer-based 
algorithms, tightly integrated with the Internet and its users. In cyber- physical 
 systems, physical and soware components are deeply intertwined, each 
 operating on different spatial and temporal scales, exhibiting multiple and 
distinct  behavioral modalities, and interacting with each other in a myriad of 
ways that change with context. CPS’s are oen part of critical systems, which must 
be secured. Composed of many interconnected subsystems, running  different 
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protocols for communication at different scales, they offer a large attack surface. 
Besides, some of them are exposed targets because a successful attack, such as 
shutting down part of a state infrastructure, may have a huge economic and 
political impact. Hence, cybersecurity is now oen an essential issue for CPS.
While cybersecurity of CPS may reuse traditional approaches, methods, and 
techniques for securing systems and networks, new approaches will also have 
to be developed to cope with dynamicity and to analyze and ensure their safety 
and security in this context. Interestingly, these might be inspired by reactive 
security, where monitoring and reaction to abnormal situations will take a more 
important place – and machine learning is likely to take an increasing important 
role that will, of course, introduce its own security issues.
 [ Note ] CPS vs. embedded systems 
CPS generalizes the much older concept of embedded systems in many ways. An 
 embedded system also implies an interface between the digital and the physical world 
and emphasizes the temporal issues, but it focuses on individual components rather 
than the whole system and the interactions between its many components—and, 
 oen, humans as well. For example, the ABS (Anti-lock Braking System) is an embedded 
system—and thus also a CPS, while a power plant controller is a CPS, involving many 
other subsystems. A large majority of computer devices in use today are actually parts 
of embedded systems or CPS.
 6.2.1 Security of Internet of Things (IoT) 
 [ Summary ] 
The IoT revolution is extending the Internet at a rapid speed and is changing the way 
the world interacts with physical devices. Security and privacy considerations put this 
revolution at stake. IoT applications are not just yet another instantiation of previously 
known distributed systems: their specificities, in particular the resources-constrained 
nature of devices, present new challenges for security that need to be addressed and 
classical security solutions are not always applicable. Several research directions need 
to be explored, in particular: secure operating systems and firmware update capabilities, 
lightweight and hardware-assisted cryptography, wireless technologies security and 
privacy, IoT dedicated security and privacy policies, IoT intrusion detection methods, 
secure programming languages and compilers for IoT applications, and dedicated 
authentication protocols.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of embedded physical devices, 
equipped with sensors, actuators, processing, storage, and connectivity that 
allows these things to connect and exchange data (Wikipedia). IoT applications 
belong to a wide variety of domains, from patient health (e.g., smart pacemakers), 
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quantified-self devices (e.g., activity tracking watches), to home appliances (e.g., 
smart thermostats, plugs, or bulbs), cars (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle emergency 
 systems), and industrial systems (e.g., SCADA). Because IoT enables a more direct 
integration of the physical world into computer-based systems, the IoT has been 
labeled 2 the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
However, concerns about IoT security, or the lack thereof, and privacy, since 
personal and sometimes sensitive personal data is exchanged, put this revolution 
at stake. For instance, the Mirai botnet (§1.3) involved a large number of  c onsumer 
devices (including vulnerable IP cameras) to launch massive Distributed DoS 
attacks. Similarly, users’ privacy is at risk when companies treat security as an 
aerthought (as was the case with some Internet connected sex toys 3).
A first IoT specificity is the resources-constrained nature of devices. Micro-
controllers in IoT devices are architecturally very different from a typical PC in 
terms of storage and CPU capabilities 4. Certain IoT devices or components will 
be stringently constrained not only by low energy consumption but also limited 
resources. These ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost devices operate on batteries 
with limited capacity or even harvest energy from the surrounding environment 
(e.g., light, heat, or vibration).
These specificities led to the design of dedicated operating systems to 
 handle different embedded architectures. Popular IoT operating systems include 
Contiki 5  (initiated at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science), Mbed OS 6 (ARM), 
RIOT 7 (initiated by Inria, Freie University of Berlin, and Hamburg University of 
Applied Sciences), and Zephyr 8 (Wind River Systems, Linux Foundation, Intel, 
NXP Semiconductors, et al.).
Another specificity is the heterogeneous nature a global IoT application. 
Covering the spectrum from microcontrollers to the Cloud, an IoT application 
 potentially includes code that runs in web clients, on servers, as well as in  embedded 
devices. IoT applications must handle a wide variety of asynchronous events: 
queries to distant services, answers, timeouts, and errors. In turn, each event may 
launch calculations that trigger a cascade of new events.
Bringing security and privacy to IoT is challenging, the attack surface being 
important and classical security solutions not always applicable. Among the 
research directions to be addressed, we can mention the following:
2. Source: the World Economic Forum 
3. https://blog.trendmicro.com/penetration-testing-researchers-successfully-hack-a-vibrator/ 
4. For example, RAM and Flash storage are 106 times smaller in an Arduino Uno microcontroller and its processing 
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SECURE SOFTWARE UPDATE CAPABILITIES 
The secure deployment of soware updates on IoT devices, and in  particular 
the firmware itself, is a mandatory feature of any secure operating system. 
Unfortunately, this key feature is oen compromised by the desire to keep device 
complexity and energy consumption as low as possible, or simply by bad practices. 
In addition to academic work, the Soware Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) 9 
IETF working group investigates this question, focusing on an architecture that is 
agnostic to the communication technologies and protocols (e.g., CoAP or HTTP).
LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY AND HARDWARE-ASSISTED CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Regarding the cryptographic building blocks, embedded device constraints 
can require the use of lightweight cryptographic primitives. This topic is discussed 
in §3.1.3.
IoT devices will also benefit from the design of specific hardware architectures 
and soware optimizations of lightweight cryptography, including protection 
against side-channel attacks and fault injection. These objectives require an 
efficient platform based on:
• hardware accelerators (crypto-processors) for security functions (e.g.,  symmetric 
and asymmetric cryptography, hashing, authentication, signature, or random 
 number generators), with a specific focus on energy efficiency and ultra-low-power;
• specialized crypto-processor designs, such as randomization, that protect against 
attacks;
• compiler optimizations targeting resource-constrained crypto-processors;
• hardware accelerated dynamic binary translation (DBT) as a mean to enhance 
soware protection;
• and new techniques for efficient hardware protections against side-channel 
attacks and fault injection, both in soware and hardware.
The global aim is to propose an energy-efficient crypto-processor with an 
instruction-set architecture that can be configured at runtime.
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES SECURITY 
IoT communications leverage both on standard wireless technologies (e.g., 
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth) and on low power technologies (e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy 
(BLE) and Zigbee), as well as low-power wide area networks in unlicensed bands 
(e.g., LoRa 10 and SigFox 11) and in licensed bands (the promising 5G that also aims 
at connecting IoT devices). Work is in progress with respect to the security and 





IOT DEDICATED SECURITY AND PRIVACY POLICIES 
Another challenge is the design of IoT dedicated security policies that prevent 
attacks exploiting the exposure of the system to physical hazards or resulting in 
physical consequences.
IOT INTRUSION DETECTION METHODS 
Another challenge for IoT security is the design of IoT intrusion detection 
techniques to stop malware and other attacks, for instance based on the device 
activities in IoT networks (§4.4).
SECURE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND COMPILERS FOR IOT APPLICATIONS 
Programming an IoT application is complex because of the mix of technologies 
involved and the languages used, and taking security and privacy into account 
adds another level of complexity. Several frameworks meant to simplify IoT 
development exist, however they are not always designed with security in mind 
and can present serious security risks. Therefore, there is a need to develop a 
secure and privacy-preserving programming language and framework for the IoT. 
The formal verification of IoT soware, starting with its cryptographic library, is 
another possible research direction.
DEDICATED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
Finally, the combination of resource-constrained devices and IoT  heterogeneity 
requires novel authentication protocols to provide a simple, secure, and 
 privacy-friendly way of seamlessly authenticating individuals and their smart 
devices online.
 [ Inria teams ] Security of Internet of Things 
↗ The ANTIQUE team is working towards analyses based on abstract interpretation 
for IoT programs.
↗ The CAIRN team tackles the question of improving energy efficiency through the 
use of flexible hardware accelerators. It proposes to rely on morphable hardware, 
whose structure can be efficiently reconfigured at runtime, for example to specialize 
the hardware to the application it executes, adapt the accelerator parallelism for 
 performance or resource usage. The team also explores hardware accelerated dynamic 
binary translation.
↗ The CELTIQUE team is working on the formalization of the Hop.js semantics in Coq 
as well as on formal verification of program analyses for the IoT.
↗ The FUN team is working on the verification of the Contiki system as well as on 
intrusion detection techniques for the IoT.
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↗ The GRACE team participated in the design of several targeted cryptographic  primitives 
for microcontrollers, notably qDSA, a signature scheme for IoT, now included in the 
RIOT operating system.
↗ The INDES team is working on the development of a secure compiler and on the 
enforcement of privacy policies for Hop.js, a programming language for the IoT.
↗ The INFINE team leads the RIOT a open-source IoT operating system development 
along with the Freie University of Berlin and Hamburg Univ. of Applied Sciences. Work 
is under progress on supporting secure firmware update facilities for RIOT.
↗ The KAIROS team is working on formal model-based co-design techniques for 
 real-time and security aspects of the IoT.
↗ The PETRUS team is working on adapted strategies to stock data in IoT objects 
instead of sending the data to the servers.
↗ The PRIVATICS team is working on privacy considerations and privacy preserving 
systems for the IoT.
↗ The PROSECCO team is building HACL*, a verified cryptographic library that is already 
included in RIOT and work is underway on a lightweight version for resource-constrained 
IoT devices.
a. https://www.riot-os.org/
 [ Research challenge 10 ] Securing the Internet of Things (IoT) 
Security in IoT is a major challenge: attacks are still relatively easy (many devices have 
not been designed with security in mind), invasive (e.g., pervasive in our lives), and 
potentially with a major impact due to the multiplication factor made possible by the 
large number of devices available and to the direct implications some of them have 
in the physical world (e.g., connected cars). The research directions are manifold, with 
for instance the ability to securely update embedded devices’ soware, the design 
of lightweight cryptographic primitives adapted to limited resources, the analysis 
of the security of new low-power wide area wireless technologies, the detection and 
mitigation of intrusions or misbehaving devices, and the need for secure-by-design 
frameworks, protocols, and operating systems.
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 6.2.2 Security of industrial systems 
 [ Summary ] 
Cybersecurity of Industrial Systems is an emerging topic and recent cyberattacks on 
industrial systems show that the problem is open. One of the main difficulties in dealing 
with industrial systems is that they fail the security-by-design principle: since they 
were not intended to be exposed on Internet at the origin, the protocols used are not 
secure; sometimes specifications are not publicly available; general-usage firewalls 
and intrusion detection devices are not handling industrial protocols. End devices are 
built with slow processors unable to use standard cryptographic protocols and thus 
require dedicated ones.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
(IACS) include a large variety of industrial digital data acquisition, control, and 
monitoring systems together with their underling communication networks. 
Two system architectures are currently used: DCS (Distributed Control System) 
and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), although SCADA tends to 
supersede DCS.
Cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems is a relatively recent  application 
field. Communications in traditional industrial systems were achieved through 
small size networks using proprietary protocols. They were submitted to hard 
real-time constraints and not interconnected with IT systems or the Internet. 
Therefore, traditional cybersecurity in industrial systems was achieved by 
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 isolation and obscurity, using proprietary protocols. Modern and large-scale 
industrial  systems such as power grids, nuclear plants, or hydraulic dams have 
global control optimization needs that require interconnexion with supervisory 
control  applications, distributed data-base systems, and, consequently,  long-range 
communication, standard data-exchange formats and interoperability. The 
 paramount communication paradigm in the modern industrial systems is the 
convergence of the Information Technology (IT) and Operation Technology (OT), or 
said otherwise, the interfacing between TCP/IP networks and real-time  proprietary 
protocols. The counterpart of IT pervasion in the OT area is that the OT is now 
exposed to cyberattacks in the same way as the IT. Moreover, as the OT still heavily 
relies on legacy protocols they are even more vulnerable. However, for almost a 
decade (1995-2003), the cybersecurity of the industrial systems was largely ignored.
The initiating event of the industrial systems cybersecurity research was the 
Northeast blackout of America in 2003. Although not the result of a cyberattack 
(for memory, the blackout was due to a wrongly calibrated sensor and a chain of 
IT bugs), this event demonstrated that a false data injection may exploit several 
vulnerabilities to shutdown 256 nuclear plants and blackout 55 million people 
in the US and Canada. Little progress was made until 2010 while the reality of 
the threat was not formally proved. Aer the occurrence of Stuxnet in 2010-
2011 important research programs were started. Further events like the string of 
attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015-2016 increased the importance of 
industrial cybersecurity programs.
The IT cybersecurity solutions do not apply directly, due to the specificities 
of the industrial systems. Below is a list of so spots of the ICS communication.
• Insecure and unsecurable protocols: legacy protocols were not designed 
for  security; moreover, they are also intended to be used with very low speed 
 processors, which rules out the use of cryptographic protocols.
• Unavailable specifications: some legacy protocols are still proprietary and the 
full specifications are not disclosed.
• Many versions: some legacy protocols are intended to be extended by  constructors 
with their own messages.
• Large attack surface: the end devices (e.g., programmable logic controllers) oen 
act as network gateways between several legacy networks.
• Process-oriented attacks: the legality of a network packet depends on the state 
of the underlying physical system or the frequency of the packet. For example, 
opening a feeding tap of a tank will be harmless if the tank is at an intermediate 
level but may damage the plant if the tank is full. Similarly, Stuxnet only modified 
the value of an otherwise legal control command. Indeed, repeatedly starting and 
stopping an actuator may eventually damage it.
Process-oriented intrusion detection is an important topic in the ICS cyber-
security area.
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 [ Inria teams ] Security of industrial systems 
↗ The CIDRE and CTRL-A teams developed an approach based on monitoring the process 
specifications. Process specification are safety properties expressed in Linear Temporal 
Logic (LTL). They are automatically mined from execution traces, then monitored by 
runtime verification techniques. Alert correlation between process monitors, a white 
list network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and a pattern IDS are used to reduce the 
number of the false positives. The approach is validated on an ICS testbed.
↗ The CTRL-A team has also developed a testbed and demonstrators of attack/defense 
in industrial systems and smart-grids. On the protocol vulnerability research side, the 
CTRL-A team worked on a vulnerability of the real-time protocol in IEC 61850 networks, 
demonstrating the attack, and proposed an IDS module in BRO.
 [ Research challenge 11 ] Secure Industrial Systems 
Industrial systems rely more and more on soware mechanisms that can be attacked. 
Their security has thus become a major issue, especially since the consequences of an 
attack against such systems can be dramatic. Although traditional security approaches 
seem applicable to the case of industrial systems, their specificities require reviewing 
the traditional security mechanisms to adapt them to this new context. In particular, 
the communication protocols used in this context cannot be modified overnight. 
There must be a transition during which legacy communications should be embedded 
in secure protocols. In addition, real-time control of the system is usually required. 
Security must thus also be applicable in real time. Finally, it is oen impossible to 
modify industrial devices. Therefore, preventive security mechanisms cannot be used. 
It is then mandatory to use reactive security and thus extremely important to study 
how effective attack detection mechanisms could be deployed in this context.
6.3  Critical application areas
Some application areas are particularly security sensitive. Medicine is one 
example, as medical data is extremely sensitive and attacks on medical apparatus 
and implants could endanger life.
Finally, machine learning has recently become extremely popular in many 
different areas. Even though it is not an application area in itself, it is an interesting 
case study for security: machine learning techniques may be misled by so-called 
adversarial examples and present privacy risks when trained on sensitive data.
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 6.3.1 Medicine 
 [ Summary ] 
Medicine is being significantly transformed by the digital revolution, and is  therefore 
also increasingly exposed to cybersecurity threats. One threat is the leakage of  sensitive, 
medical data. As this data is extremely useful for research, the compromise between 
privacy and utility is of particular importance. Medical apparatus, such as surgical 
assistant robots, are increasingly connected. Similarly, medical implants offer wireless 
connections to avoid unnecessary surgeries, increasing the attack surface in a similar 
way as for CPS and IoT.
Medicine, as many other domains, is being significantly transformed by the 
digital revolution and is therefore also increasingly exposed to cybersecurity 
threats. While cybersecurity in medicine is not much different from  cybersecurity 
in other domains, many aspects of cybersecurity are actually more sensitive in 
medicine, because medicine ultimately involves human lives, for which there is 
no price and thus no acceptable risk. This of course applies when an attack could 
endanger our lives, but also when it could leak our medical records that belong to 
the class of Sensitive Personal Information and thus are subject to very  protective 
regulations (see chapter 5).
Therefore, looking at medicine as an application domain is instructive. Although 
privacy has long been a serious concern in medicine, it is still a challenging issue; 
other aspects of cybersecurity that could endanger our lives due to malicious 
actions are oen underestimated.
In fact, while safety has always been part of the medicine culture, where all 
possible precautions are taken to save our lives, security is usually not much of a 
concern, because hospital and care centers are normally considered a sanctuary 
where there is no place for crime. This may be changing with the digitization of 
medicine, as attacks may be conducted remotely, from outside of the hospital.
There are mainly three kinds of threats: privacy leaks, malicious actions on 
medical apparatus, and attacks on implants.
PRIVACY LEAKS 
Our concern —and thus our awareness— for privacy leaks is much higher than 
for malicious actions, probably because even before digitization, we have always 
treated health information as very private and personal. However, medical data is 
being more and more centralized and stored for very long periods, hence, despite 
our awareness, this remains a critical issue that has not yet found an acceptable 
compromise.
Although medical data is highly sensitive and should not be leaked, the 
 increasing amount of medical data over a person’s lifetime and on a very large 
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population constitutes precious information for medical research. Indeed, a 
 medical study based on a few tens or hundreds of patients is far from statistically 
sufficient. We will soon have the possibility of analyzing not only thousands or 
even millions of records, but also records containing extremely rich information 
for which machine learning techniques could reveal interesting correlations 
between pathologies and physio-biological factors. Even though keeping medical 
data private and decentralized would be a good answer to privacy preservation, 
it could be a hindrance to medical progress, given the considerable potential 
impact access to this data could have for medical discoveries.
MEDICAL APPARATUS 
Health care is an important user of digital equipment. If it has long been the 
case with imaging equipment, it has recently spread to all kinds of monitoring, as 
well as robotic surgical assistants. All these systems are of course interconnected, 
which increases the attack surface. There are no particularities to mention about 
the apparatus except that in general cybersecurity threats and sometimes even 
the safety of these devices are not given sufficient attention.
IMPLANTS 
More worrying are medical implants (running the gamut from pacemakers, 
insulin implants, or audio implants to artificial hearts) that nowadays can be 
controlled remotely, allowing for the adjustment of parameters without a surgical 
intervention. This automatically exposes them to cybersecurity attacks as for Cyber 
Physical Systems (see §6.2). However, these implants are usually under  important 
size and energy-consumption constraints, oen making normal encryption 
techniques inapplicable, as is oen the case in IoT devices. Manufacturers then 
choose ad hoc solutions that are likely to be insufficiently secure.
 [ Inria teams ] Medicine 
↗ The work of the PETRUS team on private Cloud (§4.2.2) was originally motivated as 
a way to decentralize medical data, allowing everyone to hold their personal medical 
records and keep control on what, how, and by whom pieces of information can be 
accessed when necessary.
↗ The PRIVATICS and TYREX teams are jointly working on better compromises between 




 6.3.2  Robotics and connected autonomous vehicles 
 [ Summary ] 
We can partition robotics into four major application areas: self-operating robots (e.g., 
factory robots, robots to assist the elderly), remotely operated robots (e.g., surgical robots, 
drones), robotic-based transportation (e.g., terrestrial vehicles with or  without people 
inside), and large systems of robotic systems (e.g., smart cities). At Inria most research 
around cybersecurity and robotics focuses on connected autonomous vehicles (CAV’s). 
Connected cars are communicating with each other and also with external  objects. 
Due to legacy issues, architectures do not isolate critical parts from non- critical ones. 
This makes CAV’s vulnerable to both internal and external threats. Internal threats 
are generally due to soware bugs or unsecured channels. External ones are due to 
remote attacks exploiting communication channels. Current directions for avoiding 
these attacks tend to isolate the critical subsystems from non-critical ones.
Systems of connected robots are instantiations of the cyberphysical systems. 
Early examples can be found in factories and hazardous sites (e.g., nuclear or 
chemical plants). The closeness of humans and robots is getting tighter every day. 
Schematically, one may distinguish four application areas, which intersect partially: 
self-operating robots (e.g., factory robots, robots to assist the elderly), remotely 
operated robots (e.g., surgical robots, drones), robotics-based  transportation (e.g., 
terrestrial vehicles with or without people inside), and large systems of robotic 
systems (e.g., Smart cities). Of course, there is a non-empty intersection between 
systems of connected robots and IoT. Cyberthreats may lead to  undesired, possibly 
catastrophic and irreversible, outcomes in the cyberspace and in the physical space.
A recent study 12 from TrendMicro and Polytechnic University of Milan showed 
that industrial robots connected to the Internet are vulnerable and not secured. 
This security problem is also known for tele-operated surgical robots 13. Roboticists 
are paying increased attention to cybersecurity issues, due to emerging low-cost 
hardware and SoC’s that are changing the economic side of the equation. The 
possibility of having numerous affordable “smart nodes” (having low energy and 
computationally efficient cybersecurity services implemented on them) within 
networks of robots or IoT opens up new perspectives.
Currently, within Inria, the robotics-related domain where cybersecurity issues 






dedicated white book on this subject 14. In addition to onboard robotics, CAV’s will 
be equipped with radio devices enabling the exchange of data with other vehicles 
(Vehicle-to-Vehicle, or V2V, communications) as well as mobile access to Internet-
based services (Vehicle-to-everything, or V2X, communications). Furthermore, 
CAV’s will be equipped with internal sensors able to monitor passengers, in 
 particular their drowsiness. However, in current vehicles, all devices share the same 
 communication bus and most actuators (e.g., steering, brakes) are accessible via 
the onboard  diagnosis port. Moreover, current onboard systems are monolithic. 
Thus, existing CAV’s are vulnerable to both internal and external cyberthreats.
INTERNAL CYBERSECURITY ISSUES 
Internal issues are due to native attackers (faulty soware, back doors) and 
to intrusions via unsecured channels (viruses, malware). Intrusions may lead an 
otherwise honest vehicle to behave maliciously. This has been illustrated with the 
takeover of a Jeep Cherokee using a Trojan horse placed in an MP3 CD.
Cameras and diverse sensors installed within CAV’s raise specific privacy 
concerns. Who owns the collected data? What happens if the data is stolen? 
Also the underlying rationale where a passenger should be able to retake control 
 whenever necessary is not widely acknowledged, nor accepted, since human 
reaction delays are usually considered to be too high.
EXTERNAL CYBERSECURITY ISSUES 
External attacks can be performed remotely via V2X communications. 
Cybersecurity issues raised with V2X technologies are similar to those arising in 
any network services. And since V2X communications depend on intermediate 
relays (e.g., road-side units and telecommunication network nodes), without 
specific protection, they favor man-in-the-middle attacks and hence, message 
falsification, suppression, or spoofing.
In France, state authorities and insurance companies require authentication 
and non-repudiation for proper identification of responsibilities (e.g., in the 
event of an accident). Thus a state-issued certificate is stored in each vehicle 
in a tamper-proof device. For improving VAC safety, periodic beaconing is being 
considered. This implies the broadcasting of unencrypted position, speed, and 
direction several times per second. The real identities would be obfuscated using 
pseudonymity, i.e., reversible anonymity based on asymmetric cryptography 15. 
Unfortunately, it has been shown that frequent changes of pseudonyms do not 
prohibit linkability of CAV paths. This is a real privacy concern and beaconing has 
come under question.
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To avoid the above attacks scientists and manufacturers are defining 
 partitioned architectures comprised of two subsystems. A Safety Critical  subsystem 
is in charge of critical V2V messaging, processing, and cooperative driving. A non-
safety  critical subsystem, isolated from the critical part, is in charge of services 
based on V2X communications (e.g., infotainment, traffic and road conditions, 
free  parking places, personal messaging). The safety critical subsystem will be 
endowed with the capability of inspecting V2X messages received by the non-
safety critical subsystem, prior to importing them for further processing.
 [ Inria teams ] Connected autonomous vehicles 
↗ The CIDRE team currently works on the definition of an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) that could be integrated on the next generation vehicle architecture. Several 
paradigms (network vs host-based IDS, anomaly vs detection) should be explored in 
the CAV context.
↗ The RITS team is conducting research on safety critical subsystems and protocols 
for vehicular communications. The goal is to enable the prevention of attack, their 
 immediate detection, and that render eavesdropping and tracking unfeasible and useless. 
In addition to pseudonymity, anonymity (non-reversible obfuscation of  identities) of 
message senders has been shown to be feasible by forming trusted ad hoc vehicular 
sub-networks spontaneously. Onboard systems come with a “stealth mode” option 
(no sending of V2X messages), for increased privacy.
 6.3.3 Machine learning based technologies 
 [ Summary ] 
Machine learning is used in an increasing number of applications, including e- commerce 
and recommendation systems, advanced language translation mechanisms, spam 
or parental filtering tools, as well as self-driving cars and cyber physical systems in 
general. The deepest impact so far is certainly in speech and image recognition, but 
other areas are also significantly impacted. Machine learning techniques suffer from 
two main threats in relation to cybersecurity. The first one, called adversarial machine 
learning, consists in adding carefully designed noise (barely visible to human eye) to an 
image, leading to misclassification. The second one is related to privacy and consists 
in extracting information about training data from a trained network.
Machine learning (ML) based technologies now form the backbone of a quickly 
growing number of organizations and services. These include e-commerce and 
recommendation systems, advanced language translation mechanisms, spam or 
parental filtering tools, as well as self-driving cars. Millions of users interact on a 
daily basis with such systems, transparently, without even noticing.
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There is one domain where convolutional neural networks and deep learning 
strategies have had a profound impact: computer vision. Traditional problems 
such as precise image classification or fine grain object detection and labeling in 
images have recently made enormous progress, with state-of-the-art approaches 
outperforming by far older methods and even surpassing human capabilities for 
specific domains.
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING 
Recent research has shown that such machine learning approaches can be 
subverted when a small amount of carefully-designed, imperceptible adversarial 
noise is added to the input data. Such a perturbed image, called an adversarial 
example, is in turn typically misclassified, although the perturbation is barely 
 visible to human eyes. Adversarial perturbation generalizes surprisingly well across 
different input images, classifiers, and models, even when trained on diverse 
learning sets; worse, this phenomenon is not particular to deep learning and can 
be observed even with simpler classifiers. In addition, given some input data it 
seems to be relatively easy to compute a small perturbation of that input that will 
be misclassified. These alarming observations have many practical implications 
in an area where machine learning technologies are ubiquitous.
Ongoing research at Inria focuses in part on convolutional neural networks 
and follows several directions. It is necessary to gain a better understanding of the 
weaknesses of deep learning strategies, to analyze what kinds of attacks are possible 
and propose mechanisms for protecting convolutional neural networks against 
adversarial attacks. It is important to gain insight on why adversarial  perturbations 
generalize so surprisingly well. Another approach is to monitor the internal  activations 
that flow between the layers of a deep network, in order to observe where spurious 
artefacts take place, whether or not this is related to the dimensionality of the 
intermediate vector representations. It is certainly worth observing the effects 
of defensive strategies such as distillation on these flows to see why it makes the 
overall process more robust. Furthermore, it seems essential to connect adversarial 
perturbations to the subspace that corresponds to natural images, the subspace 
where classifiers are trained. This may facilitate the identification of unnatural 
images that in fact belong to different subspaces. Yet, adversarial natural images 
do exist and succeed in subverting the detection systems. Considering subspaces 
is therefore not the ultimate solutions for making systems more robust.
Finally, while most research currently focuses on images, other modalities 
such as adversarial text or adversarial audio are likely to raise a whole new set 
of difficulties which also have to be addressed. Domains that are outside multi-
media are likely to face similar sensitivities to adversarial behaviors as they also 
heavily rely on machine learning, e.g., applications for spotting intruders from 
the network analysis or applications dealing with biometric traits.
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PRIVACY ISSUES AND MACHINE LEARNING 
Using machine learning techniques also raises privacy problems. In addition to 
the use of machine learning techniques to infer possibly sensitive data, machine 
learning also raises the question as to whether an attacker who has access to the 
trained network can gain information about the training data. Different scenarios 
can be distinguished according to whether an attacker is granted white-box (giving 
access to the neural network internals) or black-box access to the network, and 
whether their aim is to extract training data or simply decide whether a given 
input was part of the training data. These privacy properties have been stated in 
terms of differential privacy, introduced in the area of database anonymization 
(discussed in §5.2.2). In the worst case, the attacker may gain access to the stored 
training data itself. This raises the additional questions on how to transform the 
data prior to storage, so as to discard any private information that is useless for 
the task at hand, and how to train in a distributed online fashion, in order to avoid 
storing all data in a single place which increases the risk of a security breach.
 [ Inria teams ] Cybersecurity and machine learning 
While adversarial machine learning is oen considered as a cybersecurity issue, as it can 
be used to attack critical systems that use machine learning techniques, it is actually 
quite different from traditional cybersecurity attack techniques, and therefore, mostly 
tackled by teams working in machine learning. Conversely, the privacy issues raised by 
machine learning are typically cybersecurity ones.
↗ The COMETE team is interested in the privacy aspects of machine learning, in  particular 
through the use of differential privacy.
↗ The LACODAM team, working in machine learning, is also considering applications 
to cybersecurity.
↗ The LINKMEDIA team investigates adversarial machine learning issues that go 
beyond adversarial computer vision and considers for instance adversarial audio, 
adversarial video, adversarial Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR), or adversarial 
Natural Language Processing (NLP). Adversarial machine learning is also considered 
from the perspective of each modality, as well as considering truly multimodal inputs. 
The team also considers a wide range of applicative goals that go beyond classification 
and include adversarial retrieval.
↗ The MAGNET team works on privacy considerations in machine learning, in the 
context of decentralized learning where several actors collaborate to improve the 
model without leaking personal data, or in datamining of mobility traces.
↗ The MULTISPEECH and MAGNET teams work on privacy-friendly speech  recognition. 
The goal is to train a speech recognition system on users’ speech data without 
 disclosing information about the identity, the traits (e.g., gender, age, or ethnic origin), 
or the states (e.g., health or emotional state) of individual users. To do so, the teams 
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 investigate  adversarial learning (which is seen here as a solution rather than a problem), 
 decentralized training, and formal privacy frameworks such as differential privacy.
↗ The ORPAILLEUR team is interested in the privacy aspects of machine learning.
↗ The PRIVATICS and TYREX teams are jointly working on privacy preserving  decentralized 
or federated machine learning, in particular in the context of large medical databases.







7.1_Academic forces at Inria and in France
 [ Summary ] 
France is one of the major European actors in cybersecurity. Its academic workforce 
consists in almost one thousand people, including researchers, faculty, postdoctoral 
fellows, Ph.D students, and research engineers.
Almost 25% of the French academic activity in cybersecurity is conducted at Inria 
within joint teams with other academic institutions, primarily CNRS and universities, 
where on average only half of the staff is from Inria. This gives Inria a leverage effect 
and makes it one of the main French academic actors in cybersecurity. Inria’s forces 
in cybersecurity represent about 7% of its total activity.
A large and visible effort, both at Inria and in France, is dedicated to cryptography 
and formal methods applied to cryptographic protocols and privacy. Hardware security 
is also well represented in France, but with very few forces are Inria. Work on network 
security, system security, and, more generally, on reactive security are, however, under-
represented both at Inria and in France given the increasing challenges of cybersecurity 
for critical infrastructures and the arrival of the Internet of Things.
Education in cybersecurity is becoming a key challenge, at all levels. Inria contributes 
to education via the advising of Ph.D students, many of whom will later be working 
in state bodies or private companies. Transfer via the creation of startups does exists, 
but is not as of yet an important vector.
French academic forces in cybersecurity are rather well organized and coordinated, 
in particular via the dedicated pre-GDR and Allistene working group. However, there is 
still insufficient interaction and coordination between the industry and academic forces.
Although cybersecurity is usually well recognized as a priority in France, in Europe, 
and worldwide, it is important that France also reinforces its financial support to 
 maintain its leading position and its capacity to seize economical opportunities.
7.1  Academic forces at Inria and in France
 Research organization and forces 
Research at Inria is organized into small teams sharing a common research 
project, which are oen joint teams with other academic institutions such as 
CNRS, Universities, specialized engineering schools, or other research institutes 
(INRA, INSERM, etc.). On average, about half of the research staff in Inria teams 
are from partner institutions, giving Inria a leverage effect. Hereaer, research at 
Inria always means research in Inria’s teams including partners. The average size 
of a team is 18 people—counting researchers and faculties, postdoctoral fellows, 
Ph.D students, and research engineers—but with a large variation, ranging from 
3-5 persons for the smallest teams up to 45-50 for the few largest ones.
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Cybersecurity has been one of Inria’s research priorities for the last fieen 
years 1. Cybersecurity now covers 7% of Inria’s activity, with about 30 teams working 
in this field 2, two thirds of which have cybersecurity as their unique or primary 
research topic. Altogether, this amounts to about 200 full-time  positions. This 
represents a fourth of the French academic forces in cybersecurity. The other main 
academic forces are scientists from CNRS and faculty members from  universities 
and engineer schools hosted in CNRS UMRs 3 but outside of the Inria teams, 
 faculty members from the Institut Mines Telecom (IMT), and CEA scientists. French 
 academic forces in cybersecurity have roughly doubled in the last decade. This 
growth is continuing but at a smaller pace. While there are some new hires, the 
growth is mostly due to researchers and faculty members moving to cybersecurity 
from other fields of computer science (see §1.1).
 Research domains 
Figure 8.1 describes the proportion of research activities between the main 
domains of cybersecurity at Inria, in red, and in all French academic entities taken 
together, in blue. The comparison is instructive. Cryptology is a strength of Inria, 
with a third of its workforce. This results from Inria’s long involvement in number 
theory, computer algebra, cryptanalysis, and coding theory. Indeed, Inria plays a 
key role worldwide in the design of new cryptographic primitives or protocols 
and the cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives.
Figure 8.1: Main topics in cybersecurity by % of French academic forces 4
1. Security was extensively discussed in Inria’s Strategic Plan for the period 2003-2007. 
2. All Inria teams working in cybersecurity are listed in Appendix A. 
3. Mixed (organization) Research Units. 
4. Source: cartography of French academic forces in cybersecurity done by the the Allistene Alliance’s working 
group on cybersecurity, see https://www.allistene.fr/files/2018/03/VF_cartographie_2017-06-13.pdf.
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Figure 8.2: Geographic breakdown of academic cybersecurity forces
5. https://www.tracip.fr  
6. The activities in forensics in France are probably underestimated, since the gures do not cover research in 
humanities.
The next most important research domain at Inria is formal methods applied 
to security and privacy. As explained in §1.1, this is largely due to the transfer of 
competences coming from formal methods combined with the fact that Inria, 
and France in general, are very well-positioned in the area of formal methods. 
Conversely, hardware and system security are underrepresented at Inria, but this 
area is still well-covered elsewhere in France at CEA, CNRS, and IMT. Notice that 
there is very little research at Inria on forensics. Nevertheless, in a collaboration 
with tracIP 5 the RESIST team works on the development of a forensics platform 
dedicated to industrial control systems. Outside of Inria, research on forensics 
does exist in France 6.
Figure 8.2 describes the geographic breakdown of academic research forces 
in France. The unit of measure is ETP, which amounts to a full time research 
activity. This shows that besides Paris the main forces in cybersecurity are in 
154
Brittany (Brest and Rennes) and in the Rhone-Alpes region (Lyon and Grenoble). 
Next comes Nancy and the Côte d’Azur (Nice and Sophia Antipolis). For Inria, the 
forces are in the Paris region (Ile de France) and then comes Rennes and Nancy.
 Non academic forces 
There are also important non-academic research forces. Indeed, research is also 
conducted in private companies, although it is usually more applied. Moreover, 
there are institutional bodies, such as DGA 7, which is part of the French ministry 
of armies, and the ANSSI 8, the French cybersecurity agency, which is part of the 
SGDSN 9 placed under the Prime Ministry, which have toplevel cybersecurity 
 expertise, including some research activity, and play a key role in defining and 
conducting the French cybersecurity policies. There are also some laboratories 
depending on the Ministry of the Interior, such as the CREOGN 10. Research  regarding 
privacy issues and regulations are also conducted in the LINC 11  innovation lab of the 
CNIL12, the French data protection authority. Inria teams regularly have scientific 
collaborations on some specific projects with most of these organizations.
 Community animation 
There are also a number of associations that play an important role in the 
animation of the cybersecurity community. The CNRS has created a pre-GDR13 
on cybersecurity 14 in 2016, whose purpose is to animate the French academic 
community in cybersecurity, in particular via the organization of workshops or 
summer schools.
The Allistene alliance 15 has created a working group on cybersecurity 16 where 
Inria and the main academic actors have representatives and whose aim is to 
 exchange information, to build a shared vision, to conduct general-purpose studies 
such as the cartography of academic forces described above, and to coordinate 
actions like the participation of the Allistene members to the FIC17.
Finally Inria is part of the working group devoted to research and innovation 
of the CoFIS (Comité de la Filière industrielle de sécurité), whose main role is to 
foster the French security industry by proposing targeted actions to increase both 
competitiveness and security at the national and European levels.
7. Direction Générale de l’Armement. 
8. Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information. 
9. Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale. 
10. Centre de recherche de l’Ecole des officiers de la gendarmerie nationale 
11. Laboratoire d’Innovation Numérique de la CNIL 
12. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
13. A GDR (Groupement De Recherche) is a structure lead by CNRS to animate the French scientic academic 




17. Forum International de la Cybersecurité
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Inria is also part of the ACN18 professional association whose role is to federate 
and represent the main industrial actors in cybersecurity. HEXATRUST is another 
important association composed of 29 SME’s in cybersecurity, where Inria (and 
academic research) is however not represented.
7.2  Education
Education is an important issue, as there is a huge lack of expertise in 
 cybersecurity at all levels, but high-level expertise remains the crux. This situation 
has been known for a few years, thus some engineering schools and universities 
have created new cybersecurity programs. Although Inria is not a university, 
education and knowledge transfer are still one of its important missions, and 
Inria  contributes to education in several ways.
Many Inria researchers are teaching advanced cybersecurity courses at 
 engineering schools and universities, especially in master-level courses, and in 
dedicated summer schools. Inria also created a couple of MOOCs on cybersecurity.
More importantly, most researchers are advising PhD students. Those that do 
not continue in academia will be hired by industry or other institutions; this is one 
of the most efficient ways of transferring expertise. The number of Ph.D students 
is about the same as the total number of researchers and faculty members, a 
proportion that is roughly the same for cybersecurity and other research domains. 
Since the industry is lacking cybersecurity experts, it is important to increase the 
number of students in cybersecurity at all levels, including Ph.D’s. Inria could 
 increase its number of Ph.D’s, but only if there is a corresponding increase in Ph.D 
funding for cybersecurity and in good Ph.D candidates. Hence, the main challenge 
remains to attract more young students to computer science in general and to 
cybersecurity in particular (see §8.2.4).
7.3  Inria’s impact in cybersecurity
France is one of the worldwide leading countries in cybersecurity. This strength 
is due to its academic forces including those at Inria. Besides strong research 
results and maintaining the highest level of expertise in most subdomains of 
cybersecurity, Inria’s research is also a key contribution to the community.
France and Inria have long been participating in cryptanalysis challenges, 
holding several factorization records. This effort is necessary to check the state of 
the art in cryptanalysis continuously, both in terms of algorithmics and computing 
power, and to recommend adjustments of cryptographic keys accordingly or a 
change of cryptographic primitives. This is a key contribution to the community.
18. Alliance pour la Confiance Numérique
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Researchers are also oen part of standardization committees, such as IETF. 
This is oen a time-consuming long-term effort but it is important to raise the 
quality of the standards.
 Inria’s startups 
In comparison with its research impact in cybersecurity, only a few startups 
in cybersecurity are directly emerging from Inria teams.
 CRYPTOSENSE 
Founded in 2013 and located in central Paris, Cryptosense19 is an academic 
spin-off of Inria and Ca’Foscari University of Venice. They develop soware based 
on the academic research carried out by Graham Steel and his colleagues from 
the Prosecco team and the former Secsi teams.
Their main product, Cryptosense Analyzer, discovers security flaws in crypto-
graphic systems using a variety of techniques. Cryptographic hardware is treated 
as a black box and tested using fuzzing techniques. The fuzzing results are used 
to infer a logical model of the device that is then analyzed by model checking. 
Cryptographic soware is tested by instrumenting calls to cryptographic  libraries. 
A model is inferred from these calls which is analyzed against a database of 
cryptographic usage rules. The libraries themselves are tested for a suite of 
cryptographic attacks.
Cryptosense soware is used by a number of international banks,  payment 
 providers, technology companies, government agencies, and hardware 
 manufacturers, in Europe and North America.
 CYBER-DETECT 
The Cyber-Detect 20 start-up was created from research on malware carried out 
in the former Carte team and continued in the Carbone LORIA team. Since several 
years, they developed a solution, dubbed morphological analysis, to analyze binary 
codes and detect malware. Morphological analysis is a method that consists in 
abstracting the control flow graph of a binary code and fully automatically build 
signatures from this abstraction. The recombination of signatures allows one to 
identify malicious functionalities. The resulting prototype is now commercialized 
by Cyber-Detect as a solution to help reverse analysis and forensics.
 LYBERO.NET 
The Lybero.net21 start-up, issued from the Inria Nancy – Grand Est research 
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distributed escrow that enables the recovery of a forgotten key (or any digital 
content) if a pre-defined quorum of administrators has been gathered.
The second service is CryptnDrive, a secure cryptographic driver that enables a 
secure and easy exchange of files within and outside an organization. Through a 
regular web browser, users can securely exchange important documents without 
ever exchanging any password with the remote destination, confidentiality being 
guaranteed by end-to-end encryption. Additionally, this service leverages on the 
quorum-based escrow in order to recover from lost credentials.
 MALIZEN 
Although many tools are used to secure our information systems proactively, 
we regularly see that attackers find ways to circumvent them or exploit flaws. 
Monitoring solutions allows one to detect, characterize, and respond to these 
intrusions in the majority of cases. However, it sometimes becomes necessary to 
handle exceptions or verify that these systems are functioning well. Faced with 
the masses of data collected from monitoring, security experts are oen poorly 
equipped and have difficulties to respond to security incidents.
Fuelled by the promising results of collaborative research projects between Inria 
and DGA-MI, Malizen22 is a startup whose goal is to equip experts in  cybersecurity 
with hardware and soware bricks to help them better respond to security 
incidents.
By using graphical user interfaces and data visualization, especially designed 
for cybersecurity, the experts are reintegrated into the analysis process. Those 
responsible for analyzing intrusions can explore their security data more intuitively 
and better understand critical situations.
Malizen is supported by Inria using research from the CIDRE team.
7.4  High Security Laboratories (LHS)
Inria has also two High Security Laboratories (LHS) located in the research 
centers of Nancy and Rennes that are shared with Inria’s local partners, CNRS 
and universities, and also supported by the Grand-Est and Bretagne regions, and 
DGA in Rennes.
Both LHS are in secured rooms. The Nancy-LHS has a network telescope that 
captures malware code and attack logs and permits experimenting with Internet 
probes. It has a closed network for sensitive experiments such as malware code 
analyses and an isolated room, not connected to the Internet, where highly sensible 
information can be processed and confidential hardware and soware experiments 
can be conducted. The Rennes-LHS hosts three platforms: one for experimenting 
22. https://malizen.com/
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with malware and ransomware infection and repair, which contains a database 
of computer viruses and ransomware; one for electromagnetic  observation and 







While cybersecurity was not an issue for the general public two decades ago, 
everybody is concerned nowadays: states, industries, and citizens. Cybersecurity is 
a hot topic with many economic, societal, political, or geopolotical security issues 
at stake and will very likely remain so in the next decades. We conclude this white 
book with the list of research challenges that we have identified and a few general 
recommendations related to the organization of research in cybersecurity and 
the interaction between researchers in cybersecurity and the society.
8.1  Research challenges
While the challenges identified throughout this white book are not the 
only  important topics, we believe them to be of particular importance and we 
 recommend they be treated as a priority. Therefore, and for convenience, we 
recall them below. Each challenge can be put in context in the section where it 
was first introduced.
 8.1.1 Hardware-targeted soware attacks (see 2.1) 
Attacks against information systems do not usually involve the hardware layer 
but exploit a soware vulnerability. However, recent attacks, such as Rowhammer, 
Spectre, or Meltdown, have shown that attacks implemented in soware can exploit 
performance optimizations of the hardware. This new type of attack is especially 
dangerous as it makes hardware attacks possible at a distance, as opposed to 
classical side channel attacks. It is not yet completely clear how the current proof 
of concept attacks can be “industrialized,” but they pave the way to a new class 
of serious attacks. Therefore we need to get a better understanding of how such 
attacks could possibly be deployed, propose a clear typology of this new kind of 
attack, and propose countermeasures, both at the hardware and the soware 
levels. This task requires expertise at the hardware, firmware, and operating system 
levels. The countermeasures can also be difficult to design as they may require to 
revisit crucial optimizations used for years, such as speculative execution.
 8.1.2 Security and usability (see 2.3.2) 
Very oen, when users request a service, they are willing to sacrifice security, 
and bypass an annoying security mechanism, if it prevents them from using the 
service. In order to avoid this problem, security must be as transparent as possible. 
Even though complete transparency is not always possible, security services must 
be as simple as possible to use. Work is needed to propose interfaces and security 
mechanisms that are suitable for nonexpert users, that ensure the user is well 
aware of the consequences of their actions, and that prevent users from making 
errors that compromise security. Designing such usable security mechanisms 
calls for interdisciplinary research typically including experts in cognitive sciences.
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 8.1.3 Post-quantum cryptography (see 3.1.3) 
Building a universal (as opposed to special purpose) quantum  computer is 
widely believed to become feasible in the next decades. Therefore, it is  important 
to think now about quantum-resistant cryptography, as some  information that 
is encrypted today may still be sensitive in, say, 50 years. Most asymmetric 
 cryptography used today is based either on the hardness of factoring or computing 
discrete logarithms, these problems are both known to be efficiently solvable by 
a quantum computer. Hence, there is a need for alternatives: lattice-based, code-
based, and multivariate-based primitives are the most prominent candidates. It 
is urgent to perform an in-depth security analysis of these new schemes.
 8.1.4 Computing on encrypted data (see 3.2.2) 
The need for computing on encrypted data has emerged, in particular, with 
the appearance of the cloud and outsourced computation. In cryptography, this 
problem can be solved using homomorphic or functional encryption. Gentry showed 
in 2009 in his breakthrough paper that it was indeed possible to construct a fully 
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. However, this construction remained 
theoretical and was completely impractical due to its poor performance. Since 
then, significant progress has been made on FHE schemes, achieving approximately 
a still very low speed of 50 logical gates per second. Significant progress will have 
extremely useful applications for privacy preserving cloud computing, where any 
technical advance may quickly be exploited as an economical advantage.
 8.1.5 End-to-end formally verified cryptographic protocols (see 3.3.4) 
As the security of cryptographic protocols is extremely difficult to ensure 
(pencil and paper proofs regularly contain errors), the use of rigorous, formal 
methods appears increasingly as the only way to achieve the expected security 
level for this class of systems. Therefore, the area of computer-aided security 
proofs is an increasingly important topic and must include all aspects from the 
specification down to the implementation. Recent work, in particular around 
TLS 1.3, have shown that this is now achievable.
However, such proofs still require carefully craed code and a very high 
 level of expertise. Leveraging the proof techniques to make them applicable to 
more general code and usable by a wider audience is now the main challenge. 
Different protocols oen ensure different security properties, but existing tools 
for verifying certain properties, such as anonymity, do not yet have the same 
maturity as tools for verifying authentication properties. Yet another challenge 
is to consider stronger adversary models, e.g., an adversary that may control part 
of the computer through malware.
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 8.1.6 Intrusion detection for encrypted networks (see 4.4.1) 
Nowadays, intrusion detection is essentially realized at the network level. If, 
as expected in the near future, the traffic were more systematically encrypted, 
which would of course be a good practice for security and privacy, the analysis of 
the network packets would become de facto inoperative, apart from the header 
analysis. Therefore, it becomes important to study and design new mechanisms 
for monitoring information systems and producing alerts, at the application, 
middleware, operating system, and even firmware or hardware levels.
 8.1.7 Understanding privacy and deriving practical tools (see 5.1.6) 
Understanding privacy principles and regulations is the foundation of any 
activity in privacy. Although this is not a new domain (e.g., the “Loi Informatique et 
Libertés” was adopted in 1978), this area has recently experienced major evolutions 
with the new GDPR European regulation and at the same time new opportunities 
to collect personal data. As a consequence, understanding the concepts and the 
regulation is a first necessity. Being able to derive practical tools is another one: 
even though the GDPR promotes several concepts and goals, it provides little 
guidance about the effective implementation of these new regulatory provisions.
In particular the GDPR introduced the right to data portability whereby a user 
can retrieve their data in a human readable and machine portable format. This right 
opens new research areas around individualized management and control over 
one’s personal data. The goal is to empower citizens to leverage their personal data 
for their own good, which calls for secure, extensible, and sovereign personal cloud 
platforms, three conflicting goals that open new research challenges (see e.g., §5.2.4).
 8.1.8 Open data and anonymization (see 5.2.3) 
Open data initiatives may sometimes mean releasing databases that contain 
sensitive, personal information. To ensure privacy of the individuals, data need to 
be anonymized. Robust anonymization, that effectively resists de-anonymization 
attacks, is an active and hot research topic. If differential privacy has become a key 
scientific tool to achieve provable anonymization guarantees, challenges remain 
on its application, for instance in order to improve the privacy/utility trade-off.
 8.1.9 Towards a privacy preserving smart connected world (see 5.3.6) 
Our connected world experiences an unprecedented growth in terms of 
 personal data collection, with practices that are increasingly intrusive for the 
citizen’s intimacy. Surfing the web, using smartphones and other smart devices, 
driving a connected —and soon to be autonomous— car are activities that generate 
personal data leaks. The lack of transparency (many services and devices behave 
as black boxes) and lack of user control (how to express consent or opposition 
when there is no information, nor user interface) are major issues.
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Identification of such hidden behavior is hindered by the number and 
 c omplexity of underlying technologies specific to each domain. For instance, 
identification of tracking practices in a web page requires advanced JavaScript 
execution analyzes, while monitoring of smartphone applications needs dedicated 
frameworks, and monitoring of certain wireless communication technologies 
remains mostly unsolved. The analysis of these data flows is required to assess 
potential privacy leaks, e.g., in a smart home.
Such challenging and diverse research activities are essential to bring 
 transparency, highlight good and bad practices, and enable regulators to enforce 
data protection laws. As such, this research directly helps in the shaping of our 
future smart connected world.
 8.1.10 Securing the Internet of Things (IoT) (see 6.2.1) 
Security in IoT is a major challenge: attacks are still relatively easy (many  devices 
have not been designed with security in mind), invasive (e.g.,  pervasive in our lives), 
and potentially with a major impact due to the multiplication  factor made possible 
by the large number of devices available and to the direct  implications some of 
them have in the physical world (e.g., connected cars). The research  directions 
are manifold, with for instance the ability to securely update embedded devices’ 
soware, the design of lightweight cryptographic primitives adapted to limited 
resources, the analysis of the security of new low-power wide area wireless 
 technologies, the detection and mitigation of intrusions or misbehaving devices, 
and the need for secure-by-design frameworks, protocols, and operating systems.
 8.1.11 Secure Industrial Systems (see 6.2.2) 
Industrial systems rely more and more on soware mechanisms that can 
be attacked. Their security has thus become a major issue, especially since the 
consequences of an attack against such systems can be dramatic. Although 
 traditional security approaches seem applicable to the case of industrial systems, 
their specificities require reviewing the traditional security mechanisms to adapt 
them to this new context. In particular, the communication protocols used in this 
context cannot be modified overnight. There must be a transition during which 
legacy communications should be embedded in secure protocols. In addition, 
real-time control of the system is usually required. Security must thus also be 
applicable in real time. Finally, it is oen impossible to modify industrial devices. 
Therefore, preventive security mechanisms cannot be used. It is then mandatory 
to use reactive security and thus extremely important to study how effective 
attack detection mechanisms could be deployed in this context.
8.1_Research challenges
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8.2  General recommendations
We give here a few general recommendations related to the interaction 
between researchers in cybersecurity and society, the organization of research 
in cybersecurity, and to conclude, the importance of cyber-resilience.
 8.2.1 Society should profit more from academic scientific expertise 
For most topics of cybersecurity, there are academics with very specific technical 
expertise who can provide useful scientific advice and who occasionally already 
do so. However, scientists are oen underrepresented in national or industrial 
advisory committees, in comparison to industrial members. Moreover, some 
positions or decisions taken, at different levels, show a lack of scientific advice.
 8.2.2 Transfer of expertise between cybersecurity and other domains 
The need for cybersecurity expertise is striking in most of its application domains, 
e.g., industrial systems, medical systems, robotics, and, perhaps even more crucially, 
IoT (see §6 for the complete list). Unfortunately, cybersecurity is not yet sufficiently 
identified as a priority in these domains, and thus not taken into account in early design 
stage of applications, failing to uphold the security-by-design principle. Conversely, 
research in cybersecurity sometimes needs more expertise in formal methods or 
artificial intelligence for instance. A transfer of expertise between  research teams in 
cybersecurity and these different domains is needed to turn the tide.
 8.2.3 Promoting security also as an experimental science 
System security and network security appear to suffer from a lack of prestige 
in the academic world, at least in France. This may be a cultural issue, partly due to 
the fact that research in these domains is more experimental and technological. 
Another concern is the lack of real-world datasets. For instance, intrusion detection 
and alert correlation suffer from a lack of real data on which it is possible to test 
and compare new mechanisms proposed by researchers. Helping researchers to 
access or generate such data appears crucial.
 8.2.4 Education 
Education is essential to security (see §1.3 and §2.3.3) and major  dissemination 
efforts should be made for all audiences: teachers, faculty members,  researchers, 
industrial actors, and specialists, to everyday citizens including young  children. 
Concerning  awareness, there is need for scientific mediation in cybersecurity, 
 targeting the society in  general, and with a special focus on scholars and  teachers 
in primary and secondary schools. On the professional side, Ph.D training in 
 cybersecurity areas is of course a natural education tool. But dedicated  professional 
master degrees or final-year programs of engineering schools could already bring 
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to students a clear vision of the possible future of information security (beyond the 
industrial state of the art). In this context, MOOCs could be an efficient  dissemination 
and education vector, as well as a major communication tool, as they potentially 
reach several thousand users during each MOOC session and require an active 
 participation from users.
 8.2.5 Cyber-resilience by design 
Many recent reports on the analysis of cybersecurity threats claim that states 
will have to face massive cyber attacks. Are we well-prepared to resist a cyber 
tornado? The resilience of critical infrastructures and, in particular, of operators 
of vital importance (OVI) is a real issue. A large part of this challenge is actually 
organizational and engineering-related, rather than academic—and the ANSSI has 
already spent many efforts increasing our resilience. Nevertheless, research can 
help: the security-by-design principle should also apply to cyber-resilience. This 
means that cyber-resilience should not be considered aer the fact, but taken 
into account from the initial design when constructing digital systems, networks, 
and digital infrastructure.
Moreover, many subdomains of cybersecurity are also indirectly implied in 
this challenge: reactive security or malware detection are of utmost importance; 
preventive security to ensure state-of-the-art protection levels is also relevant; 
formal methods including proofs of protocols, their implementations, as well as 
critical parts of operating systems can have a significant long-term impact on 
communication system resilience.
Final remarks
In recent years, a major national effort has been made to strengthen the 
security of the state and vital operators’ information systems. In particular, the 
ANSSI (Agence Nationale pour la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) and the 
DGA (Délégation Générale de l’Armement)—to give only two examples—have 
recruited many top talents to adapt their human resources to identified needs.
Nevertheless, even if the awareness of the importance of cybersecurity 
 research and training has increased, no such recruitment effort to enroll more 
faculty members and researchers has been made. In the area of cyberresilience, 
 human resources are essential: we therefore call for a continuation of the efforts 
 undertaken by some national institutions, and that these efforts be extended to 
research institutions, universities, and schools.
Similar to the countries making a significant effort to improve their cyber-
security capabilities, France should maintain or even reinforce its academic forces 
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